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NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

Monterey, California



THESIS

THE TWO FACES OF ITALIAN COMMUNISM:
THE SEIZURE OF POWER BY TACTICS OF
ACCOMMODATION AND THE CALCULATED
DESTRUCTION OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY
BY REVOLUTIONARY TRANSFORMATION OF SOCIETY

by

Richard Eric Coe


June 1977

Thesis Advisor:

R. H. S. Stolfi

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The evidence resulting from this study clearly indicates that there are definable characteristics of the Italian Communist Party which can be used to form the contextual basis for scenario-building and decision-making. The primary conclusion is that, inspite of its complex goals and tactics, the Italian Communist Party is more bound to the ideals of communism than to the principles of western liberal democracy.

The Two Faces of Italian Communism: The Seizure
of Power by Tactics of Accommodation and the
Calculated Destruction of Liberal Democracy
by Revolutionary Transformation of Society

by

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

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I. INTRODUCTION

In recent years much attention has been focused on the Italian Communist Party (Partito Comunista Italiano, or PCI) and the limelight is well deserved. Outside of communist-controlled countries it is the largest and most important communist party in the world. It has enunciated what has been called a "new" form of communism, Eurocommunism. This "new" form is primarily geared to tailoring the Marxist-Leninist revolutionary strategy to a modern industrial society without losing the attachment to international communism.

The success in developing a large party as well as the independence from, and criticism of, the CPSU has led to many analyses of the PCI. It has been dissected and probed but never looked at as the unique organization that it is. Unfortunately, the studies have tended to focus on minute aspects of Party life or projected future occurrences without presenting a factual analysis of the character of the PCI. This lack of a detailed study has led to many false assumptions about the ultimate goals and desires of the Italian Communists. Most studies either portray them as plodding party hacks who are clandestine subversives or, more recently, respectable politicians who are really social democrats. The first stereotype has generally been ruled out because of the tendency of communism as a whole to become Africanized, or Asianized, or in this case Europeanized. The second

characterization of the PCI is the most popular and has become the norm (especially for most major U.S. news services). The main reasons for this second characterization have been the expansion of detente and Western desires to gauge the PCI in democratic terms. Unfortunately, this "democratic cognitive set" has led the West to blur the struggle between the liberty of Western civilization and the "mediation of earthly paradise" of Marxism. Because of a lack of knowledge many Western elites have been unable to clearly discern the nature of the Communists' commitment to the total transformation of society and to the demise of the political state in Italy as it now exists. This in turn has led to a tendency on the part of the West to accommodate the PCI within the existing system.

The official U.S. position as stated by Secretary of State Henry Kissinger has been that the inclusion of the PCI in the Italian government would be detrimental to the interests of the U.S. and the West. The strong showing by the PCI in the national elections of July 1976 has heightened this anxiety. Numerous scenarios depicting the results of PCI governmental participation have been voiced by Secretary Kissinger. Regrettably, the lack of a strong analysis of the character of the PCI has precluded a firm contextual basis for scenario construction and subsequent concrete policy formulation. This confusion over the nature of the PCI has led to criticism of U.S. policy as unrealistic. A concise characterization of the PCI was needed to add credibility to U.S. policy.

There is ample evidence available to provide a characterization but the salient features have not been sorted out and presented in a succinct form. This paper proposes to fill this void by presenting a specific body of identifying features with which to evaluate the Italian Communist Party. The concern, therefore, will be not in describing what we perceive the PCI to be but what it is and what it will become. The Syntopicon of the Great Books of the Western World states the problem thusly:

It is difficult to describe the character of anything because the verbal character of anything is an imitation of the real character and hence subject to the interpretation of many people and therefore may or may not be correct.¹

In order to guard against such false interpretations factual evidence such as Party statements and historical facts will make up the main body of evidence and only after the nature of the Party becomes apparent will conclusions be drawn. Also, standard terminology will be used to describe these attributes and in any areas where misunderstanding may occur a definition will be given. Perhaps the first and most important term which needs defining is "character." Webster's Dictionary defines character as a "distinctive trait, quality or attribute" which has an "essential quality or nature."² It is further distinguished by Black's Law Dictionary as that

¹ Hutchins, Robert Maynard, et al. Great Books of the Western World, Vol. II (Chicago, 1952), p. 193.

² McKechnie, Jean L. Webster's New Twentieth Century Dictionary (New York, 1975), p. 304.

which something is, and not what it is reputed to be.³ It is therefore necessary to distinguish between ideological being and aspects of the PCI which are of a tactical or strategic nature. Also, the Party and the movement must be separated to differentiate between the hard core and fellow travellers.

Since the PCI is a complex organization, it has interests and purposes which seem to be at odds with each other, but the question is whether this is by design or by happenstance, and if by design, has there been a continuity in the over-all plan of the Party? Words like change, revisionist and de-radicalized have described these ends and means of the PCI and as such imply a historical process. Therefore, the starting point of the analysis of the character will be with the history of the Party. If there is a strong continuity of history and purpose, a unique character will be easily discernible.

From that starting point the political and socioeconomic goals of the Party will be analyzed to answer certain questions such as: is it revolutionary; is it democratic; is it nationalistic; is it independent from the USSR and international communism; and is it some sort of social democratic party? Once these questions have been answered, the structure, organization, leadership and membership will be examined to determine if the ideology is believed internally and if it can be effectively carried out.

³ Black, Henry Campbell. Black's Law Dictionary (St. Paul, 1933), p. 309-310.

By following such a pattern the analysis will be conducted on three levels: factors determining beliefs; actual political beliefs; and the resultant political actions. In dealing with the character on these three levels and sticking to specifics, the pitfalls which have plagued earlier attempts at characterizations should be avoided. These earlier problems involved: too much generalization; insufficient historical perspective to show continuity; and a failure to see the interaction, but differences between ideology, strategy, organization and international relations.

In summary, the objectives of the investigation are as follows: to briefly trace the origins and development of the PCI and show their effects on the present Party composition and ideology; to analyze the unique ideology, strategy and tactics of the Party; to determine the structure and composition of the Party so as to gauge its effectiveness; to show a continuity in the ideology and purpose; to concisely define the major distinctive characteristics of the Party; and present some recommendations for the future. To review all the details of the PCI goes beyond the scope of this paper but rather the more important traits will be dealt with in order to succinctly depict the character of the PCI.

II. HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose.

Alphonse Karr, Les Guêpes, January 1849

These words have added meaning for the PCI. Written during the formative years of socialist theory in Italy they foretell the future of the ideology of the Party. Although history and cultural changes had a powerful influence on socialist/communist theory in Italy there remains a solid continuity in goals and policy which tie together the Italian communist movement. As party theorist Antonio Gramsci wrote while in prison, "We must feel solidarity with the old men of today, who represent the past still living among us..."⁴ By highlighting the origins of the communist movement and analyzing the crises which beset the Party one is better able to determine what the nature of the Party is and why it has become so.

It is important to realize that although the means of the Party have changed during the course of time, the revolutionary ideals have not. What is perhaps just as important is the fact that the theories of Gramsci, worked out in prison around 1930, have been applied throughout the history of the Party. The theories of Gramsci have been modified slightly to conform to the unique situation in Italy at any time.

⁴ John M. Cammett, Antonio Gramsci and the Origins of Italian Communism (Stanford, 1967), p. 195.

In contrast to most European countries where Marxism was introduced from external sources and then modified by internal forces, Marxism in Italy became the modifier of the unique brand of Italian socialism formed in the middle of the nineteenth century. As Sergio Segre, PCI Central Committee member remarked:

The autonomy of the party...had historical roots: it did not just base itself on translations of Marxist-Leninist texts. It has its own seminal thinkers in the figure of Gramsci and others. Italian communism was not an import. It had developed in the tradition of the previous Italian culture.⁵

The PCI has tried to follow the "Italian Road to Socialism."

Many people have interpreted the "Italian Road to Socialism" to mean that the PCI has abandoned the basic tenets of Marxism-Leninism. This is simply not the case at all. As Central Committee member Gian Carlo Pajetta wrote in Rinascita on 28 November 1975:

Marx was not really buried--as some affirmed at the beginning of the century--if it is true that there is a new and growing demand everywhere for socialism consisting of thought and militancy....Marxism is alive precisely because its teaching is permeated by the dialectic of history. It is alive because it teaches us the need for continuous process of renewal.⁶

The utopian goals of Marxism-Leninism have not been lost and are even more applicable today when the economic structure of Italy seems to be approaching the theoretical crisis predicted by Marx.

⁵ Daniel Yergin, "A Letter from Rome," The New Republic, LCXXIII, No. 18 (1 November 1975), p. 12.

⁶ Gian Carlo Pajetta, Rinascita (28 November 1975), p. 1-2. Pajetta was explaining that the Italians had not rejected Marx. He was trying to explain the validity of Marx's philosophy to present circumstances.

The birth of socialism in Italy can be traced back to around the time of Risorgimento or unification. Perhaps the earliest leader of this movement was Mazzini. In Italy he was more well known than Marx and even today he is an important source of ideology. But like most communist parties in Europe, the PCI was a product of inner conflicts in the socialist movement. These conflicts are normally a product of or are affected by crisis within the country. These crises not only set the context in which the party is first born, but also are critical in determining the future course of the party. It is essential that one have a knowledge of the history of the party to make any accurate analysis or assumptions. Economics, war, industrialization, and Fascism are all reflected in the PCI's ideology.

It is assumed that most people have an adequate knowledge of Marxism-Leninism so the historical analysis will be limited to the growth of the "Italian Road to Socialism." It is a turbulent story but perhaps Pajetta said it best:

...the truest and simplest thing to be said is that experience--the obstacles faced and the successes achieved--has now impelled us toward a search for a new road toward socialism which would recognize national specifics and at the same time would consider common elements in nations which historical tradition, relationships between political forces, social structures and ways of realizing⁷ civil life, present so many and such profound analogies.

⁷ Ibid, p. 1. This is part of Pajetta's explanation of the focus of Italian ideology mentioned previously.

III. CREATION OF THE ITALIAN SOCIALIST PARTY, 1800-1895

The historical roots of the Italian Socialist Party are two: the great national movement of the nineteenth century, which was concerned not only with the achievement of national unity but also with the plight of the masses; and the anarchical tendencies of the Italian peasant which led to the success of the Bakunist movement.

The unification process (Risorgimento) was precipitated by the breakup of Italian feudalism which was accompanied by demands for political representation by the entrepreneurial and middle classes. As industrialization began, the growth of economic well being was accompanied by a desire of the working masses to follow in the footsteps of the middle classes in their demand for a more meaningful role in the determination of public policy. The Risorgimento swept away centuries of authoritarian tradition and replaced it with progress and liberty. Most of us would probably have called the new Italian state conservative but for the newly-liberated Italians it was liberal. The key to the new liberalism was parliamentarianism. However, one finds that even though the unification process proceeded quickly, once parliamentary practices were established the social revolution was slow in coming. The state remained strongly centralized while ideas, values and attitudes were still deeply rooted in regional traditionalism. It was not until the workers began to clamor

for their rights that the move to replace liberalism with socialism began.

The movement for socialism was designed to curb individualism, socialize the economy, abolish restrictive forms of private property and curb the differences in classes. The guiding light in this movement was Giuseppe Mazzini.

Mazzini was deeply involved in the unification movement even to the point of heading the new Constituent Assembly in 1848. He was part of the movement which proclaimed a Republic in July 1849.

Mazzini's original followers were a quasi-military group whose primary aim was unification. His first organization was founded in 1831, La Giovane Italia. It was a group somewhere in that intermediate stage between a secret society and a political party. The initial goal of unification would be followed by sweeping social reforms. The protagonist was, as in Marxian theory, the society as a whole. However, unlike Marx, Mazzini was against anything that was devoid of nationalism (especially when talking of Italian nationalism). His nationalism and primary focus on the process of unification to the detriment of social reforms would prove to be his downfall later.

Like Marx, Mazzini voiced the idea that the worker was a slave who lived in misery. He saw the crisis of capitalism and its replacement by associations of nations of the workingmen. The nations themselves would be formed out of regional workingmen's associations. These "leagues of

proletarians" would be the fighters against tyranny, but in the name of nationalism and not class struggle.

In the 1850's these workingmen's associations began to crop up as a logical extension of the guild system. They were called Mutual Aid Societies in Italy. These societies were open to everyone, even the bourgeoisie. They were dedicated to cooperation and association designed to stem the abuses of the workingman, his wages, working hours, and welfare.

In 1860, Massini launched a serious campaign to harness the Mutual Aid Societies to a political program. His program was designed to form a National Party of Action and he called on all his followers to infiltrate all the existing parties for his cause:

Help the trend toward mutual aid societies. Form them wherever you can. If others create them, place our workers in them, so that the National Idea is inserted, so that they are not reduced to a mere fact of material interest. They will be created in the south at any time and once founded, they will seek contact with yours (of the center and north), so that later a strong league of the people can be formed.⁸

These Mutual Aid Societies did get together for numerous conferences but never voted to adopt the national plan of action that Mazzini wished to follow. Nonetheless, his program was a milestone because it created a new movement in Italy that showed that a worker had become aware of the more complex issues, "other than those having to do with assistance to the sick and infirm."⁹

⁸ Richard Hostetter, The Italian Socialist Movement: Origins (1860-1882) (Princeton, 1958), p. 27.

⁹ Ibid, p. 62.

Perhaps one reason the Party of Action program failed was because there was such a strong competing system, the clientelismo or clientele system. This system grew up with the Mutual Aid Societies but was more of an economic formation designed to procure favors and jobs. The clientelismo system produced strong relations which themselves became political parties. This system continues today in Italy because of its relative achievements. The clientelismo will be discussed in depth later since it has become a source of PCI support.

Mazzini's ideas on socialism were to become more coherent as the unification process moved to completion. His basic premise was that virtue was the divine goal, not, as Marx would say, utility and self-interest. His ideas were more national than individual and herein is his main gift to the Italian socialist movement. He also became well known internationally because of his part in the unification movement and the blossoming socialist movement. He was even becoming as well known as the authors of the Communist Manifesto. Like the authors of the Communist Manifesto, Mazzini identified the plight of the proletariat as the central issue in the socialist movement. He was for the rights of the proletariat in the sense of equality:

Abolition of the proletariat, emancipation of the workers from the tyranny of capital concentrated in a small number of individuals; division of the product, or the value that issues from it, according to work accomplished...(However), we are not communists, nor levellers nor hostile to property....¹⁰

¹⁰ Ibid, p. 40.

Mazzini's historical analysis of the workingman's struggle concluded that social remedies must follow political change because politics alone would not suffice. Here again he differed from Marx in that he preached a peaceful transition to social reformation:

In Italy...the social question does not carry with it threats of unjust subversions or anarchy. In those regions there boils no profound hatred between class and class,...(there is) no necessity for the introduction of rash systems or solutions.¹¹

In the intervening years until his death in 1872 he pursued the social goals of the workingman as well as a total republican unification of the country. The preoccupation with these two strong ideas was the main reason for his loss of leadership in the socialist movement.

On 28 September 1864 the First International was formed in London. The International met at this time in preparation for the first International Workingmen's Association (IWA) Congress in Brussels in 1865. The meetings were concerned with setting the standards for the revolutionary movements in all of Europe. Mazzini sent two of his strongest supporters, Wolf and Fontana, to present his program to the council. Initially, Mazzini's program was adopted but on the arrival of Marx the program was changed. Marx radically changed the platform more along the "Marxian" line, abolishing the more humanitarian aspects of Mazzini's.¹²

¹¹ Ibid, p. 44.

¹² Günter Nollau, International Communism and World Revolution (New York, 1961), p. 323. The London Council's program was accepted by the council in 1866 and later by the full IWA Congress in 1871. See Appendix A for the full text.

This marked the end of Mazzini's predominance in the international socialist movement.

Marx was also convinced that he needed to totally destroy Mazzini, even in Italy. He contacted Michael Bakunin, who was in Italy, and persuaded him to undertake the task of personally destroying Mazzini's brand of socialism. Bakunin succeeded in destroying Mazzini but at the same time, in his desire for international stature, damaged Marxian socialism almost as much.

Bakunin, the legendary Russian anarchist, arrived in Italy in early 1864, bent on bringing revolution to the people. He was convinced that Italy was the weakest link in the chain of reactionary Europe, the country with the most promising prospects of revolution. Bakunin agreed to many of the Italian aspirations for political and social reform but only in an attempt to persuade the Italians to accept the anarchist formula of catastrophic social revolution, international organization of the workingman and total rejection of authority.

By 1866, Bakunin was experiencing limited success nationally, although he was receiving a more encouraging response from the rural peasantry of the south. He had succeeded in mobilizing the workers toward more revolutionary actions and away from Mazzini. The disaffected reformers who left Mazzini did so because he refused to abandon his patriotic goals for purely social ones. With each success Bakunin increased his goals. He began to formulate plans to wrest the leadership of the international movement from Marx.

Bakunin's initial bids for leadership in the international movement were in the formation of rival organizations which he hoped would merge with the IWA and by sheer numbers gain control. His first attempt in 1868, the League for Peace and Liberty, failed. He then founded the International Alliance of Social Democracy which, because of widespread international pressure, was absorbed into the IWA in 1869. This was unfortunate for both Mazzini and Marx because it legitimized Bakunin's brand of socialism on the peninsula and delayed the debut of Marxism into Italy until the 1880's.

Two general factors led to Mazzini's decline in Italy. The first was the international appeal of the IWA which was beginning to make itself felt in Italy. However, had Mazzini followed up his earlier attempts to nationalize the workers groups he would have had the organizational solidarity to resist the IWA. If he had made early attempts through these organizations to block the International movement, he might have succeeded.¹³ The second factor was a problem related to unification. Mazzinian socialism had slowed to a walk by the time of the Franco-Prussian War, which put a capstone on the process of Italian unity. Both Bakunin¹⁴ and Mazzini

¹³ Hostetter gives a more complete explanation of how this could have occurred. On page 124 he tells how Mazzini did not take full advantage of his resources.

¹⁴ Hostetter quotes, on page 136 of his book, a letter from Bakunin to Gambuzzi on 4 July 1870 in which Bakunin says, "Is there still a section in Naples? In what condition is it? Might it have fallen into the hands of Intriguers?...But, in the name of Heaven, don't sleep."

noticed this occurrence, but Mazzini was more severely affected. Mazzini was so concerned with the process of Italian unity that when the process ceased he lost much of his enthusiasm. He had implanted unification so deeply in his brand of socialism that the movement was not able to switch to a social and political cause of socialism until unity was complete. This intransigence in the Italian proletariat was to be forced out into the open by the events in France. The Paris Commune was to be the spark that re-ignited socialism in Italy.

Events in Paris between 18 March and 25 May 1871 completely altered to Mazzini's disadvantage the leadership structure of the Italian Socialist movement. From the Paris Commune on, Mazzini never recovered his stature or the leadership of the movement. Mazzini alienated many of his supporters by condemning the materialistic Frenchmen and their inherent denial of his thesis that social change should occur by gradual peaceful means. He felt that the major fault was the inherent anti-nationality of the Commune:

Politically, that system leads to the indefinite dismemberment of authority, to the exclusive recognition of sovereignty in the smallest local collective entity; and therefore to the absolute negation of Nation and to the absurd proposition that the Commune, more than the Nation, has the secret, the inspiration of the national life and right...(Such a league of) independent and sovereign Communes would destroy everything that makes the national idea sacred.¹⁵

By contrast, the Italian radicals hailed the loss of the Commune by the French proletariat as the beginning of the

¹⁵ Hostetter, p. 148.

long awaited class struggle in the world. The International Socialists were the benefactors of the defeat of the Commune. Bakunin, because he was more well known in Italy, reaped the majority of benefits of this new movement in Italy.

Italy was split into four factions of the Commune. Mazzini's followers were strongly anti-Commune. The IWA was strongly pro-Commune but lacked the visibility in Italy to make substantial gains. Garibaldi, the hero of the "One Thousand," was ironically pro-Commune. He was so, mainly out of a disillusionment with Mazzini and Mazzini's lack of action. He was also convinced that all men should unite under one banner to help humanity. Perhaps he could have used his national stature to become a serious threat in Italy but his lack of a clear-cut plan doomed any venture to failure. Bakunin's principles of anarchy and action fit perfectly with the ideals of the Italian radicals and his organization was prepared to take advantage of any opportunity.

By the Congress of Rome on 1 November 1871, Bakunin had successfully replaced Mazzini as the leader of Italian socialism. Although his social principles were endorsed by the Congress, Mazzini failed to organize Italy into an anti-international front. His failure to separate unification from the social movement prevented him from entering the new phase of international socialism. Bakunin's action programs were more to the liking of the Congress. They were convinced that Bakunin could lead them to their goals.

The intervening period since the Commune had also been successful for Bakunin in his fight against the IWA. Bakunin's polemics with the IWA were so fruitful that when the split between his faction and the IWA occurred in mid-November, he was in firm control of Italian Socialism. Bakunin's ideas flourished quickly in Italy, especially in the more industrialized areas of Romagna, and with Mazzini's death on 10 March 1872 Bakunin was in absolute control of the Italian Socialist movement. On 4 August 1872 at Rimini the Italian Socialists held their first organized National Congress (the other Congresses having been held by the Mutual Aid Societies). The Congress declared for Bakunin, thereby marking the beginning of the end for the Second International in Italy and, as events will show, in Europe as well.

On 15 September the anti-authoritarians, led by Bakunin, met in St. Imier, Switzerland and proclaimed their split from the IWA (on 2 September Bakunin had been expelled from the IWA). It should be noted that many of the Italian Socialists were not actually cognizant of the differences between Bakunin and the International. When Bakunin emerged as their leader, it was not because of his ideas but because of his stature, his organization and the penetration of his movement.

The next phase of Italian Socialism embodied the violence which Bakunin so avidly supported. Bakunin tried to carry out his plan to replace the existing structure of government in Italy. He did not fully realize the potential of his new enemy, the state, and by 1876 Bakuninism was on the decline.

Beginning in 1872, Bakunin planned a series of armed insurrections which failed, and by 1874 most of his followers were brought to trial. Due to the ineptness of the Italian prosecutors, the anarchists were acquitted and freed to reorganize and pursue the same course. However, adverse public reaction had set in and in March 1877, when his followers attempted to liberate several towns in the San Lupo area, the whole repressive machinery of state was brought to bear. The government outlawed the organization, dissolved the sections, arrested the leaders and used other pressures. Although Bakunin escaped, anarchism had failed in Italy and with it the link to international socialism.¹⁶

As one socialist wrote: "The International...no longer exists, either as a Marxist association or as a Bakunist sect. There are revolutionary and anarchist socialists in every part of the world, but there is no longer any contact, public or secret, between them."¹⁷

Perhaps the attempt at violence helped to precipitate the rapid decline of international socialism in Italy, but it would have ultimately failed because the anarchists lacked the organizational base required for the slow education of the Italians. Into this void was growing a new socialist group aimed at "legal" revolution.

¹⁶ In 1879 some small uprisings and outbreaks of violence occurred but they were on such a small scale as to not affect the over-all situation.

¹⁷ Hostetter, p. 409.

The "new left" was a product of earlier moderates who were determined to achieve their ends through gradual means. The new reform method was designed to conquer through the electoral process. The new attitude was not so much dictated by a serene assessment of the relative merits of a new theory as by circumstances in Italy at the time.

In 1882 the real origin of present day socialism began with a change in the electoral laws which quadrupled the electorate, allowing the socialists to send members to the Chamber of Deputies for the first time. Additionally, a new industrial proletariat began to emerge in the north creating a schism with the old southern oriented Italian socialism and a new awareness of labor problems.

Two poles of socialism began to emerge during the 1880's, centered around the "new left" and its legal revolution. The first of these groups, Minimalisti or "minimalists," stressed short term democratic reform and emphasized the usage of the electoral process for change. The Minimalisti were willing to enter the political arena in a parliamentary state and collaborate with non-socialist parties. This could be accomplished only by renouncing integral collectivism and advocating economic and social reforms acceptable to non-socialists. In effect, they accepted pluralism and all that democracy offered. The second of these groups, Massimalisti or "maximalists," was concerned with long term goals of revolutionary change. They were convinced that, once the economic base was changed, political transition would be

abrupt and immediate. They refused to play the parliamentary game and were opposed to collaboration with non-socialists, but they counted on the electoral process to put them in power. This position was based on the erroneous assumptions that all wage earners were sympathetic to socialism and wage earners were a majority in Italy.

These groups were all part of the Marxian socialist movement that met in Genoa in August of 1892 to form the Partito dei Lavoratori Italiani (Italian Workers Party). In 1895 the name was changed to the Partito Socialista Italiano (Italian Socialist Party, PSI) the name it retains today. This new party for the first time presented the government with an opposition made up of the worker-peasant group. Although its leaders were drawn from the intellectuals of the industrialized northern cities of Milan, Turin and Genoa, the most substantial support came from the agricultural and industrial workers.

The original objectives of the party as stated in 1892 combined the goals of the major factions of the party; an immediate struggle to improve conditions of the workers; followed by a longer range struggle to win control of the working class. These goals were pursued until late 1895 when the party began a new phase of socialism.

The early years of socialism were marked by many changes which would bear on the later historical development of the party. Mazzini had identified the spirit of nationalism that all Italians felt. He had identified the need, as Bakunin

did later, for infiltration of workers organizations for the purpose of persuading them to accept his ideals. He did not realize, as Bakunin did, the need for a strong organization to control the movement. Mazzini also formulated the theory of a peaceful transition to social reform.

Bakunin failed organizationally because of his lack of extensiveness in organization and the fact that he tried to use the organization before it was mature. Perhaps the most important lesson to be gained from Bakunin was the failure of anarchist methods. This lesson would be repeated in the violence leading up to World War I.

Some other lessons learned during this time were the success of the clientelismo system and a reaffirmation by the "new left" of the use of the electoral means to power.

IV. FRAGMENTATION OF THE SOCIALIST PARTY, 1895-1920

The period between the formation of the PSI and the split which gave birth to the PCI was extremely turbulent. The opposing factions within the party became even more fragmented as the growing demands of the working classes were amplified by the chaos brought on by WWI.

In the initial four years between 1896 and 1900 the country was beset by a series of strikes and uprisings. Although these were minor in scale they served to heighten the differences between the moderate faction, which opposed revolutionary activity, and the more radical section of the party. Filippo Turati's reformists were in control of the party during this time and they were able to subdue the more violent aspirations of the radicals because of his success in achieving some of the aims of the socialists by cooperation with Giolitti's liberal government. In fact, Turati was so successful with his governmental dealings that he was invited into the government on numerous occasions between 1904 and 1914 but the anti-government and anti-bourgeoisie feeling of the party ran so high that he was forced to decline. To some extent this tendency to participate in the government was influenced by the growth of vested interests in both the existing institutional framework (both government and municipal) and the pressure exerted by the unions to separate the economic and political issues (as the German Social Democrats had).

In the period between 1908 and 1912 the moderates and reformists found that their control was being eroded by the more radical factions. Additionally, the party was split four ways between the minimalisti, massimalisti, revoluzionari (revolutionaries who counted on force to seize power and replace capitalism with collectivism, and the riformisti (reformists) who were a more liberal section of the minimalisti and therefore quite eager to collaborate with the government. The polarization of these factions was increased by the lack of achievement of major changes and by the practice of gradualism and compromise utilized by the moderates.

The normalization of relations with the International reflected these divisions. Whereas the moderates were content to deal with the controlling hierarchy of the International, the radical factions formed a subgroup within the International. At the meeting of the International Socialist Bureau on 30 July 1914 conferences were scheduled at Zimmerwald for September 1915 and Kienthal for April 1916 at which only certain groups attended. These groups were later to form the third, or Communist International (Comintern).

At the thirteenth Socialist Party Congress at Reggio Emilia in July 1912 the massimalisti faction gained a leading role in the party. It was at this Congress that Benito Mussolini, the leader of a leftwing revolutionary faction, was thrown into the spotlight. Although he was a leading figure in the party for the next two years, he was expelled on

24 November 1914 for supporting Italy's entry into the war, a manifest breach of party discipline.¹⁸

The change in party orientation was a reflection of the growing labor unrest which preceded World War I, but the war and the economic chaos that followed the war crystallized the conflicts in the party. The PSI was the only leftist party in Western Europe opposed to the war. The reasons given by the party for this neutrality were fostered by the radicals' ideology. They felt that if the party was one of class alone then there was no need to defend the government from its imminent destruction. This also coincided with the theories of Lenin soon to be applied in Russia. It was also one of the basic premises of a new Marxist group being formed around Amedeo Bordiga of Naples and a young intellectual following which headed the Turin industrial workers. The Turin intellectuals contained such soon to be party notables as Gramsci, Togliatti, Terracini and Tasca.

There were a number of strikes and spontaneous uprisings in the industrialized North, capped by a five-day insurrection in Turin during August of 1917. The failure of this uprising vaulted Antonio Gramsci into the forefront of the Turin movement. Gramsci was determined to build the Turin section into a strong, well disciplined political party along the general lines of the Russian party. He felt that if he

¹⁸ Mussolini was made editor of Avanti, the socialist newspaper, four months after the Congress. In this capacity he had considerable political clout and could readily influence his readers.

could build the core of the party up to a position of relative strength, it could act whenever the opportunity arose. He was even more convinced of this after Lenin's successful revolution in Russia and said this about the timetable for socialism, "...it is possible to realize Socialism at any moment....They (the Leninists) are revolutionaries, not evolutionaries. And revolutionary thought does not see time as a factor of progress."¹⁹

The majority of the Socialist Party overwhelmingly supported the Russian revolution and planned to follow the Soviet example, but felt that they should wait until the war was over. This was a serious error because the recovery of the Italian army coupled with the post-war economic destruction changed the distribution of power in Italy. The PSI still may have been able to carry out a successful coup but the lack of a strong plan prevented any action.

The founding of the Third International (Comintern) at Moscow, 2-6 March 1919, was a major boost for Bordiga and the Turin group. Although the PSI immediately declared their support for the International, they did not take the necessary action to rid themselves of the riformisti to insure their ideological solidarity with the Comintern. The Turin faction, led by Gramsci, was so impressed by the Comintern and disappointed by their own party's lack of purity that they began their own more revolutionary order within the party.

¹⁹ Cammett, p. 61.



Antonio Gramsci as a young man.

The idea of this new group, Ordine Nuovo (the New Order), was to socialize the workers and prepare them for the revolution. With this in mind, Gramsci created Factory Councils, along the lines of the Russian Soviets, to educate the workers. He felt that Marxism was a --

...philosophy of praxis, a belief that the goal of proletarian liberation could be achieved through voluntary political activity of the proletariat itself, or rather by means of a continually progressive dialectic between the proletariat and the class conscious vanguard.²⁰

Additionally, Gramsci decided to gain control of the unions where he could then exert more pressure on the state. Gramsci felt that --

The Italian state must be decapitated in Milan, not Rome, because the real capitalist governing apparatus is not in Rome but Milan....Rome has no function in Italian social life; it represents nothing and will submit to the hard laws of the worker's state against parasites.²¹

The trade unions became quite active; however, the legalities within which they worked forced Ordine Nuovo to yield to the Italian system and operate within it.²² This in turn forced the party to rationalize this legal activity. Gramsci described the unions as a tool of the revolutionary movement and that legality was justifiable if it aided the working class. Cammett explains the process thusly:

²⁰ Ibid, p. 93.

²¹ Neil McInnes, The Western Marxists (New York, 1972), p. 10.

²² Cammett gives a more detailed description of the interaction of Ordine Nuovo and the trade unions starting on page 65 of his book. The complete description goes into considerable detail as to how the whole operation was to be carried out.

Insofar as the unions recognized the temporary nature of the compromise and tried to increase the power of the working class and prepare it for a more positive role in society, they would be a revolutionary instrument in the class struggle. Even if industrial legality were enforced with such ends in mind, it would be justified by the need for industrial discipline.²³

The executive council of Ordine Nuovo incorporated this policy in their national program by calling for participation in national elections so as to prevent isolation of the people and further their social education. This philosophy was later enhanced by the major failure of the one bid by the Ordine Nuovo at Turin in April 1920 to bring immediate revolution to the workers and create an Italian "Petrograd."

While Ordine Nuovo was growing in strength, events elsewhere in Italy were focusing attention on the PSI Congress in October 5-8 and the national elections in November. The situation in which the political struggle developed was growing increasingly acute and complex. The reformisti still retained their influence in the Party hierarchy but the effects of the Comintern were being manifest in the growth of the Bordiga and Ordine Nuovo groups. In addition, the Fascists were already making themselves known by resorting to violence and sabotage.

When the PSI met in October it overwhelmingly resolved to support the Comintern and to build the revolutionary organization required by the Comintern. Even though this initial step was taken, pressure by the reformisti forced the PSI to declare that the revolution would have to wait because the time

²³ Cammett, p. 85.

was not ripe and that the party would continue parliamentary action for awhile. Bordiga violently opposed this concession to the reformist group and campaigned for their expulsion. It is ironic that Lenin was critical of both factions: the PSI for not expelling the reformers; and Bordiga for opposing parliamentary action.²⁴

In November the PSI made decisive gains in the Italian parliament. They won 1,756,344 votes and 156 out of 508 positions in parliament (or almost 31%).²⁵ The success of the elections seemed to show that the newly "Russian" styled party was popular with the people, but the fact that the reformists were tolerated within the party was destined to prolong the internal friction.²⁶

This continued ambivalence in the Party was reflected in the events of 1920. The riformisti were convinced that capitalism would fall of its own weight, while the radical left was more preoccupied with revolutionary action. The immobilization of the leadership over these issues destroyed its capacity to take advantage of the economic problems occurring

²⁴ James W. Hulse, The Forming of the Communist International (Stanford, 1964), p. 163. Hulse gives a fairly concise description of Lenin's whole feelings on the situation in Italy during this period.

²⁵ Franz Borkenau, World Communism: A History of the Communist International (Ann Arbor, 1962), p. 169.

²⁶ According to Borkenau, on page 169, although there were serious difficulties between the radical sects and the moderates, "the majority of the Italians rejected absolutely the idea of purging the party of reformists and traitors." The point is that to the Italians the reformist ideas were very popular.

in Italy and was perhaps one reason for the Party's failure to support the ill-fated Turin uprising in April. The masses involved in the Turin uprising, lacking the direction and effective organization of the whole PSI, ultimately could not adequately carry out their plans. At the most opportune moment in the early 1900's the inaction of the leadership prevented a successful revolution.

Gramsci had learned a lesson from his failure at Turin that he would apply vigorously to his Party: It must be "...a homogenous, cohesive Party, with its own doctrine and tactics and a rigid and implacable discipline..."²⁷

As if on cue, the Comintern held its Second Congress at Moscow from 17 July to 7 August where it issued its famous 21 conditions for Comintern membership. The seventh, sixteenth, seventeenth and twenty-first were particularly applicable to the PSI. (See Appendix B for complete list.)

7. Parties which wish to join the Communist International are obliged to recognize the necessity for a complete and absolute break with reformism and with the policy of the "centre," and to advocate this break as widely as possible among their members. Without that no consistent Communist policy is possible.

The Communist International demands unconditionally and categorically that this break be effected as quickly as possible. The Communist International is unable to agree that notorious opportunists, such as Turati, Modigliani...etc., shall have the right to appear as members of the Communist International that could only lead to the Communist International becoming in many respects similar to the Second International, which has gone to pieces.

²⁷ Cammett, p. 104.

16. All the decisions of the Congress of the Communist International, as well as the decisions of its Executive Committee, are binding in all parties belonging to the Communist International. The Communist International, working in conditions of acute civil war, must be far more centralized in its structure than was the Second International. Consideration must be of course given by the Communist International and its Executive Committee in all their activities to the varying conditions in which the individual parties have to fight and work, and they must make decisions of general validity only when such decisions are possible.
17. In this connection, all parties which wish to join the Communist International must change their names. Every party which wishes to join the Communist International must be called: Communist party of such and such a country (section of the Communist International). This question of name is not merely a formal matter, but essentially a political question of great importance. The Communist International has declared war on the entire bourgeois world and on all yellow social-democratic parties. The difference between the Communist parties and the old official "social-democratic" or "socialist" parties, which have betrayed the banner of the working class, must be brought home to every ordinary worker.
21. Those members of the party who reject in principle the conditions and these put forward by the Communist International are to be expelled from the Party.²⁸

Furthermore, Lenin indicated on two separate occasions his agreement with the program advocated by Ordine Nuovo. On the latter occasion he very bluntly told the Congress that, "We must simply tell the Italian comrades that the trend of the Communist International corresponds to the trend of Ordine Nuovo, and not to that of the present majority of Socialist leaders and their parliamentary group."²⁹

²⁸ Nollau, p. 340-344. Full text in Appendix B.

²⁹ Cammett, p. 106.

The majority of the PSI leadership enthusiastically embraced communism but felt that Moscow was being unreasonable and could be persuaded to change its mind. The majority, led by Serrati's moderates, felt that Moscow did not understand the Italian situation and that the long distance direction could ruin the Party. This group attempted to change Moscow's mind but ultimately agreed to convene a special Congress in January of 1921 to consider the conditions.

The vacillations of the Serrati group threw the Ordine Nuovo and Bordiga groups together at last. In November of 1920 they set up a central office headed by Bordiga to coordinate strategy for the upcoming Congress. The stage was being set for the confrontation at the January Congress and both sides were preparing their arguments.

The background on which the foundation on 21 January 1921 of the PCI seemed in many respects to have been built by disunity and disorganization rather than a concerted desire on the part of the new "Marxists" to change history. Within this background many lessons had been learned that would influence the new party as it split from the PSI and consolidated its position. The moderates had shown that socialism could make significant gains at the polls. This was re-emphasized by Gramsci's theoretical writings on association with the electoral process and the failure of the Turin uprising. The Turin uprising also underscored the need for a strong, well disciplined party that could work within the system but still be ready to attempt the revolution if the opportunity arose.

Finally, the Fascist agitation was becoming more than a nuisance to the rest of the socialists.

All of these factors would influence Gramsci's later theoretical writings.

V. FORMATION OF THE ITALIAN COMMUNIST PARTY

The evolution of the Italian socialism which was begun in the 1800's was about to give birth to another child. The new party would be Marxist in ideology but so thoroughly Italian as to seem at times almost non-communist.

The lines of battle were sharply drawn when the 17th Congress of the PSI began its deliberations on 15 January 1921 at Livorno. The Bordiga-Ordine Nuovo faction was intent on the purification of the party along the lines of the 21 Conditions, which meant: an acceptance of the revolutionary strategy; the struggle against reformism; and the creation of party identity through elite solidarity and centralized organization. The moderate PSI leadership supported most of the Soviet directives but refused to expel the reformists. The final vote was as follows: out of 172,487 voting, 58,783 votes went to the Bordiga faction, 98,028 votes went to the moderates, and 14,695 votes were cast for the reformists.³⁰ The victorious moderates immediately contacted Moscow to try to renegotiate their membership in the Comintern, but they were turned down by Lenin.

³⁰ Cammett, p. 151.

Bordiga and his followers seceded from the PSI and formed the Italian section of the Comintern.³¹ Bordiga summed it up thusly:

The majority of the Congress, with its vote, has placed itself outside the Third International. The delegates who voted for the Communist motion are to leave the hall. They will meet at eleven o'clock at the Teatro San Marco to write the constitution of the Communist Party, Italian Section of the Third International.³²

The meaning of the split is not necessarily so obvious a problem as that of doctrine alone. The Congress was initially called in response to problems that would determine how far and in what ways the PSI would split but deeper doctrinal problems and historical forces were set into motion by the split. One of the most immediate problems encountered was the loss of over 100,000 members by the PSI, as well as a great deal of unity and cohesion. The initial confusion on both sides of the split was a factor which contributed to the rapid rise of Fascism in the country and brought about an abrupt end to the growth of both parties for over 20 years.

Another result of the schism was that Ordine Nuovo ceased to exist as a group after January and it took almost five years for the leaders to attain the leadership of the PCI. Had the Ordine Nuovo group been able to move Bordiga aside

³¹ See Drachkovitch, Milorad M. and Branko Lazitch, etc, The Comintern: Historical Highlights (New York, 1966), p. 359-360, for more background on Bordiga. Also see, on p. 272-299, Paul Lewis' letter to the Comintern on the PCI. It reveals actual events of the period as well as doubts of the Comintern over European communism.

³² Ibid, p. 151.

at the start, the party may have built their organization swiftly enough to pose a threat to the Fascists.

The new Italian Communist Party was formed along the lines of the Comintern's 21 Conditions and the Organic Acts of Constitution reflected the goals of international communism as put forth by Lenin. These Acts proclaimed the imminent downfall of capitalism, the necessity of armed conflict between the workers and the bourgeois state, the hegemonic role of the proletarian party, the goal of destruction of the bourgeois state, and the immediate establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Although this showed complete acceptance of the Comintern strategy, it disguised the great variation in ideology and style between Bordiga and Gramsci.

This solidarity with Moscow proved to be short-lived. The lack of mass support in Europe from 1919 to 1921, coupled with the growing internal difficulties encountered by Moscow, prompted the Third Comintern Congress which met in June 1921 to alter its tactics in favor of a "temporary conciliation of capitalism" and a resumption of collaboration with the socialist parties in the form of a "united front." Terracini, representing the PCI at the Congress, initially opposed the policy but finally yielded to the Moscow leadership.

Bordiga refused to accept the new policy of the Comintern and at the Second PCI Congress in Rome in March 1922 won overwhelming support by the Party. The Bordiga position, which opposed collaboration with the socialists and upheld the

practice of power seizure through revolutionary action, was upheld by the Congress by a vote of 31,000 to only 4,000 for the opposition, which was led by Angelo Tasca. At this time both Gramsci and Togliatti were among those supporting Bordiga. With the matter presumably settled, the PCI began the task of building a central core of militant and professional cadres. Togliatti was appointed to the Central Committee and the organization was streamlined to prevent the institutional paralysis that had beset the old PSI.

The Comintern, realizing that it had obtained a communist party which it neither anticipated nor fully accepted, began preparing for Bordiga's removal. In June of 1922 Gramsci went to Russia to attend the first meeting of the Comintern Plenum. During his eighteen months in Moscow he developed a close relationship with the Comintern leader, Gregori Zinoviev, and apparently in return for a promise by Zinoviev of support in a bid to become leader of the PCI, was persuaded to oppose Bordiga's "Rome thesis." Gramsci was also able to devote some time to the preparation of his own programs. Pajetta also says that at this time Gramsci returned to the real meaning of Leninism and the true revolutionary perspective.³³

Bordiga now faced the difficult choice between repudiating the program which he had fought for in the Socialist Party and defiance of the Comintern. He realized that Moscow was now

³³ Gian Carlo Pajetta, "Italian Communist Party: Fifty Years," New Times, No. 3 (20 January 1971), p. 12. The purpose of Pajetta's article was to connect the history and origins of the PCI with the situation in 1971.

tightening the international organization, intending to transform it into a monolithic Soviet instrument. With concurrence of the majority of the PCI, Bordiga decided to oppose the Comintern openly.

Events within the PSI in 1922 were working to the disadvantage of Bordiga. In August the PSI finally bowed to the Comintern's wishes by expelling Turati and voting to adhere to the 21 Conditions. By the time of the Fourth Comintern Congress of November-December 1922, Bordiga was opposed by the same group which he had forced out of the Comintern two years earlier.

At the Fourth Congress the Russians and Italians clashed openly over the "united front" tactic. Zinoviev and the Comintern leadership let it be known that if Bordiga and his followers did not accept the Comintern's direction to collaborate with the PSI that they would not remain for long as leaders of the PCI. Bordiga still refused, but the Congress overruled him and then appointed Gramsci as the mediator in the unification process. Gramsci was not wholeheartedly in favor of the union but took the job knowing it was doomed to failure by the reluctance of both sides to merge.

Mussolini's seizure of power in Italy and his subsequent crackdown on political parties simplified the Comintern's problem with Bordiga. Bordiga and the PCI leaders were arrested in February 1923 by the Fascist police. At the same time, almost 2,000 other communists were arrested and almost two-thirds of the party membership deserted the ranks.

The Comintern quickly designated Gramsci, then in Vienna, as acting head of the PCI, who in turn instructed Togliatti, who was in hiding in Italy, to temporarily perform these functions until his return.

Bordiga was released in September 1923 along with most of the other arrested communist leaders, but Gramsci and his followers had no intention of relinquishing control of the Party. The subsequent power struggle allowed the direction of the Party to become diverted from the real menace, which was fascism.

In May of 1924 a National Party Conference was held in secret at Como. The only positive accomplishment of this Conference was the establishment of clandestine underground activities. In addition, the clash between Bordiga and Gramsci came to a head, with the Bordiga faction once again winning the support of the Congress. This action prompted the Comintern at its Fifth Congress, from June 7 to July 8, to appoint a new PCI Central Committee which excluded Bordiga and his followers.

Opposed by the Comintern and deserted by a growing number of his followers, Bordiga was finally defeated at the Third PCI Congress at Lyon in January 1926. The Gramsci-Tasca forces overwhelmingly defeated Bordiga (Bordiga only received 9.2% of the vote). Bordiga's influence in the Party had ended, although he was not formally expelled until 1930.

Gramsci's victory was won not only in the name of international communism but also represented a victory of

"Italian" communism. The "Lyon Thesis" delivered at the Congress reflected the national as well as class character of the Party. Gramsci called for a unified and centralized party on both the ideological and organizational level and an abolition of factions within the party. He declared that the party should remain primarily in the hands of the proletariat but that, "the working class cannot do without the intellectuals, nor can it ignore the problem of gathering around itself all those elements driven in one way or another to revolt against capitalism."³⁴ He stressed the need for the party to lead by becoming part of all sections of the working class and not by merely proclaiming its leadership of the people.³⁵ In Thesis 30, Gramsci reintroduced the idea of Factory Councils so as to infiltrate the worker's movements and reeducate the masses. By mobilizing the masses over temporary demands, Gramsci felt he could win the masses over:

(The Party) leads and unifies the working class by participating in all struggles of a limited character, and by formulating and promoting a program of immediate interest for the working class. Partial, limited demands are considered a necessary opportunity for achieving the progressive mobilization and unification of all the forces of the laboring class.³⁶

Gramsci echoed the "united front" tactic of the Comintern but theorized that it was to be used for the ultimate destruction of the state and those allies with which they had united.

³⁴ Cammett, p. 173.

³⁵ Ibid, p. 173.

³⁶ Ibid, p. 174.

The real reason behind the "united front" was the exposure and elimination of the reactionary forces, not the fraternity of compatible interests.

In his analysis of fascism, Gramsci made an error which meant his ultimate imprisonment and the near fatal destruction of the party. His preoccupation with capitalism was such that he viewed fascism as only another form of capitalism, and as such destined to create the forces of its own self-destruction. He was not able to judge the real nature of the movement and, as Landauer says:

What a tragedy that the Italian Marxists had read the Communist Manifesto more carefully than the Class Struggle in France and The Eighteenth of Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte! From the nature of the role of Bonapartism as described by Marx in the two latter writings, they could have drawn illuminating analogies to the dangerous potentialities of fascism, and could have learned that the socialist workers might have to cooperate with the liberal bourgeoisie to stave off such a danger.³⁷

It took the PCI twenty-two years of fascist rule to be able to apply the lessons learned in the late 1920's.

In November 1926, Mussolini issued a series of exceptional decrees which clamped down completely on the PCI. The PCI was relieved of all its seats in parliament while Gramsci, Bordiga, Terracini and others were arrested. Togliatti and Tasca were luckily in Moscow attending the Seventh Plenum of the Comintern and thereby escaped arrest. Togliatti was appointed the interim leader of the PCI and directed its

³⁷ Carl Landauer, Hilde Stein Landauer and Elizabeth Krindl Valkenier, European Socialism, A History of Ideas and Movements, Vol. I (Berkeley, 1959), p. 887.

activities, first from Zurich and then from Paris, as the PCI went completely underground.

The organization which had been set up at the May 1924 Congress was called into play as the entire PCI began clandestine activities. During the winter of 1926-1927 the organization achieved considerable success and operations were rapidly built up in the major population centers. A secret domestic center was formed which remained in operation until 1932 when it was dissolved by the leadership as too dangerous to the party hierarchy.

The years between 1927 and 1929 represent a critical juncture in the history of PCI. During this time the forces of Mussolini were mobilized in a swift counter-offensive against the underground, and the PCI was decimated by the fascist cadres. Finally, in June Gramsci was sentenced to 20 years, 4 months and 5 days in prison. This internment stopped him physically but not intellectually.

Although the PCI lost an able leader in Gramsci, it benefited in the long run from his writings in prison. Between 1929 and his death in 1937 he filled 32 notebooks, which contained 3,000 pages of minute handwriting. His writings, although marxist in theory, follow a more transitional approach to communism in Italy. He defended democratic objectives as the strategy most appropriate to the Italian conditions. He did reemphasize the need for a "pure" party, a theme which was carried out by Togliatti in his expulsion of Angelo Tasca in 1929, "the three" -- Pietro Tresso, Alfonso Leonetti and

Paolo Ravazzoli in 1930, as well as numerous others between 1930 and 1932.

Gramsci took into account the unique historical conditions of Italy and drew these experiences together by the thread of marxist ideology. He realized that his error in failing to foresee the revolutionary power of fascism prevented him from accommodating with the right and center in a parliamentary way to overcome fascism. This lesson in political processes would be repeated by Gramsci in all of his writings on cooperation and collaboration. As Togliatti later wrote of him, "Gramsci was a political theorist, but he was above all a practical politician."³⁸

The decimation of the party had some positive effects. The remaining communists were forged into small but highly reliable groups in which a high premium was placed on organizational talents and unquestioning obedience to authority. These forces were able to exist despite the pressures exerted by fascism over the next ten years.

The first ten years of the PCI had been turbulent and sometimes disastrous, but many historical lessons were learned which shaped the ideology of the party. The need for cohesion and discipline was reinforced. A policy of total obedience was instituted which called for the elimination of any factions so as to preserve the strength and purity of the party. Finally, the tactic of the united front became standard

³⁸ Cammett, p. 192.

party policy. The slogan of a constitutional assembly used as, "the basis for an agreement with the anti-fascist parties," is still used today.³⁹

³⁹ Ibid, p. 185.

VI. FASCISM AND WORLD WAR II

The Fascist victory affected the PCI deeply. For more than two decades the party would lead a highly precarious and frustrating existence, squeezed between the increasingly effective repressions of the Fascist police, who made it virtually impossible to launch any sustained organized political activity, and the stringent demands of the Comintern. These factors helped to produce a new and articulate program of the forces and directions of the Italian revolution.

Two figures shaped the party during this time, Antonio Gramsci and Palmiro Togliatti. Gramsci was the party theoretician who combined the deterministic features of Marx with the culture and historical processes of Italy and translated them into an ideology and practice for the party to follow. Togliatti, who was Gramsci's successor, was the pragmatist who knew how to apply the practical aspects of Gramsci's ideology to the peculiar nature of Italian circumstances. Togliatti also shared a common background with Gramsci as well as a sense of the distinctiveness of the Italian revolutionary tradition. This blending of the two personalities during the period of Fascism solidified the party into the entity one sees today. With the death of Gramsci in 1937 the whole party leadership was shifted to Togliatti.

Between 1930 and 1933 the PCI center in France had little success in reviving the underground in Italy against the




Palmiro Togliatti

mounting pressure of the Fascist state. The organization continued to be whittled down by the repressive methods of Mussolini. In 1934 the PCI, realizing that it was losing in Italy, switched to external activities abroad.

One of the first manifestations of the new policy was the formation of the "Unity of Action Pact" in 1934 with Nenni's Socialists. This was a logical extension of Gramsci's theories of cooperation and of Togliatti's application of these principles. Also in 1934 the PCI switched its activities to foreign ventures aimed at propagandizing the Italian emigres.

In 1935 the Comintern approved the PCI's idea of a united front and based its new worldwide strategy on the Italian model. The purpose of this new strategy was to unite mass support against fascism with a later mind to assimilating the full front into the communist party. The Soviets, because of fear of the rise of Hitler in Germany, even went so far as to induce the PCI to seek collaboration with the Fascists. The proposal was rejected by Mussolini, but the lengths to which the Soviets would go to insure their survival seemed endless.

The outbreak of the Spanish Civil War provided the PCI the opportunity to display its organizational and leadership talents. Togliatti, then a member of the Executive Committee of the Comintern, was appointed as the Comintern's representative in the War. Luigi Longo was one of the most effective leaders of the non-Spanish forces. Numerous other leaders of the International Brigades distinguished themselves during the fighting. The notoriety achieved by the PCI would not be lost



Luigi Longo

on the Italian people when the resistance was finally formed in Italy.

The impact of the signing of the Hitler-Stalin Pact on 23 August 1939 and the subsequent change in Comintern policy on Italy was cushioned by the fact that the PCI was so isolated from the Italian people. The results of the Comintern policy, which had such a bewildering effect on other European communist parties, did not reach the Italian people and hence the PCI was still held in relatively high esteem. The new policy did force the termination of the Unity of Action Pact with the Socialists and a definite cooling of relations between the two parties.

When France entered the war, many of the PCI leaders residing in France were arrested, and the remainder were forced to flee and move their headquarters to Moscow. Togliatti arrived there in April 1940 where he set up the structure for directing the Italian resistance.

When Germany attacked the Soviet Union in June of 1941, the Sixth Strategy of the Comintern, calling for a United War Front, was put into operation. By October 1941 the PSI and PCI had reunited in a new "Union of the Italian People." Through this union the PCI was able to subordinate the will of the PSI until the middle of the 1950's. It is one of the factors which would prevent the Italian Socialists from becoming a strong post-war party, able to stand by itself.

Once given the green light by Moscow to resume underground activities in Italy, Togliatti immediately reopened

the domestic center in Italy and began active agitation. In Milan and Turin the PCI renewed propaganda activities which were designed to give a political character to the labor movement. The skeleton underground system, benefitting from the obvious international notoriety of the PCI, was built up rapidly into an impressive resistance organization. By the end of 1941 the PCI was able to carry out effective clandestine operations in Italy.

The mission of the PCI during the resistance was two-fold: to defeat the Fascist regime and to penetrate the strongholds of Italian society. Because the PCI had the only well disciplined organization in Italy it was able to become the leader in the resistance effort as well as carry out its own far reaching political objectives. By March of 1943 they had succeeded in instigating strikes in Turin and Milan and by April definite cadres were reestablished in the north. On 10 June 1943 the Comintern was dissolved in a tactic designed to placate Russia's allies, and the strategy of National Fronts was promulgated. This policy was quickly accepted in Italy where communists, socialists, liberals and Catholics began to form "Committees of National Liberation" (CLN) to fight the Nazis. These organizations were generally run by the PCI leadership and were later used to participate within the legal framework in areas under allied control, and to carry out guerrilla warfare in areas under German control.

The backing the PCI received from all classes involved in the CLN allowed them to establish a foothold in some key

areas of Italian society; the national and local government administration; labor unions; cooperatives; and other numerous organizations and institutions. Many Socialist supporters who were disillusioned by interparty struggles and the party's utter collapse before the Fascist onslaught were more than eager to join these new organizations.

Through their powerful organization the PCI was also able to become co-leader of the national labor organization, and later obtain full control. The bureaucratic organizations of labor erected by the Fascists were taken over, lock, stock and barrel by the PCI.

When Mussolini fell on 25 July 1943, the PCI was in charge of most of the resistance activities in Italy and was the strongest political force in northern and central Italy. With the conclusion of the armistice between Italy and the Allies on 8 September, Togliatti began preparation for his return to Italy. The party's program from that time forward was designed to conclude the war effort, effect national reconstruction, develop a policy of collaboration and conciliation with other parties and classes in the name of national solidarity, and to hold in check the revolutionary potential of the workers while preventing the formation of other parties which could exploit this potential.

After 18 years of exile, Togliatti returned to Italy in April 1944. Togliatti knew the plans of the USSR and the theory of dividing Europe into spheres. He realized what bloodshed had occurred in Italy and had no illusions about a


revolution taking place in a country emerging from 20 years of Fascism and occupied by Allied troops. He planned to bring Italy down the road to socialism by a gradual process of democratization of the state and collaboration, based upon the guidelines set down by Gramsci. He wanted above all to build a large party capable of winning an electoral victory, or as he describes it: "We are the party of the working class; but the working class has never been foreign to the interests of the nation. We will no longer be a small, restricted association of propagandists for the general interests of Communism."⁴⁰ He was quick to assure the middle class that he would protect their interests also:

We do not intend to ask for the bureaucratization of any part of the National economy...or to fight capitalism in general...Even if we were alone in power today, we'd appeal to private initiative to help in the reconstruction, because we know that Italy isn't yet mature enough for certain tasks.⁴¹

Togliatti took the underground leadership of the PCI to task for not collaborating more fully with the anti-fascist forces and for their sectarian tactics. He immediately offered to support the Royal government and later aligned the party with the Badoglio cabinet. This willingness to join the ruling coalition was extended to each successive government until the PCI was forced out in 1947. Togliatti made everyone fully aware that he favored a constituent assembly

⁴⁰ Sidney G. Tarrow, Peasant Communism in Southern Italy (Cambridge, 1967), p. 106.

⁴¹ Claire Sterling, "The Crucial Hour for Italian Democracy," Reporter (2 June 1955), p. 11.



Palmiro Togliatti and Luigi Longo in 1945.

(as Gramsci had in his early writings). Unfortunately for the PCI, Western Allied pressure prevented them from achieving any key posts in the post-war governments or achieving decisive control of the parliament.

The clean slate that the PCI had carried into the war and its impressive resistance activities during the war helped to build it up to the second largest party in Italy by the war's end. Within a short time the party boasted over 1-1/2 million members; however, the important aspect of this growth was represented by the fact that it drew its support from a wide spectrum of the Italian people. It held a fascination for the majority of the intelligensia and these people supplied the brains and organizational ability which had become the party's chief asset. This organizational ability was applied to the local PCI-run administrations to produce a competent and honest machine. In a nation characterized by gross corruption and inefficiency, honest administration proved attractive to many non-communists.

Togliatti went one step further by removing many of the radical elements from positions of leadership in the PCI and turning over arms caches to the Allies. The PCI bent over backwards to keep from alienating the Allies. Also, being acutely aware of the Catholic hostility to his party, Togliatti insisted on the inclusion of the Lateran Pacts of 1929 in the new constitution.

The inclusion of the PCI in the Constitutional Committee was a crowning achievement for the PCI because it legitimized

their position and when the first government was formed in June of 1945, the PCI became part of it. By the end of 1945 the PCI had over 1.7 million members and continued to grow for the next five years.

The PCI participated in the Italian government until May of 1947 when Alcide de Gasperi excluded the PCI from the Government, but not before the PCI had proven that it could make a respectable attempt at working within the processes of the state.⁴² To do this, the PCI stifled any manifestation of long term revolutionary objectives and called for a continuation of the "United Front" formed during the resistance. A tactic which bore more than passing resemblance to that being used so successfully in Eastern Europe.

In the non-political arena, Togliatti attempted to institute programs that Gramsci had written about in 1919:

The socialist state already exists potentially in the institutions of the social life of the exploited working class. To tie these institutions together...to centralize them powerfully...means creating from then on a true and real workers democracy.⁴³

He mobilized the CGIL (Italian General Confederation of Labor) in an attempt to institute a dual controlled economy and thereby infiltrate the higher institutions of government. The idea was to institute management councils containing both employer and employee, which would become the pivot of industry.⁴⁴ By combining the forces of labor and capital, the

⁴² See Appendix C for PCI participation in government.

⁴³ Tarrow, p. 103.

⁴⁴ This system works well in West Germany now, but it did not suit the traditional Italian employer.

PCI hoped to gain a foothold in management process. Despite the pressure of the PCI and the massive labor organization of the CGIL, the Italian economy was reconstructed along conventional lines and the objectives of the PCI failed. This defeat of the economic plan, although it reflected on the ability of the PCI to carry out its total program, nonetheless failed to detract from the growth of the PCI. The failure was understood by most workers as more of a reluctance on the part of management to accept a reasonable policy than a failure of the PCI leadership.

Unfortunately, the fact that a successful accommodation could not be reached with the employers caused the workers to demand more militant action. Togliatti was impelled to issue a series of warnings to the people to maintain the party line and desist from any radical overtures. All of his maneuverings seemed to have been for naught because in May of 1947 the PCI was excluded from the government.

Had Togliatti been less aware of the Allied pressure against his inclusion in the Italian government he would have considered his parliamentary program a failure. But given the success achieved in gaining control of municipal administration, the labor organizations and the bureaucratic organizations, he could be proud of the effectiveness of his program.

Fascism and World War II had considerable impact on the PCI. The party learned that cooperation with all available groups was essential to achieve its ends, but also learned

that intra-party purity and discipline had to be maintained at the highest level to take advantage of the cooperation. It also learned that to cooperate it had to make appeals to all classes of the Italian people and control the radical fringe elements to keep from alienating the majority it sought. It is also apparent during this time that the ideology delineated by Gramsci in the late 1930's was carried out with very little change over a period of 20 years.⁴⁵ The Italian Communist Party had become a unique entity by the end of WWII.

⁴⁵ This continuity in Party ideology is discussed in most PCI literature. Although the Italian Communists admit to making tactical changes, they try to emphasize wherever possible that Gramscian thought was the guiding light during the period.

VII. TOGLIATTI GUIDES THE POST-WAR PARTY

The exclusion of the PCI from the Italian government, although detrimental to Togliatti's immediate plans, caused no alteration in the PCI's long term strategy. During Togliatti's period of leadership the party would still attempt to attain power through parliamentary means by pursuing a three-pronged strategy aimed at: (1) developing and maintaining the party base within the industrial proletariat while extending its influence throughout all aspects of Italian life, to include the middle class, the subproletariat and the southern peasant, (2) pursuing any favorable alliance or coalition, and (3) accommodating links with the USSR and the international movement which would not impact adversely on the party.

The strategy proved difficult to carry out in 1947 and 1948 in light of certain events which exacerbated growing anti-communist sentiments in Italy. The first problem arose within the party's own supporters, the militant labor force. This group staged a series of strikes throughout the country in protest over the PCI's exclusion from the government. Togliatti moved swiftly to halt the strikers and get them back to work. Although the strikers were calmed down by the communists, the Italian populace was acutely aware of the communist presence and firmly believed the strikes were communist instigated. Premier De Gasperi capitalized on the strike issue to reinforce the anti-communist sentiment which

he had earlier whipped up and used to exclude the PCI from the government.

In addition to the Christian Democrats' anti-communist campaign, the Catholic church was also conducting its own anti-communist campaign. Since the vast majority of Italy was Catholic, the Church held sway over a large bloc of votes which could be pivotal at any point. Gramsci had been aware of this fact; in his writings he made it a Party imperative to win Church support. Togliatti had been following this policy quite closely, as evidenced by his strong support of the attachment of the Lateran Pacts to the Constitution. The bad publicity from Eastern Europe over treatment of Catholics overshadowed any PCI overtures and caused the Church to press harder against the communists.

By the fall of 1947 the international scene was to provide a further roadblock in the PCI's strategic path. The Zhdanov speech in September to the Cominform urging the communists to take the hard line once again and wreck the West's economic recovery ran counter to Togliatti's "respectable politician" approach. If Togliatti followed "orders" by resisting reconstruction and disrupting the Marshall Plan, he would certainly alienate business and the middle class, while economic failure would destroy the workers. On the other hand, if he alienated the USSR he would lose his financial backing and repudiate the center of communism. Togliatti did what the PCI could do so well, he took the middle road by playing to the Soviets verbally and half-heartedly while focusing most of the Party's

attention on domestic priorities.⁴⁶ This tactic allowed the PCI to continue to pursue both strategies and became one of the cornerstones of its over-all policy.

If all of these events weren't bad enough, the Unity of Action Pact with the PSI was coming under fire from groups within the PSI. In January 1947, a group led by Guiseppe Saragat broke with the PSI (this group would form the core of what later became the Social Democratic Party). Throughout the year other factions left the PSI to join the Saragat group, thereby cutting back on an already weakened party.

In spite of the fact that the PCI's membership drive seemed to be blunted somewhat, Togliatti persisted in following the Party strategy.⁴⁷ Convinced that the party could form a socialist state by parliamentary means, Togliatti continued to advocate the use of democratic methods to attain power.⁴⁸ Perhaps he may have also found it difficult at that time to change the structure of the organization which had been devised under the auspices of Gramsci's theories for a parliamentary accession to power. Additionally, most Italian people found it hard to believe that a communist could conform

⁴⁶ None of the machinations that the party went through to please the Soviets were pressed with any determination because of fear of alienating an already skittish Italian middle class.

⁴⁷ Membership figures were still increasing but not at the previous rapid pace. For a comparison, see Appendix E for figures.

⁴⁸ Galli, Giorgio, "Italian Communism" Communism in Europe, Vol. I, ed. William E. Griffith (Cambridge, 1964) p. 305.

to a democracy, especially in light of the "Czech Coup" in February of 1948.

In April of 1948, the nationwide elections provided a test of both the Christian Democrats' anti-communist campaign and the strategy of the PCI. The Christian Democrats were obviously the big winners and polled an impressive 48% of the vote; however, the Communists were able to maintain their strength by polling, along with the PSI, 31% of the vote, and even increased their seats in the Chamber of Deputies by 27.⁴⁹

The PCI's mass party strategy was somewhat vindicated by these elections, but the PCI was forced to scale down its ambition from trying to get into the government immediately to a more modest target of building a powerful opposition.

There was an additional threat to the PCI's moderate strategy in July of 1948. On 14 July, as Togliatti was leaving the Chamber of Deputies, he was wounded by a 25-year-old Sicilian student named Antonio Pullante. The reaction of the radical elements in the PCI to the attempted assassination was immediate. The largest labor union, the CGIL (Confederazione generale italiana del lavoro), called a general strike and violence broke out in Turin, Genoa, Milan and Tuscany. For a while it looked as if the revolution was imminent; however, the PCI leadership acted quickly to halt the radicals and by the 16th things had returned to normal. The radicals were obviously disappointed by the failure of the

⁴⁹ Mackie, Thomas T. and Richard Rose. The International Almanac of Electoral History. (New York, 1974), p. 72. See also Appendix F for voting figures.

PCI leadership to provide inspiration and direction to the willing revolutionary forces.⁵⁰ Although the PCI had antagonized many of its industrial proletariat supporters, it had kept from alienating other sectors of Italian society and prevented the government from using the strikes as a pretext to crush or even outlaw the Communists.

Togliatti was clearly fortunate in having many subordinates who could carry on while he was hospitalized. Had discipline in the Party hierarchy been less stringent, the crisis may have gotten out of hand, and as it was, serious breaches of discipline did occur. Several groups within the leadership polarized around which way the Party should have gone during the strikes. When Togliatti recovered he swiftly moved to demonstrate that Party strategy and discipline would be followed implicitly and democratic centralism was still a mainstay of Party policy. On 18 July he instituted a series of purges in which the more radical members of the Party were replaced.⁵¹ It became evident to even the most radical elements that the PCI was determined not to upset the balance in the country until the Party had a large enough majority to allow it to control the organs of government fully.

⁵⁰ It is interesting to note the presence of a strong violent revolutionary apparatus even without the support and guidance of the PCI leadership.

⁵¹ Wohl, Robert A. "Palmiro Togliatti--Master of Maneuver," Leaders of the Communist World, ed. Rodger Swearingen (New York, 1971), p. 28.

During this same timeframe the PCI was still going through the motions of seemingly following the Zhdanov directive, albeit half-heartedly. In June the Communists made a bid to help the Italian government administer the European Recovery Plan, which was voted down in the Chamber of Deputies and the PCI quickly let the issue die. Other unsuccessful and weak attempts were made in this same vein throughout the year while the PCI continued under-the-table cooperation with the government. In fact, despite the open display of ideological hostility to the government, from 1948 to 1953 more than one-half of the laws passed in parliament did so in committees with the support of the PCI.⁵² The PCI was obviously pursuing domestic policies at the expense of relations with the CPSU.

The CPSU was not so naive as to be oblivious to what the PCI was doing; however, problems in Eastern Europe took most of its time. The CPSU pressured and admonished the PCI to get back in line but the obvious positive results of the PCI strategy made the Soviet policy seem rather futile.

The PCI sensed the reluctance of the Soviets to clamp down severely on it and pushed forward with its plans to extend the Party's electoral and membership base. During 1949 and early 1950 the drive to sign up members reached its peak when the price of a card was reduced to ten lire, or one-half the price of the Party newspaper.⁵³ The results

⁵² Devlin, Kevin. The PCI's Long March Through the Institutions. Radio Free Europe Background Report #103 (10 May 1976) p. 5.

⁵³ Bouscaren, Anthony J. Imperial Communism (Washington, D.C., 1953), p. 175.

were somewhat spectacular as Party membership rose to 2,532,625.⁵⁴ Although this drive was perhaps successful in pure numbers, certain groups were still not being penetrated successfully. In particular, the Catholic church dealt the PCI a disastrous blow in 1949. In July, Pope Pius XII excommunicated all Marxists.⁵⁵ As can be seen from the membership figures, this move was not immediately disastrous, but the long term impact on Catholic Italy would have profound implications for the PCI. Without the Catholics the PCI could never control the country.

In other domestic developments, the PCI-controlled CGIL reintroduced the idea of dual management of industry but resistance was still so great that the proposal was withdrawn to prevent alienating business. The CGIL was emasculated somewhat by the PCI leadership and had to be content to perform mainly traditional trade union functions. The PCI took up much of the slack from the CGIL and between 1950 and 1953 mediated labor disputes between labor and the government, typically trying to portray the government in a bad light.

The only pro-Soviet plan of any substance during the 1950-1953 period was an offer by the PCI to support any

⁵⁴ Legislative Reference Service of the Library of Congress. World Communist Movement: Selective Chronology, 1918-1957 (Washington, D.C., 1960), p. 389.

⁵⁵ Kogan, Norman. "Italian Communism, The Working Class, and Organized Catholicism: An Italian Interpretation." Western Political Quarterly, XI, No. 3 (September 1958), p. 534. Also see Vree, Davis. "Coalition Politics on the Left in France and Italy," The Review of Politics, XXXVII, No. 3 (July 1975), p. 350.

government which would try to neutralize aspects of the cold war.⁵⁶ Not realizing that this offer was designed to aid the Soviets, many Italians applauded the PCI for their non-revolutionary and democratic stance.

In March 1953, Stalin died and with his death a series of events began which would allow the PCI finally to pursue openly its long repressed domestic strategies and equally repressed autonomous international role. The death of Stalin came at an opportune time for the PCI because of the approaching Italian elections. While the USSR was "leaderless", the PCI quickly boasted of its moderate and responsible position, one which was independent of outside influence. The PCI polled 6,121,922 votes and increased their percentage of the vote to 22.6%. There was a slight increase in seats in the Chamber of Deputies to 143, or 24.2%.⁵⁷ The PCI-PSI coalition together polled a total of 35% of the vote. The Communists showed significant gains among the southern peasants and the middle class, although because of their previous labor tactics there was a decline among the industrial workers of the north.⁵⁸

Togliatti sensed that the PCI had finally emerged from a purely protective period into one in which it could expand and take the initiative in increasing its penetration of Italian society. He remarked on 15 September 1953 that:

⁵⁶ Galli, Giorgio. "The Road Toward a Dilemma, 1945-1956," Problems of Communism (May/June 1956), p. 45.

⁵⁷ See Appendix F for comparison of figures.

⁵⁸ Galli. "The Road," p. 46.

The victory of June 7 has brought to maturity the first elements, and I believe also the principal elements, of a new situation, in which the democratic labor forces see before them the possibility of passing from resistance to advance.⁵⁹

Furthermore, the results had shown in slightly less than a decade the PCI had grown from a party based in the industrial north to a "great mass party" spread throughout a wide strata of the Italian society. The decline of prestige among the proletariat was a small price to pay for pursuing a successful strategy which had extended its social base and electoral strength. The Party had also been able to maintain quite close and friendly relations with the USSR despite its differences of opinion with respect to Italian strategy.

Togliatti continued the Party's penetration into Italian society in the period from 1953 to 1956. No new programs were initiated, but as Togliatti indicated, the Party took the initiative in spreading the Party base throughout the country. At this point it would be easy to assume that the PCI may have been tempted to go further in its compromises with parliamentary methods and make changes in the Party organization also. This was not the case, as the Party maintained its reliance on the typical Marxist-Leninist forms of discipline and authority it had instituted in 1921. A good example of this occurred on 18 January 1955 when Togliatti demoted a high Party official, Pietro Secchia, and "exiled"

⁵⁹ Galli in Griffith, p. 308.

him to Lombardy as the regional secretary because of differences of opinion concerning strategy.⁶⁰

Events within the association of international communist parties seemed to have been unstable between 1953 and 1956, but it was clear that the Soviets were giving tacit approval to PCI policy. The Soviets were becoming more agreeable to a new degree of autonomy in the international communist movement. At the Bandung Conference of April 1955, Krushchev formulated the idea of a Commonwealth of Socialist Nations rather than the previous rigid "family."⁶¹ Other liberal policy decisions by the CPSU signaled the PCI that it was not overstepping its authority.

The real watershed for PCI strategy occurred in 1956 when the "secret speech" once and for all resolved the conflict between domestic strategy and the international communist movement. It was ironic that the Soviets were the ones who cut the bonds and released the PCI to pursue its own brand of socialism. This period alone could provide ample material for research because of its importance to the PCI, and yet the results can be summarized fairly concisely for the purposes of this paper.⁶²

⁶⁰ Legislative Reference Service, p. 908.

⁶¹ Triska, Jan F., ed., Communist Party States. (Indianapolis, 1969), p. 11.

⁶² See Donald L.M. Blackmer's book, Unity in Diversity for just such a detailed extensive analysis of the events and ramifications of destalinization.

One of the first lessons that the PCI had learned from the Bordiga days was that it was imperative to attend all CPSU Congresses to show solidarity with the Soviets. Consequently, Togliatti was present in Moscow and able to take advantage of the opportunities which arose at the CPSU XX Congress. The CPSU XX Congress met in February 1956 to discuss some of the new policies of the Soviet Union and the world communist movement. Basically three issues were raised by Khrushchev. First, peaceful coexistence between east and west was possible as the ideological barriers separating the two camps began to fade.⁶³ Secondly, Khrushchev endorsed varied and democratic roads to socialism and a new system of socialist states by stating that:

Forms of transition to socialism vary and implementation of these forms need not be associated with civil war under all circumstances. (Further) the question arises of whether it is possible to go over to socialism by using parliamentary means. No such course was open to the Russian Bolesheviki, who were the first to affect this transition. Lenin showed us another road, that of the establishment of a republic of soviets, the only correct road in those historical conditions...

The winning of a stable parliamentary majority backed by a mass revolutionary movement of the proletariat and of all the working people could create for the working class in a number of capitalist and former colonial countries the conditions needed to secure fundamental social changes.⁶⁴

The final issue dealt with Stalin's cult of personality.

Khrushchev admitted that Stalin had made errors which were not

⁶³ Codevilla, Angelo. "The Opening for Communism in Italy," Politeia, II., No. 1 (Winter 1964-1965), p. 29-30.

⁶⁴ Boggs, Carl Elwood, Jr., The Transformation of Italian Communism. (Berkeley, 1970), p. 80.

appropriate for the USSR, and stripped Stalin of the godlike reverence with which he was held.⁶⁵

The ramifications of the "secret speech" were far reaching. The speech acknowledged pluralism among the communist parties of the world by doing away with the automatic subordination of every communist party to the Soviets. This acknowledgement of pluralism in turn open the way to the pursuit of independent national strategies. Of some significance was the subsequent loss of the aura of infallibility which the USSR had perpetuated for so long. With agreement that national needs of each country would be different from those of the Soviets, it was clear that open doctrinal conflicts would eventually evolve (the PRC, for example, would eventually break totally with the Soviets). Free discussions of ideological problems, openness to the West and a recognition of alliances and coalitions would all have a profound effect on world communism.

For the PCI, Khrushchev's admissions seemed to totally ratify the policy that had been followed by the Italian Communists since Gramsci first formulated it in prison. This was the same policy line which had been carefully reiterated by Togliatti in 1944.⁶⁶ However, Togliatti was not content to leave anything to chance so when he spoke to the Congress he made sure that it was clear what the PCI's sentiments were.

⁶⁵ Codevilla, p. 29-30.

⁶⁶ Boggs, p. 80 and see also Galli, "The Road," p. 48.

With attention to his domestic audience in Italy, he demanded that the Soviet comrades give a detailed answer to the question of how the course of socialist development in the USSR could have allowed a person like Stalin to become so warped. Then, for good measure, he added that he was now sure that no one believed that the PCI got instructions from the CPSU on how to conduct business. In spite of these seemingly hostile remarks, he did hint at confidential meetings with CPSU representatives.⁶⁷ It seems clear that although ties with the USSR went beyond the personal bonds forged by Lenin and Stalin, Togliatti's denunciation of Stalin helped to widen any theoretical gap between the PCI and the USSR. Togliatti did not press for any further concessions, perhaps because of the stunning impact of the "secret speech" or perhaps because he was satisfied with the majority of the items brought out in the speech.

On his return to Italy, Togliatti addressed a meeting of the PCI Central Committee on 15 March where he launched the slogan of the "Italian road to socialism." During his summary of events at the CPSU Congress he stated that:

The search for an Italian road to socialism has been our constant preoccupation. I believe that I am able to affirm that it has already been the preoccupation of Antonio Gramsci, who in all his political actions, particularly in the later period of his life, aimed to translate into Italian terms the teachings of the Russian Revolution.⁶⁸

⁶⁷ Nollau, p. 264.

⁶⁸ Galli in Griffith, p. 310.

The rest of his speech dealt with three basic themes which he had gleaned from the CPSU Congress and clearly felt would further the aims of the PCI: first, he reiterated Khrushchev's peaceful coexistence theme; second, the need to change the pattern of relationships between the USSR and other communist parties; and finally, the growing economic strength and democratization of the USSR.⁶⁹

The first theme suited the domestic purpose of the PCI because Soviet and international communist militancy could be played down. If the USSR could be viewed as a peaceful power, then the neutralist line advocated since World War I by the PCI would be more believable to the Italian people.

The second issue was the system of socialist states. The new autonomy within the socialist system proved the triumph of socialism against its enemies, since the USSR no longer had to be the bastion of the faith. It also meant that, "the states that are marching along the road to socialism are free states, independent, sovereign, fully autonomous."⁷⁰ Furthermore, as stated by Togliatti in his description of the "Italian road," it was clear that, although the Soviet experience in socialism was an inspiration to all, it had to be recognized that there were also other experiences that the PCI could learn from.⁷¹ These facts confirmed that the PCI

⁶⁹ Blackmer, Donald L.M., Unity in Diversity (Cambridge, 1968) p. 22.

⁷⁰ Ibid, p. 24.

⁷¹ Ibid, p. 24.

could and should continue to modify its strategy and tactics to suit its own unique domestic situation.

The last theme, dealing with the vast achievements of the Soviets, showed the validity of the Soviet system. Togliatti was sure that these great feats should have been an inspiration to all and spoke of how, once the Italians embraced communism, they too could expect great things. In light of the growth of post-war Italy, this optimistic view of a future socialist economy may have been a rather shaky hypothesis.

These three themes were accepted readily by the PCI membership but the destalinization of the CPSU caused a minor crisis in the Party. The Central Committee was polarized around Stalinists and "progressives." The polarization occurred within the context of an intellectual debate which even spilled over externally and gained notoriety in the Italian press. The debate centered around not only the repudiation of Stalin's methods, as compared to the more moderate approach of Togliatti and the PCI, but also the effect of destalinization on the international communist movement. It is interesting to note that this objectiveness within the party never threatened seriously the "we" mentality of the PCI, and as Blackmer noted, "at no point did party discipline become so weak that distinct factions with clear alternative programs were able to crystallize."⁷²

⁷² Ibid, p. 101.

In response to the internal discussion over the CPSU XX Congress, the editors of the periodical Nuovo Argumenti invited Togliatti and other intellectuals to write articles for their May-June issues on the subject. In the first of these articles Togliatti criticized the cult of personality which had built up around Stalin.⁷³ In a later article on 17 June Togliatti expounded on the fact that the PCI would now follow the "Italian road to socialism" and what the XXth Congress meant to world communism:

The Soviet model should no longer be obligatory...The complex of the system is becoming polycentric, and in the communist movement itself one can no longer speak of a single guide...The criticisms of Stalin give rise to a general problem, common to the whole movement.⁷⁴

On 24 June 1956 in an address to a Plenary session of the PCI Central Committee, he explained the meaning of the polycentric system:

The solution which probably most nearly corresponds to the new situation may be to grant the individual Communist parties complete autonomy and to set up bilateral connections between them, so that complete mutual understanding and mutual trust can be achieved, conditions which are essential for the unifying not only of the Communist movement but also of the whole of the progressive working class movement.

...It is clear that in the new situation, while we are working towards the creation of new contacts with other sections of the international Communist movement, we must energetically reaffirm and fight for the spirit of proletarian internationalism...⁷⁵

⁷³ For much of the text, see Daniels, Robert V., ed., A Documentary History of Communism (New York, 1960), p. 231-235.

⁷⁴ Labedz, Leopold and Walter Laquer, eds., Polycentrism (New York, 1962), p. 127.

⁷⁵ Nollau, p. 265-266.

Although this may have seemed to have been a declaration of independence from the USSR, closer examination will reveal that Togliatti only went as far in his autonomy from the USSR as he felt was required to aid his domestic strategy and in effect echoed Khrushchev's "system of socialist states."

The destalinization process allowed the PCI to openly and actively pursue long sought goals. The discussion in the PCI which ensued from July to December of 1956 led to a gradual change in the tactics to be used in the pursuit of these goals, but the basic strategy of alliances and electoral presence remained unchanged. The PCI obviously had to restructure its ties with the USSR, but this restructuring had been slowly taking place since 1944 when Togliatti arrived back in Italy and described his "new party." The only disruptive effect of the XXth Congress was the rise of a Bordiga-like group within the PCI which published a series of not too complimentary articles in June and which caused its expulsion from the Party.⁷⁶

After the Polish uprisings in July, Togliatti once again published an article clarifying the "Italian road":

It would be...unwise to draw...the conclusion that it is beyond any doubt that in Italy we will be able to reach socialism by means of a series of parliamentary decisions. The error therefore lies in saying that the terms "Italian road" and "parliamentary road" are equivalent. Will we succeed, and how, in using Parliament to foster the advance to socialism? In any given situation the problem must be faced and resolved in the light of concrete data ...But why is it also wrong and senseless to establish an identity between the "Italian road" and the "democratic road"? Because every road that leads to socialism is

⁷⁶ Labedz, Leopold. Revisionism (New York, 1962), p. 328.

necessarily a democratic road, always and in whatever case...⁷⁷

Togliatti was still juggling words to arrive at a satisfactory explanation as to how the Party was to progress. Clearly, he was still concerned with maintaining his tactical flexibility as each new international and national development occurred. The rapid way in which the situation in Poland was cleared up allowed the PCI to escape without major adjustments, but the events in Hungary in October of 1956 were not so easily overlooked.

The armed intervention and decisive crushing of the revolt in Hungary caused such a furor in Italy that the PCI was forced to make some hard decisions concerning their association with the international communist movement and the USSR. Perhaps because of their continued attachment to the Soviets, the PCI's response was too supportive of the Soviets for the Italian people.

Instead of open outrage, the PCI concerned itself with the ideological validity of the Soviet action. Togliatti originally agreed with the spirit of the Hungarian people in wanting to pursue their own form of socialism; however, under the pressure of the Soviets, the PCI finally defended the "painful necessity" of Soviet intervention because "counterrevolutionaries" had taken over the reform movement and the Soviets were compelled to restore unity to the

⁷⁷ Galli in Griffith, p. 311.

socialist camp.⁷⁸ The continued uproar in Italy over the intervention and the negative response to the PCI's analysis of the situation made it obvious to the PCI that a close association with the USSR could prove harmful to the PCI. By 1957, when over 200,000 party members had torn up their cards, Togliatti decided that such losses were not necessary and that all that was required was a tactic which would maintain close relations with the international movement while allowing the PCI to accept or reject anything the Soviets did and still remain good communists. Following the "Italian road" in a polycentric system was clearly the way to solve the problem.

The post-war period up to 1956 saw the PCI caught in a conflict of domestic and international priorities. The PCI had been unable to pursue a successful domestic strategy under Stalin's relentless directive pressure. With the release granted by Khrushchev's "secret speech" at the CPSU XX Congress, the Party was finally free to follow the "Italian road to socialism." During this period of settling into the "Italian road" the PCI would need to make fine corrections to its program in order to find an equilibrium within the strategic confines of Party goals. These adjustments would lead to domestic and international criticism and yet the PCI would ultimately be proven correct in its policies. The new

⁷⁸ Hellman, Stephen M. Organization and Ideology in Four Italian Communist Federations. (Cambridge, 1973), p. 50, 180.

polycentric system of socialist states had offered the PCI the opportunity for gradual autonomy and the PCI had accepted it.

VIII. THE PCI FOLLOWS THE "ITALIAN ROAD"

The period from 1956 to 1964, although turbulent in terms of international communist relations, was a period of domestic settling for the PCI. The process of de-stalinization caused frequent discussions over which way to go and what tactics to employ, but basically the Party began to solidify behind Togliatti's "Italian road." The decline of Soviet authority in the international movement as well as the Sino-Soviet split encouraged the Party to rely more and more on its own ideological and political resources. As its electoral strength grew, the PCI realized that its access to power was not dependent on its association with the USSR. As a result of the decision not to rely on the Soviets, the PCI moved more decisively forward with its system of alliances and penetration into Italian life.

The impact of the XXth CPSU Congress and the events in Hungary caused a drastic drop in Party membership of 217,197 by September of 1957.⁷⁹ Togliatti moved swiftly to expand the base of the PCI once again. He urged all cadre members to actively recruit new members. He even made some changes in the Party hierarchy to insure that he could maintain a smooth running organization and weed out some of the dissension. Enrico Berlinguer was made responsible for the over-all

⁷⁹ Labedz, Polycentrism, p. 201; also see Hellman, p. 158.

Party organization after having performed so admirably with the communist youth organizations.

On the international scene, the PCI was still cautious in its dealings with other parties. In November 1957, the PCI delegates attended the 40th anniversary celebration of the USSR revolution where apparently the Soviets attempted to restore some of their old worldwide leadership. The "Moscow Declaration" which followed the meeting stated common principles of international unity as well as reconfirmed the leading role of the USSR.⁸⁰ It was clear to the PCI at that time that the Chinese and the Soviets were having fundamental problems and despite its cautious attitude, the Party tried to help solve the problems.

The involvement in the Sino-Soviet split by the PCI is quite complicated. The PCI attempted to mediate the dispute between the two parties without making either hostile. Later developments would make it necessary for the PCI to side with the Soviets in the dispute, but at this point there was a real concern in the PCI that autonomy did not mean that the socialist parties should not be united, at least in basic theory. This need to maintain unity was given as the reason for signing the "Moscow Declaration." In any case, the Italians gained additional prestige in the international movement by their honest brokerage. This prestige and solidarity shown

⁸⁰ Blackmer, Unity, p. 130. For an excellent analysis of events within the Soviet sphere, see Griffith, William E. The Sino-Soviet Rift. (Cambridge: The M.I.T. Press, 1963).

with the international movement allowed them to take advantage of the situation to pursue an independent domestic policy free from conflicts with USSR.

Things were not going as well for the PCI domestically. The PSI, which had been drifting away from the PCI since 1956, continued to move farther away. At the PSI Congress in 1957 the Party Secretary, Nenni, pushed through a resolution stating that democracy was as important as attaining a socialist society.⁸¹ By 1959 the Unity of Action Pact was formally abrogated and the PSI moved swiftly to ingratiate itself with the ruling Christian Democratic Party. By 1960 some DC-PSI local administrations were formed and in 1963 the PSI was participating fully in the government. The PCI's strategy was obviously affected by this defection, but the inclusion of a leftist party in the government was a blessing in disguise. The Communists reasoned that if one leftist party could gain a respectable place in government, why couldn't the PCI? The answer to that question was found in the goals of the parties; one wished to reform and one wished to transform. The people of Italy were not ready for a radical transformation but perhaps as they became used to the PSI they might change.

The "economic miracle" in Italy in the late 1950's and early 1960's also forced the PCI to change their tactics. Some explanation for this growth had to be made and the PCI

⁸¹ Kogan, "Italian Communism, The Working Class, and Organized Catholicism," p. 537.

had to find something better to offer the workers. With a 75% majority in the largest union, the CGIL, the PCI was able to exploit much of the economic growth to their own advantage by saying the PCI's direction of labor had facilitated the growth. While no longer stridently predicting the imminent collapse of the capitalist system, the PCI was quick to point out that this was only because the PCI had been helping the capitalists to stave off collapse. The PCI even admitted that perhaps the EEC was not as bad as the Party had initially described it.⁸²

In January and February of 1960 the PCI held its Ninth Congress. The first item on the agenda was a "new" long term strategy designed to increase the PCI's inroads into the middle class. By the Congress almost 250,000 members had been lost since 1956 and the PCI needed to recoup its losses if the over-all strategy of a mass democratic party was to be effective. Togliatti called for all democratic elements of society, peasants, workers, intellectuals, small industrialists and white collar workers to unite together.⁸³ This "new majority" of all Catholic and anti-fascist forces would then be able to build a new Italian socialist system.⁸⁴

⁸² Galli in Griffith, p. 325-326.

⁸³ Blackmer, Unity, p. 221.

⁸⁴ Hellman, p. 117. This "new majority" was described by Gramsci in his theoretical writings and crops up as new theory now and again. Berlinguer's "historic compromise" is based on this "new majority."

After speaking at length of democracy for the people of Italy, the PCI displayed a little of its own internal "democracy" at the Congress by replacing some of its leadership so as to make room for people who were more supportive of the "Italian road." Along with the earlier resignations of leading party members Giolitti, Reale and Onofrio, this move solidified the Party's stand on what the future strategy of the PCI would be.⁸⁵

The autonomous role of the PCI got an added boost in November and December at the Moscow Conference of 81 communist countries when Khrushchev made an effort to recognize the differences between socialist countries, a theme he had touched on only slightly at the XXI CPSU Congress in 1959.⁸⁶ Khrushchev stressed the need for all parties to be independent and equal and to "shape their policies according to specific conditions in their respective countries."⁸⁷ He even went so far as to refuse to have the CPSU designated as the leader of the communist world.⁸⁸ The PCI wholeheartedly supported the Soviet position and once again its forward position was vindicated.⁸⁹

⁸⁵ Labedz, "Polycentrism," p. 127.

⁸⁶ Daniels, p. 273-281 and also Lowenthal, Richard. World Communism: The Disintegration of a Secular Faith (New York, 1964), p. 200-202.

⁸⁷ Blackmer, Unity, p. 170.

⁸⁸ Ibid, p. 178, and Lowenthal, p. 201.

⁸⁹ Dallin, Alexander, Johnathan Harris and Grey Hodnett, eds. Diversity in International Communism (New York, 1963), p. 845-860, p. 863. These documents, although delivered by Deputy General Secretary Luigi Longo still reflect the smug satisfaction of the PCI.

The period from late 1960 until the XXII CPSU Congress in October of 1961 was one of increasing turbulence in the international communist movement. The Sino-Soviet dispute was becoming more intense. The PCI finally sided with the Soviets because of the greater power of the Soviets to maintain unity in the international communist movement.⁹⁰

By the CPSU Congress in October, Khrushchev was still willing to recognize the differences between socialist countries. He was also willing to continue the process of destalinization begun at the XXth Congress, but the extreme positions of Albania and China forced his hand. The events of the XXII Congress and the expulsion of Albania are well known, but one may wish to read Dallin's book, Diversity in International Communism, which contains many original documents of the Congress.⁹¹ The utter disarray that the communist system was in after the Congress would bring about mixed emotions in the PCI.

This second wave of destalinization caused extended debate in the PCI over the unity of the socialist movement and the events within the Soviet Union. One of the features which was emerging as a unique feature of the Party was the ability to view other socialist parties objectively and make fine adjustments to PCI strategy if something better were found. Although perhaps too much emphasis has been placed on the debates of

⁹⁰ See Galli and Griffith for some of the reasoning behind why this was done and other particulars.

⁹¹ See Dallin, Diversity in International Communism.

October and November 1961, it was clear that even though supportive of the Soviets for unity reasons, the PCI was critical of Soviet policy. The PCI openly criticized Soviet domestic life as not fitting the pattern that Italian growth should take. These debates clearly went beyond the destalinization process of Khrushchev because they dealt with the need for continual revision of policy and structure to keep up with reality. Because of Togliatti's strong leadership, the debates were steered in a centrist direction so as to avoid many of the radical viewpoints in the Party. The Party was able to once again maintain discipline and order and come up with a policy formulated to please as many members as possible. The final communiqué at the end of the debates reflected this compromise.⁹²

Togliatti's initial address to the Central Committee, which reemphasized the autonomy and independence of the Italian Communists, set the framework for the final communiqué:

The decisions of the XX Congress, and particularly the texts relating to the possibility of avoiding a new world conflict, or to the various ways of reaching socialism, etc., had great importance to us, not because they caused us to revise the policy we had followed for twenty years but because, by confirming the correctness of that policy, they enabled us to go more deeply into it, give a better justification for it, develop it with greater courage in today's circumstances, and forge a better link, in all our work between practice and theory, thereby achieving a wide regeneration of our forces.⁹³

⁹² Blackmer, Unity, p. 182. See also Dallin's book for the actual documents and Sylvia Sprigge's article, "De-Stalinization in the Italian Communist Party," World Today, XVIII (January 1962), p. 23-29, for an excellent analysis of this period.

⁹³ Dallin, p. 409.

Certainly we cannot deny that this way of acting of ours has given our party a particular, original stamp in the very extensive camp of the international Communist movement of today. But this does not at all disturb us--quite the contrary. We have found nothing in Marx, Lenin, or Gramsci that contradicts or condemns the manner in which we are moving. We have always been persistent advocates, for quite a long time now, of the belief that the struggles of the working class must have a stamp of their own, corresponding to the conditions and traditions of the country, and a corresponding course of political action.⁹⁴

He made it clear that the Party was determined within the framework set out by the Soviets to become a completely autonomous party.

The final communiqué published by the PCI Secretariat on 28 November 1961 more accurately depicted the diversity of views in the Central Committee but still showed the strength of Togliatti's leadership. The issues debated and the diversity of opinions are contained in Dallin's book but can be summarized as follows: first, the PCI applauded the Soviet advancement; second, it once again spelled out the thesis that peaceful coexistence was the road for the PCI to follow; third, it confirmed the policy of destalinization and the policies of the XXII CPSU Congress, but made some rather harsh accusations about earlier errors of the Soviets; fourth, it acknowledged the idea of a multi-party, pluralistic system as being acceptable; fifth, it affirmed solidarity with the international movement; sixth, it stated that different roads to socialism were a correct approach to

⁹⁴ Ibid, p. 419.

international socialism; and lastly, it confirmed the Leninist principle of democratic centralism.⁹⁵

In the final analysis, the conclusions of the communiqué were more a compilation of several policies and strategies which had emerged in earlier PCI debates. No major change in the "Italian road" had occurred and the debate could better be compared to one which would arise in the CPSU Politburo than a schism or break in Party cohesiveness and discipline. The independent course which the Party now supported was no different than that advocated by Togliatti in 1944 or Gramsci in 1930.

While international events involving the Chinese and Soviets held much of the Party's attention, domestic policies were still important, and two noteworthy events occurred in 1963. The brightest spot seemed to be the growing rapprochement with the Catholic Church. In April 1963, Pope John XXIII issued his famous Pacem in Terris which essentially opened a new dialogue with the Marxists and undermined the discrimination against the PCI.⁹⁶ The inclusion of the PSI in the government also legitimized the position of the left and an "opening to the left" was underway in Italy.

Internationally, the PCI continued to side with the USSR in the Sino-Soviet dispute because of concern about the disruptive effect the quarrel was having on the international

⁹⁵ Ibid, p. 451-468.

⁹⁶ Kogan, "Italian Communism, The Working Class, and Organized Catholicism," p. 537.

communist movement. On the other hand, the PCI did not wish to have the CPSU regain its supremacy in the world movement for fear that the Italian Communists might lose some of their autonomy. Therefore, the PCI resisted Soviet attempts to excommunicate the Chinese through a worldwide communist party conference, but instead asked for a set of bilateral conferences to help work out problems amicably.⁹⁷ Togliatti found another subtle way to bring his objections to the Soviet's attention. He published a series of letters between himself and Gramsci in 1926 concerning the factional struggle in the CPSU at that time.⁹⁸ The gist of the letters was that factional disputes would have an adverse effect on international unity, which would have a detrimental outcome for the Soviet leadership. The Soviets' response to this subterfuge was rather neutral although they did register that they had seen the articles.

During the course of the dispute there was an obvious division of labor between the PCI and the CPSU. The PCI was able to voice ideas which the CPSU was toying with but prior to Soviet official pronouncement and therefore proposed ideas that seemingly ran counter to the Soviets.⁹⁹ This division of labor was to be extended throughout the 1960's and allowed greater flexibility in the Soviet strategy as well as Italian foreign policy.

⁹⁷ Galli in Griffith, p. 379, and also see Blackmer, Unity, p. 364.

⁹⁸ Blackmer, Unity, p. 364.

⁹⁹ Galli in Griffith, p. 379.

Soon after his debates with the CPSU over international unity, Togliatti left for a scheduled trip to the USSR. While staying in Yalta, Togliatti became ill and died. The memorandum he wrote to himself for Khrushchev on the eve of his death was to be one of the more important Party documents. While the "Yalta Memorandum" was not meant for public consumption, it was quickly published as Togliatti's "testament."¹⁰⁰ There was nothing particularly new or remarkable in the "testament" but the circumstances surrounding the authorship put a historical stamp on it.

Togliatti's memorandum expressed many of the tendencies which the Party had exhibited all along but the fact that it was his final document led to much interpretation. His "testament" dealt with several broad topics. He first declared that the PCI would attend a preparatory meeting in Moscow for an international communist meeting, but he criticized the Soviet handling of the Chinese situation and the slowness of destalinization in Eastern Europe. He wrote at length about the autonomy of the communist parties and reinforced different ways to socialism. He suggested that perhaps a looser form of exchange could take place between communist parties rather than a new international organization. He also crystallized the idea of transforming the state from within when he wrote about the possibility:

¹⁰⁰ A good description of his testament is published in French in *Est et Ouest*, No. 327 (Paris, 1-15 October 1964), p. 4-8.

....of the working class capturing the positions of power within a state that has not changed its bourgeois nature, and therefore the possibility of fighting for its progressive transformation from inside.¹⁰¹

The effects of the "testament" on the Soviets were negative to say the least. The "testament" created a platform for criticism of just about every Soviet policy. It also undermined the Soviet international position considerably. The stand taken by Togliatti was clearly not intended to support the Chinese view and yet the Chinese quickly capitalized on the points of international unity raised by Togliatti. What Togliatti would not have done to the Soviets while he was alive, his "testament" did after his death.

The impact of the "testament" on internal PCI politics was to reinforce the policies already in being and provide a concrete guide for the future. The PCI had travelled a rocky road during Togliatti's stewardship, but by the time of his death a cohesive Party had decided on a common plan for the future. Togliatti had applied Gramsci's theories of Marx and Lenin to the unique Italian situation and formulated the "Italian road to socialism." More than anything else, the Italian road was a pragmatic approach to the future which took into account the situation in Italy and applied the appropriate strategy or tactic. The Party now was given a much more concrete contemporary guide to the future. What Marx, Lenin and Gramsci had done for Party ideology, Togliatti had done for the strategy and tactics of the Party.

¹⁰¹ Est et Ouest, No. 327, p. 6.

IX. 1965 TO 1976; CONTEMPORARY ITALIAN COMMUNISM

Togliatti's loss to the Party was a great blow, but a final tribute to the man was the smoothness by which the Party machinery continued to run and the ease of the succession process. The Party functioned in his absence as he had planned. The strategy of the "Italian road" was maintained and the tactical spirit of adapting the Party to practical reality was applied at every opportunity. While affirming the image of autonomy, the PCI sustained the idea of international communist solidarity and continued its amicable associations with the USSR.¹⁰²

Togliatti died on 21 August 1964 and on 26 August Luigi Longo was elected unanimously as the new General Secretary by the PCI's Central Committee and Central Control Commission. Longo was the obvious choice and proved to be a good one. Seven years Togliatti's junior, Longo was the next senior party official and Deputy General Secretary. His excellent record in the Comintern and in the Italian underground added to his credentials of excellent party work in the post-war years. Longo's release of Togliatti's "testament" despite Soviet displeasure was a clear indication that he intended to follow the policies outlined by Togliatti.¹⁰³

¹⁰² Wohl, p. 30.

¹⁰³ Caldwell, William S. "Luigi Longo--Italy's Middle-of-the-Road Tactician." Leaders of the Communist World, ed. Rodger Swearingen (New York, 1971), p. 506.

Longo's organizational skill and centrist tactics were sufficient to keep the Party on the "Italian road" and increase the growth of Party strength.

Despite angering the Soviets over the release of the "Testament" the PCI did its best to maintain good relations with the Soviets between 1964 and 1968. The PCI position could best be described as that of the loyal opposition. They still resisted the reclaiming of supremacy of the world movement by the Soviets but they echoed the Soviet line on China, Albania and most other problems.¹⁰⁴

The Party's membership continued to decline from its high mark of 2,532,625 members in 1950. This was a deceptive problem because the actual base of sympathizers as reflected in electoral increases was still growing. By 1965 the youth movement had one-half million members, more than 150,000 over 1955. Also, the communist extension of its organization into all aspects of the Italian social structure was becoming more extensive. A case in point was the CGIL where, although PCI total numbers were reduced, the influence in the organization remained strong and was extended to include new sympathizers. (This penetration of Italian life will be discussed in a later chapter.) The PCI hierarchy seemed to be satisfied with the Party's progress and their plan was working even though it was taking a long time. The PCI philosophy was that when one is working for a utopian goal, time does not matter.

¹⁰⁴ Blackmer, Unity, p. 397.

In January 1966 the PCI met for its Eleventh Congress. The central topic of discussion was the growth of the Party strength. Pietro Ingrao and a small group urged more liberal action on this issue but their ideas were overruled.¹⁰⁵ Longo's policy put forward to the Congress was a reiteration of Togliatti's plan for a "single party of the working class" based on a "new majority" formed "through joint action between left-wing lay and Catholic forces."¹⁰⁶ Longo saw the "new party" as a combination of all socialist forces:

It is directed toward all of the left-wing forces; its purpose is to create new forms of cooperation and unity among them: on one hand, to help create a new unity of popular and democratic forces, and a new parliamentary majority, and on the other, to create a single party of the working class embracing all really socialist forces.¹⁰⁷

This "new" plan satisfied all sides of the debate over the Party's future strategy because it provided the most realistic approach to the Italian situation.

In addition to the "new plan" the normal range of other topics were brought up at the conference: the increasing worldwide crisis of capitalism; new contradictions in the Italian political and social life; the Party's propositions for the development of the new society; and the failure of the present center-left government in Italy to solve the

¹⁰⁵ Hellman, p. 210.

¹⁰⁶ Caldwell, p. 522. See also "Italy," The Yearbook on International Communist Affairs (hereafter referred to as YICA), 1966, ed. Milorad M. Drachkovitch (Stanford, 1967), p. 610.

¹⁰⁷ Caldwell, p. 522.

country's problems.¹⁰⁸ In the final document of the Congress, the PCI expressed the continuity of the Party ideology as well as the dedication to the transformation of Italian society:

With full confidence in the will of the Italian people to advance along the path shown by Gramsci and Togliatti, the Communists will vigorously carry forward their fight for a new policy, for the transformation of Italian society, for socialism.¹⁰⁹

There were some continued internal mumblings, perhaps brought on by the lack of a charismatic leader such as Togliatti; however, the Party hierarchy ably handled the problems. The solution took the form of numerous expulsions of Party members in the fall of 1966, beginning with that of a Senator, Luca di Luca.¹¹⁰ In September, Silvio Paolicchi, a federation secretary, and two regional secretaries, Giovanni Ceccarelli and Settimo Pallechi, were also expelled from the Party. "Discussion" was allowed within the Party's proper channels if it was sufficiently discrete and "friendly" but dissention and factionalism were dealt with by traditional Marxist-Leninist discipline and democratic centralism.

Luigi Longo represented the PCI at the CPSU XXIII Congress. His speech was very low key on international topics. He refrained from openly attacking the Chinese position, as was the case at the last CPSU Congress, but Longo did reiterate

¹⁰⁸ Est et Ouest, No. 354 (Paris, 1-5 January 1966), p. 10-11.

¹⁰⁹ YICA, 1966, p. 613.

¹¹⁰ Ibid, p. 128.


his solidarity with the Soviets.¹¹¹ The PCI press more than made up for Longo's omission of mention of the Chinese by directly attacking the Chinese for not attending the Congress and for the "extremely grave errors" in recent Chinese policy.¹¹² Longo was apparently still trying to maintain some friendly relations with the Chinese and repair the breach in international communist unity. However, it was obvious from articles in Italy that the PCI was becoming more pro-Soviet, as the Chinese drifted farther away from the Soviets and displayed open hostility to any rapprochement with the international movement.

In 1967 the Party continued to follow a moderate approach to domestic affairs. The strategy of combining with all Catholic and socialist forces was pursued diligently. Nothing particularly noteworthy occurred, which suited the PCI's strategy of a low profile penetration and it was therefore free to expound on international occurrences.

Several major policy statements were made by the Italian Communist leadership on the international situation during the year. Enrico Berlinguer delivered a speech to the joint plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission in which he supported the idea of convoking a world conference of communist parties. This agreement with the Soviet stand was made in the name of unity of the world

¹¹¹ Ibid, p. 128.

¹¹² Ibid, p. 128.



Enrico Berlinguer

communist movement.¹¹³ Berlinguer's position was ratified by Longo and the PCI leadership; however, in late October and early November Longo published a series of articles dealing with the world communist conference and other issues. In these articles he hedged on the Party's earlier endorsement of a world communist conference by calling for intensive study of world problems prior to the conference.¹¹⁴ Longo also repeated Togliatti's policy concerning unity in the world communist movement in the form of a loose association of socialist states. The term "unity in diversity" was to guide this association. This vacillation in the Party showed that the PCI was still following a centrist policy in its views toward autonomy and proletarian internationalism.

The events of the "Prague Spring" and the subsequent invasion of Czechoslovakia proved to be somewhat of a problem to the "fence sitting" strategy of the PCI. The Party was forced by domestic pressure to make some sort of a commitment. After showing caution initially, the PCI approved the new tack being taken by the Czech communists in the spring of 1968. In May Longo visited Czechoslovakia and expressed his Party's satisfaction with the way in which Czechoslovakian socialism was progressing.

Longo was in Moscow in August when the invasion occurred. The uproar was so great in Italy that, in his absence, the

¹¹³ YICA, 1968, ed. Richard V. Allen (Stanford, 1969), p. 925-930.

¹¹⁴ YICA, 1968, see p. 934-939 for complete text.

Directorate issued a statement expressing "serious disagreement" with the "wholly unjustified" military invasion.¹¹⁵

Upon Longo's return the PCI leaders met in several emergency sessions to confirm their initial reaction. Even during this display of Party indignation at the Czechoslovakian invasion there was not unanimous agreement. There were many old party officials who were not convinced that there was any difference between Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968 and therefore there was no reason to take offense with the Soviet undertaking.¹¹⁶

The debate in the PCI made it clear that three issues were involved in the Czechoslovakian invasion: the reaffirmation of worldwide Soviet hegemony within the socialist "system"; the autonomy of socialist parties; and the freedom to be allowed within any given country. The "Brezhnev Doctrine" made it clear where the Soviets stood, but it was more difficult to ascertain the PCI's position.¹¹⁷ The main thrust of the PCI was that the properly constituted organs of the Czechoslovakian state were capable of handling the situation in Czechoslovakia and should have been allowed to do so independently. In an article in Rinascita, Berlinguer questioned

¹¹⁵ YICA, 1969, ed. Richard R. Staar (Stanford, 1970), p. 500.

¹¹⁶ YICA, 1969, p. 500.

¹¹⁷ For an extensive and informative look at the impact of the "Brezhnev Doctrine" see Mitchell, F. Judson, "The Brezhnev Doctrine and Communist Ideology," The Review of Politics, XXXIV, No. 2 (April 1972), p. 190-209.

whether or not all political avenues had been exhausted by the Soviets before the invasion began.¹¹⁸ As can be seen by his article in Rinascita, his objections to the whole situation were on more of a philosophical rather than purely practical level.

In that article, Berlinguer tackled the problem of Soviet hegemony and autonomy of the socialist parties in such a way as to side with the Soviets while at the same time taking a backhanded slap at the latter:

If we point out and underline this undeniable situation (of different roads to socialism), this does not mean that we wish to detract from the fact that the Soviet Union represents the first, the most grandiose and multiform experience in the building of socialism nor that we deny that this experience has been, remains, and will always be a rich source of precious information for all. It means, however, that we recognize, even in the building of socialism, the legitimacy and indeed the absolute historical and political necessity of the most varied and original roads. And it means that we must consider in a new way the problem of how we can and must ensure a system of relations among the socialist states founded on common solidarity in struggle and reciprocal collaboration, despite this diversity.

On this point, we have always expressed the opinion that one of the essential conditions to guarantee this objective is absolute and rigorous respect of the principles of sovereignty, equal rights, and non-interference in relations among socialist states.¹¹⁹

He gave the impression in several places in the article that there was a definite need for action in Czechoslovakia, but because of the philosophical level of the article he never described what action would have been appropriate.

¹¹⁸ See YICA, 1969, p. 1037-1042 for the complete text.

¹¹⁹ Ibid, p. 1037.

Berlinguer's article also reflected the PCI's preoccupation with the extent of internal freedom a country was to have. Since Italian public opinion had focused on the freedom issue as the real reason for Soviet intervention, the Party had to make it a part of its discussion also. While not naming specifics at that time, the PCI did stress the fact that internal conditions were the sole domain of each independent party.¹²⁰ The freedom issue will be analyzed more in depth in a later chapter.

As discussed above, the Italian people reacted favorably to the democratization of a communist regime and, like the rest of the world, was shocked by the invasion and suppression of freedom. But just as quickly as the rest of the world, the Italian people let this issue of Czechoslovakia die, and although the PCI followed suit, periodically articles confirming the Party's initial stand on Czechoslovakia surfaced. The issues in these articles have always been the same: agreement with the new course the Czechoslovakians had been pursuing; the Czech Communists were capable of handling the situation; and the military intervention only aggravated the problem.

As far as over-all impact to the PCI went, besides casting doubt once again on whether a communist country could ever be free and autonomous, the PCI's membership in 1969 dipped to the slowest figure since World War II, 1,503,181.¹²¹ By 1970

¹²⁰ Ibid, p. 1041.

¹²¹ YICA, 1970, ed. Richard F. Staar (Stanford, 1971), p. 209.

the membership figures were on the rise, so the effects of the intervention seemed to have been only momentary.

In February of 1969 at Bologna, the PCI held its Twelfth Congress during which nothing new was added to the Party platform of the last Congress. Peaceful coexistence, solidarity with the Soviets, "validity of the strategy of reforms and alliances," the new majority, and a need to tighten up the organization were the major themes at the Congress.¹²² Although Czechoslovakia was mentioned briefly, the speeches about Vietnam evoked the greatest applause and most interest.

A dissident group which had begun to form in 1968 became more visible at the Congress. This "leftist" group was allowed to address the Congress but warned about their criticisms. The group continued to express criticisms of the USSR and PCI throughout the Spring and by June had published its own periodical, Il Manifesto. The persistence of the group, despite a number of opportunities to return to the "Italian road," prompted the PCI to expel the group temporarily. This temporary expulsion was made permanent by local federations in November and a wave of purges followed in November and December which cleared the Party of other dissident elements.¹²³

The PCI attended the International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties at Moscow on 5-11 June 1969.

¹²² Ibid, p. 214. Also, for a more complete listing of the theses as drawn up in the Fall of 1968 see Est et Ouest, No. 414 (Paris, 16-30 November 1968), p. 3-6.

¹²³ Ibid, p. 213-214.

Berlinguer led a large contingent which firmly discussed both Czechoslovakia and the Sino-Soviet dispute. Once again Italian declarations were more directed at increasing discussion to solve problems rather than placing blame on any individual party. The PCI was successful in preventing any condemnation of China in the final document, but because some controversial issues in parts of the document may have offended non-communist Italians, the PCI only signed the last section of the document.¹²⁴

The so-called "Hot Autumn" of 1969 brought PCI attention back to the domestic arena. Worker dissatisfaction that had been building since 1967 when the Italian "economic miracle" began to fade erupted in Autumn in a series of massive grass-roots strikes.¹²⁵ The PCI was momentarily disoriented by the spontaneity of the strikes and the Party's inability to control the tempo. It was imperative for the Communists to bring the strikes rapidly under control because a large sector of the middle class was swiftly becoming alienated by the events of the "Hot Autumn." Gradually, the striking died down and became controllable. Once the strikes had subsided, the PCI quickly proclaimed a victory for the Party at having been able to raise the level of worker cohesion and militancy to new levels.¹²⁶

¹²⁴ Ibid, p. 216.

¹²⁵ Popov, Milorad. YICA, 1971, ed. Richard F. Staar (Stanford, 1971), p. 213.

¹²⁶ YICA, 1971, p. 213-214.

The challenge to the Party provided by the labor unrest provided fuel for the Il Manifesto group, which played upon the indecision of the PCI. Lingering "leftists" within the Party also called for a more specific policy from the PCI. Since the PCI was slowly trying to improve its image as a moderate party, it found a need to disassociate itself from these factions, so further purges and resignations occurred in 1970 and 1971.

The emphasis on alliances and coalitions to extend the moderate image of the PCI brought new members to the PCI ranks in the form of women, because of the PCI's support of the divorce referendum in 1970, and many businessmen, by the Party's support of the institutional status quo. The Party also found opportunities to criticize the Czechoslovakian intervention and the Soviets' "repression" of freedoms, which further increased its respectability at home (but only after the Italian press had raised the issues, and then the Party only went as far as domestic consumption required).

In 1971 the PCI participated in the CPSU XXIV Congress, where Luigi Longo delivered the Italians' address to the Congress. After expressing the usual platitudes, Longo summarized the PCI's international views:

Our international solidarity does not mean and, needless to say, cannot mean the complete coincidence of our positions with the positions of each socialist country or, on a broader plane, with the positions of each Communist or Worker's Party, positions that it has taken and is taking on its own responsibility. Our solidarity means profound solidarity with a country like yours, with the other socialist countries, with all of that world that has already altered the destiny of mankind

by the very fact of its existence and by its gains.¹²⁷ This same theme was repeated later in the year in a series of articles published on the occasion of Nikita Khrushchev's death.¹²⁸ Once again the PCI seemed to be proclaiming the need for autonomy and yet still solidly in the Soviet camp. The polemics against the USSR never caused a serious break with the Soviets, and the PCI was always quick to praise the Soviets at every opportunity.

The PCI's thirteenth Congress, held in March of 1972, was focused on domestic affairs again. Berlinguer, the newly-elected General Secretary, in his opening remarks to the Congress proposed a "new" program of cooperation in the country: "In a country like Italy a new perspective can only come about through collaboration between the three great popular currents: Communist, Socialist, and Catholic."¹²⁹ He added that this new force would require the defeat of the ruling Christian Democrats so they would have to open their forces to contact with the Communists.¹³⁰ Berlinguer was clearly trying to impress the Italian electorate with the

¹²⁷ Bessel, Richard, ed. "The Documentary Record of the 24th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union," Current Soviet Policies, Vol. VI (Columbus, 1973), p. 49. The slightly abridged text is presented on p. 49-50.

¹²⁸ Liverani, Carla. YICA, 1972, ed. Richard F. Staar (Stanford, 1972), p. 196.

¹²⁹ Liverani, Carla. YICA, 1973, ed. Richard F. Staar (Stanford, 1973), p. 193.

¹³⁰ Est et Ouest, No. 487 (Paris, 16-30 April 1973), p. 9. Full text is presented on p. 9-10.

openness and willingness of the PCI to cooperate with all aspects of Italian society (the Congress just happened to coincide with the elections in Italy). His willingness to cooperate obviously did not extend to the Christian Democrats and, in actuality, Berlinguer's "new" proposals were just old policies dating back to Gramsci, Togliatti and Longo, but which were worded in a slightly different way.

Berlinguer's accession to power posed no difficulties since he had been a protégé of Togliatti and Deputy General Secretary under Longo. The 72-year-old Longo was given the honorific post of Party President where he was to remain a persuasive but not initiative force in PCI policy making. The election of Berlinguer to the General Secretary's post meant that, despite occasional internal disputes, the PCI policies which had been initiated by Gramsci were to be continued unchanged by the new leadership of the PCI.

Early in March, members of the PCI met with CPSU officials to discuss the international movement and foreign policy issues. The joint communiqué issued at the end of the meeting proclaimed agreement on issues long considered to be points of contention between the two parties:

The delegations of the CPSU and the PCI proceed from the premise that in the development of the revolutionary struggle in all countries there are common principles which manifest themselves in different ways according to the specific conditions in each country. Each country independently develops its own way toward the democratic and socialist transformation of society and the building of socialism according to the conditions and traditions of its own country. The two parties reaffirm determination...to contribute to consolidation of the unity of international communist and workers' movement and to its



Enrico Berlinguer and Luigi Longo at a PCI rally.

solidarity and cooperation, while respecting the autonomy and equality of rights of each party on the basis of non-interference in internal affairs.¹³¹

The communiqué also emphasized the "damage done by any form of anti-Sovietism" but affirmed the policy of overcoming the Cold War legacy of opposing military blocs in Europe.¹³²

Things seemed to be going well between the two parties but discussions over the different printed versions in Soviet and Italian newspapers led to problems. The omission of certain points of autonomy in the Soviet version caused Berlinguer to comment on that subject and on other topics of Soviet foreign policy, most notably "freedoms" and Czechoslovakia. After reaffirming the PCI's original stand on Czechoslovakia, Berlinguer mentioned the lack of freedom in Eastern Europe. These remarks were broadened to include the repression of dissidents in the Soviet Union. The conclusion drawn by the articles was that Italian Communist and Soviet ideas of democracy were not the same.¹³³

The right wing coup d'etat in Chile crushed what the Italians thought was to be the model for future communist accession to power. The Chilean experience confirmed the PCI's policy of the need to form broad alliances to gain power but indicated a necessity for a much greater majority to hold power. Berlinguer qualified his earlier proposals

¹³¹ Chubb, Judith A. YICA, 1974, ed. Richard R. Staar (Stanford, 1974), p. 187.

¹³² Ibid, p. 187.

¹³³ Ibid, p. 188.

for collaboration of the "democratic forces" of Italy by saying that a simple majority would not be sufficient in the future to achieve the socialist society but that a "historic compromise" among the great majority of Italian people was required.¹³⁴ The PCI leaders emphasized that this was a long term project and would not be accomplished overnight. The "historic compromise" gave a new twist to the old alliance strategy and became the central point of future PCI policy (because of its importance, it will be discussed in a later chapter).

International affairs in 1974 and 1975 tended to prove that the PCI was correct in taking a more long term approach in its domestic policies. Specifically, the events in Portugal reinforced the events in Chile and prompted Berlinguer to go further in his concessions to the other parties in Italy so as to facilitate the "historic compromise." Berlinguer emphasized the PCI's willingness to remain in the EEC and even stated that the PCI would no longer press for Italy's withdrawal from NATO.¹³⁵ This change in posture on NATO was explained by Berlinguer as being designed to reduce friction between the left and right in Italy.

The domestic and international strategy of the PCI was obviously working well, as evidenced by the large gains in the regional elections in 1975 (the PCI gained almost 6%

¹³⁴ Ibid, p. 184-185.

¹³⁵ Germino, Dante. YICA, 1975, ed. Richard F. Staar (Stanford, 1975), p. 215.

compared to a DC loss of 2%).¹³⁶ The PCI gained control of three more regions as well as almost all of the major cities in Italy.¹³⁷ Had these elections taken place on a national level, the ruling coalition led by the DC would surely have been forced to make concessions to the Communists in 1975.

At the PCI's fourteenth Congress in March of 1975, the Party dealt with the usual international and national problems but focused the majority of the discussions on the "historic compromise."¹³⁸ Berlinguer stressed the need for a "transformation" of the DC before the "historic compromise" could take place and that the coalition would then take place only within the framework laid out by the "democratic and socialist" forces.

The PCI, in turn, was doing a little transforming itself. The Politburo was entirely eliminated and the Secretariat was increased from 7 to 9 members. This streamlining was perhaps due to the leadership's desire to increase control and discipline within the Party as the regional organizations spread out and decentralized.

The Party's policies in the rest of 1975 and 1976 remained almost unchanged except for some tactical changes which will

¹³⁶ Codevilla, Angelo. YICA, 1976, ed. Richard F. Staar (Stanford, 1976), p. 180-182.

¹³⁷ Devlin, Radio Free Europe Background Report #103, p. 2.

¹³⁸ See "Western Europe Daily Report," Foreign Broadcast Information Service (hereafter referred to as FBIS) No. 82, Supp. 6, 28 April 1975 and No. 87, Supp. 8, 5 May 1975 for the complete text of the Congress.

be noted in later chapters. This cohesiveness and stability of the PCI continued to garner good results, as shown by the elections of June 1976 when the PCI polled 34.4% of the vote compared with 38.7% for the DC.¹³⁹ The DC was for a time even running behind the PCI in the polls and seemed in danger of losing.

The PCI emerged from the elections as the real victor since it had a dramatic increase in votes and yet did not have to take the reins of government while the country was in such a shaky position economically. Because of the DC's inability to form a government alone after the elections, they were forced to rely on abstentions of no-confidence votes from the PCI and therefore allow some limited participation in government by the PCI. This penetration was in the form of the PCI's acquisition of chairmanships of permanent commissions of the Senate and Chamber of Deputies for the first time in the history of the post-war republic.¹⁴⁰ In addition, Pietro Ingrao was named as Speaker of the Chamber of Deputies. The PCI gained the chairmanship of the following commissions: in the Chamber of Deputies: Constitutional Affairs, Finance and Treasury, Public Works and Transport; in the Senate: Budget, Agriculture, Councils for Authorization to Proceed and for the Elections. If one understands that a majority of the bills passed by the Italian government are passed by these

¹³⁹ Proctor, Robert E. "Political Impasse in Italy," The Nation (31 July - 7 August 1976), p. 83.

¹⁴⁰ FBIS, No. 145 (27 July 1976), p. L-1.

commissions, then it is easy to realize the tremendous gains made by the PCI in the June elections.¹⁴¹ By claiming seven of the twenty-four chairmanships, the PCI is now able to exert more influence in the government. Although the representation in the commissions is proportional to the electoral vote, the chairmanship allows the PCI to "guide" the decisions of the commissions in the PCI's favor (as in the U.S. Congress).

By 1976 the PCI had advanced well along the "Italian road" to power. While not denying the internationalism of the Party, changes in the international relations of the PCI had taken place. A superficial examination of history alone may even indicate a deradicalization of the party to the extent that they might be just another democratic party. A closer inspection of the Party should reveal whether or not the tactical and strategic changes made throughout the Party's history led to ideological changes also.

¹⁴¹ For an explanation of the workings of the legislative process, see the Istituto Italiano Di Cultura's Facts About Italy, No. 5, "The Legislative Process in Italy" and No. 6, "The Parliament," (Italy, May 1970). Also see Adams, John C. and Paolo Barile. The Government of Republican Italy (Boston, 1972), p. 65-71.

X. THE IDEOLOGICAL CONTEXT

The origins of Italian communist ideology are two-fold: the historical cultural context of the Italian national experience; and the writings of Marx and Lenin. While it is not the intent of this paper to accomplish a descriptive analysis of Italian communist ideology or a comparative analysis with the Soviet system, certain aspects of both types of analyses will emerge during the description of the character of the PCI.

It is assumed that the reader has a basic knowledge of Marxism-Leninism; however, some parallels will be drawn with Marxist-Leninist theory to refresh the reader's memory for comparison with the unique Italian experience.

To speak effectively of the ideology one must have a firm idea of what ideology is. For the PCI, it is a symbolic guide to action, a source of solidarity and communication which provides for concrete role definition, as Gramsci wrote:

Ideologies, thus are "true" philosophy because they are philosophical "vulgarizations" that carry masses to concrete action, to the transformation of reality. That is, ideologies are the mass aspect of each philosophical conception which in the "philosopher," looks abstractly universal, beyond space and time....¹⁴²

¹⁴² McInnes, Neil. The Western Marxists (New York, 1972), p. 28. McInnes' book is a concise comparison of major Marxist theorists. Although perhaps lacking in depth, this book should give the reader who wishes a refresher on comparative ideology as a basis for an analysis of Italian theory a place to start.

Within this broad context Gramsci further subdivided ideology. Besides the pure philosophy, there are doctrinal elements, the general direction of political action, and the action program itself.

In modern Italian revolutionary ideology, the doctrinal assumptions about the nature of reality have led to several changes in actions programs but not philosophy. This is clearly evidenced in the historical context and will be re-emphasized more later.

Assumptions about the realities of Italian politics have generated one of the unique aspects of the PCI, which is the ability to quickly alter its program to meet the changing state of societal affairs. These pragmatic solutions to everyday problems are integrated into the Party's systematic program, but only after first checking for justification in communist philosophy. Other communist parties do this same thing but none have specifically allowed for such contingencies in their ideology and most are then dogmatic about changes. The PCI has made a point of flexibility in meeting the needs of its long term goals.

The PCI has been called revisionist, but, since communism has taken so many forms, revisionism is to Marxian movements what heresy is to religious ones, i.e., what occurs inside one movement is dogma, while externally it is viewed as heresy. With respect to revisionism, the PCI contends that it ultimately bases its theory and practice on the ideas of Marx, the elucidation of Marx by Lenin, and a uniquely national

philosophical interpretation of Gramsci. When the PCI is finally backed into a corner over ideological disputes, it stubbornly persists in its adherence to the traditions of Marxism-Leninism.

The national element of the Italian communist movement has developed out of the confusing myth that there is some sort of mystical affinity between communism and the "people." This confusion and misunderstanding, which is based on erroneous assumptions about the goals of the Communists is extraordinarily durable. The sources of these assumptions are several. The first is the semantic disorientation which the Party fosters through the systematic perverse use of the language, e.g., by calling "hegemonic" that which is "dictatorship," "democratic" that which is "autocratic," and "free" that which is upheld by coercion. By falsifying reality through obscuration of the language, the PCI has made inroads to the actual sense of political reality.

As was clearly visible in the historical context, the Communists have also made an effort to identify the Party with Italian tradition, such as the Risorgimento and the Resistance. This strategy has encompassed a broader penetration and coalition strategy which will be discussed at length, but briefly this identification with competing movements has allowed the Party to recruit fellow travelers by blurring the issues and alignments to prevent drawing lines of ultimate conflict.

The final confusion arises over the fact that the true purpose of the PCI is normally concealed behind the facade

of democratic ideals. This is in turn enhanced by the formidable communications stopper which arises out of the projection of Western democratic expectations, needs, values and cognitive habits. Since the majority of Western experiences have been shaped by dealings with other democratic parties, there is a tendency to mistake short term strategies and tactics for long term goals.

In the following chapters certain characteristics of PCI theory and practice will be analyzed to clear away the confusion surrounding the purpose of the Party. The PCI will be looked at to find out whether it is a revolutionary party or whether time and changes have de-radicalized the Party. To preclude a misunderstanding caused by the interpretation of Communist goals by the Western mind, much of the Party's own words will be used to describe the PCI.

XI. PCI GOALS AND STRATEGY

It is being asked whether we communists are taking the road to become a social democrat party. Our party has remained, remains and will remain a communist Party. To be and remain such, means first of all that in whatever circumstance (even when one must demonstrate realism and flexibility) one must not lose sight, not even for a single moment, of the seeds for which we are fighting: The emancipation of workers and of all society, of the construction of a society superior in everything and for every thing to the bourgeois society.

Enrico Berlinguer, 21 September 1976¹⁴³

Italian Communism is unique in that while most of the socialists in Europe were trying to apply Marxism to their countries Antonio Gramsci was interpreting Marx in an Italian way. Gramsci's formative years during World War I impressed upon him the vibrant moral, material and cultural history of the Italian people so that when he began to apply Marx to Italy he did so to all aspects of Italian life: political, cultural, social, and economical. Gramsci had no intention of revising Marx but rather thought of himself as following Lenin along the course of further purifying Marx.¹⁴⁴ Gramsci was mainly concerned with a less deterministic and dogmatic approach to Marxism, or as Togliatti described it, "with Gramsci, Marxism is liberated from the parasitic deformations of positivist Marxism and vulgar materialism, and regains its

¹⁴³ FBIS, No. 184 (21 September 1976), p. L-5.

¹⁴⁴ Cammett, p. 192.

full value as a conception of the world and an integral vision of history."¹⁴⁵ It is sufficient to note in any case that the Italian movement, although Marxist-Leninist in origin, has been enriched by Gramsci and a once purely international class movement is now one that develops along national lines.¹⁴⁶

The PCI, despite whatever accusations have been leveled at it, has, because of Gramsci, had the tremendous advantage of a largely original theoretical analysis in which the majority of the Party firmly believed since the early days of its formation. This originality was indeed an advantage considering the disastrous domestic and international upheaval as well as the ideological conflict in the international communist system from 1921 to the present. Gramsci's Quaderni del Carcere (prison notebooks) are most certainly more resonant for PCI ideology than any other source, perhaps even overshadowing Marx. To insure purity in ideology, the Party, which controls all of Gramsci's writings, only releases bits and pieces when required to substantiate or initiate policy. In fact, several years ago the USSR urged the PCI not to publish all of Gramsci's works because they contained suspect material. Many of his earlier writings which may have been

¹⁴⁵ Greene, Thomas H. "The Communist Parties of Italy and France," World Politics, XXI, No. 1 (October 1968), p. 27.

¹⁴⁶ Triska, Jan F., ed. Communist Party - States (Indianapolis, 1969), p. 10.

embarrassing were delayed in publication until after the CPSU XX Congress.¹⁴⁷

What is Gramscian ideology? It is derived from Marx and Lenin, it proceeds from the premise that capitalism will disappear, it is concerned with the transformation of society and then continues where Marx and Lenin became fuzzy. Gramsci was more concrete about the transition to power, the role of the intellectual, the use of will in politics, and taught that quality and profundity of ideas were essential in political success.¹⁴⁸ Togliatti called Gramsci the "political realist" because Gramsci's theories were designed to become a guide to over-all goal resolution while allowing almost anything in practice to achieve the goals.¹⁴⁹ This realistic response to the Italian situation was described in his metaphorical writings on war in which he allowed for diverse tactics to be used by a revolutionary party in an advanced country.¹⁵⁰ As was shown in the historical context, Togliatti took these flexible theories and turned them into practice in Italy, being always careful to bind each new strategy or tactic together with a bit of Gramscian ideology. The philosophical aspect of the PCI can thus be summed up as national,

¹⁴⁷ McInnes, Neil. The Western Marxists (New York, 1972), p. 88.

¹⁴⁸ Marzani, Carl. The Open Marxism of Antonio Gramsci (New York, 1957), p. 7. See also Gramsci, Antonio. Letters from Prison, ed. Lynne Lawner (New York, 1973).

¹⁴⁹ Blackmer, Unity, p. 10.

¹⁵⁰ Tarrow, Sidney G. Peasant Communism in Southern Italy (Cambridge, 1967), p. 127-128.

flexible, based on its own thinkers, more concrete in its guidance and yet not dogmatic.

Once the Party had an ideology it needed to set goals for the future and plan strategies. As shown in the historical analysis, the PCI has always followed a rather continuous strategy, but what about goals? Have these goals been consistent and are they really revolutionary or just progressive?

Since communism calls for a revolutionary change in society, from capitalism to a classless society, then it follows that the PCI must be a revolutionary party if it is to be really communist. The problem lies in defining what is revolutionary. Revolution has been defined as "a complete or radical change of any kind," for example, "overthrow of a government, form of government, or social system, with another taking its place."¹⁵¹ Nothing is said about violence, but instead, radical change is the key word and change is, "to be partially or wholly transformed, in nature, form or character."¹⁵² In summary, revolution is a radical transformation of the nature of society, not necessarily involving violence. Even Lenin said that violence was not a necessary prerequisite for revolution.

Looking for statements calling for radical change in the Italian communist pronouncements is difficult, since the PCI

¹⁵¹ McKechnie, Jean L. Webster's New Twentieth Century Dictionary (New York, 1975), p. 1553.

¹⁵² Ibid, p. 1938 and p. 302.

is surely not going to find much cooperation in government if it broadcasts the fact that it wishes to do away with the government. Then again, there is a problem defining whether a change is radical enough to be called revolutionary or, as the Syntopicon describes the problem, "that change is, is evident, but what change is, is neither evident nor easy to define."¹⁵³ Perhaps the best way to solve this problem is to use the words of the PCI itself. If the PCI calls for a transformation and not just progressive changes, then it can be assumed it fits the definition of revolutionary change.

Early in the formulation of PCI theory by Gramsci it was clear that although the aim of transformation must be preserved, the means would have to conform to Italian experience, and it would be non-violent. If the Party was to enter the government and transform society from within, a violent revolution would be disruptive because the state system itself was to be used in the transformation.¹⁵⁴ This transformation shaped up as a lengthy process, involving a prolonged conflict between values and ideals in the gradual transformation of Italian society, rather than the sudden Boleshevik changes perpetrated at the political level.¹⁵⁵ Gramsci felt that in order to destroy capitalism it was first necessary to

¹⁵³ Hutchins, Robert M., et al. Great Books of the Western World, Vol. II (Chicago, 1952), p. 193.

¹⁵⁴ Tarrow, Peasant Communism, p. 112-113. See also Marzani, p. 7.

¹⁵⁵ Boggs, p. 63-64.

undermine the legitimacy, the moral and cultural dominance of the ruling bourgeoisie and the groups aligned with it prior to the assumption of power by the working class. In his writings he likened this process to a battle where there was a "war of position" (the undermining process) and a "war of movement" (when the government is totally transformed).¹⁵⁶

The "war of position" was the long campaign of passive resistance in which the state would be infiltrated and undermined from within the superstructure of bourgeois society. In this war the revolutionary party is required to deal with democracy on its own terms:

The massive structure of modern democracies, their state organizations and complexes of civic organizations, constitute for political art the "trenches" and permanent fortifications of the front in the war of position.¹⁵⁷

On the other hand, the "war of movement" is the frontal war which takes place at every opportunity but without endangering the "war of position." The "war of movement" will probably be limited to small skirmishes until it is obvious that no opposition can overcome the final thrust in the "war of movement."¹⁵⁸

The PCI leadership has constantly maintained that they have been fighting the "war of position" to gain control of the cultural, social and economic base of society and that while in this war the revolution is essentially non-violent -

The transition from capitalism to socialism...does not shape up as a general catastrophic collapse but as an

¹⁵⁶ Tarrow, Peasant Communism, p. 126-129

¹⁵⁷ Ibid, p. 127.

¹⁵⁸ Ibid, p. 127-128.

interplay of battles and revolutionary conquests that will develop to different degrees..."¹⁵⁹

This downplaying of the radical aspect of the Party began early in the Party history with the ouster of the Bordiga faction and has continued throughout the long history of the Party.

It is important to understand that this "war of position" does not portend the ultimate goal of the Party. Only after absolute power has been concentrated in the hands of the PCI will the radical transformation occur. The "war of movement" is a new phase which has not been entered yet and therefore the effects are often disassociated from the communist movement.

Following Gramsci's theories, the PCI set the stage for the battle for socialism in Italy under its own terms:

Communists are laying down certain inescapable conditions: a coherent program of reforms and a new method of government which will free the state from the parasitic incrustations of those engaged in political corruption. Only under these circumstances can the rapprochement between Communists, Socialists, and a DC which has been changed in terms of its trends and methods provide a positive solution to the country's serious crisis.¹⁶⁰

The Party also declared that in spite of what occurs within the context of the "war of position" the Italian people will have to realize that the PCI is determined to cure the ills of the country by communism and not by progressive reform. Gian Carlo Pajetta summed up the way to this new socialism:

¹⁵⁹ Ibid, p. 5.

¹⁶⁰ FBIS, No. 117 (13 September 1974), p. M2.

...it would be simplistic and even grotesque to imagine a new unity of the workers' and socialist movement as acceptance of the status quo by the Communist. The elimination of the old splits - even though seen as autonomous characteristics that have developed in this period - the new internationalism, make sense only if they serve to emerge from the crisis of capitalism in a new way, to transform the society that produced it, to open a new page of history.¹⁶¹

Pajetta further declared that for the Italian Communists, "our model cannot, therefore, be that of social democracy which, even where it has governed for a long time has not brought about an effective socialist transformation."¹⁶²

Essentially, the final goal of the Party will be different than that displayed by the pragmatic maneuvering in the "war of position" to build "the new socialist society which... involves a transformation of the entire structure of society..."¹⁶³

Despite these definite long term goals of the Communists, there is perhaps still a question in some minds as to whether or not the PCI is really not just a social democratic party. It is difficult for some to realize that when the Communists start sounding like social democrats in their "war of position" they are not trying to say their goals have changed but only that they will achieve them by persuasion.

¹⁶¹ Rinascita (Rome, 28 November 1975), p. L2.

¹⁶² FBIS, No. 239 (11 December 1975), p. L2.

¹⁶³ Berlinguer's speech to PCI CC, on 13 May 1976. FBIS No. 105, Supp. 36 (25 May 1976), p. 20. Macciocchi emphasized this in her book on p. 139 when she said, "our party was born and grew not just to build a democratic society, but to destroy capitalism and construct a socialist society." Macciocchi, Maria A. Letters from Inside the Italian Communist Party to Louis Althusser (New York, 1973).

Gramsci always advocated a more peaceful and flexible approach than Marx or Lenin.¹⁶⁴ More recently, when asked if the PCI's policies of peaceful transition to socialism meant they were social democrats, Berlinguer replied:

No, because social democratic societies do not progress toward overcoming capitalism. Nor are they successful in freeing themselves from the characteristic element of modern capitalism, namely the presence of large monopoly concentrations. Whereas socialism also means the affirmation of new human values, in social democratic society, despite the progress made in terms of material prosperity, all the negative effects of capitalism, such as alienation, continue to exist...¹⁶⁵

Clearly the Party hierarchy believes in the transformation of society, but what about the lower echelons? In Maria Antonietta Macciocchi's book describing her victory while running for the Chamber of Deputies in Naples under the PCI ticket during 1968 she states that:

The thing which is really at the heart of this victory is, as I have written so many times, the triumph of the ideals of profound opposition to the old class society; the aspiration to overturn this society (and not simply to correct it or see it improved); it is, in general, what we call a drive for socialism.¹⁶⁶

Of course, it would take many people like Macciocchi to make the changes required and in her opinion, "the PCI has an overwhelming quantity of true revolutionary militants in its ranks, above all in the working class."¹⁶⁷ In Robert Putman's

¹⁶⁴ McInnes, Western Marxists, p. 73.

¹⁶⁵ FBIS No. 118 (17 June 1976), p. L5.

¹⁶⁶ Macciocchi, p. 273.

¹⁶⁷ Ibid, p. 293.

studies of the PCI members in the Chamber of Deputies in 1968, the Communists scored well above all others in radical tendencies (Table I and Table II).

The PCI is definitely more radical than any of the other parties but does this mean that violence will be used by the PCI to effect the desired change? The best answer to this question comes from Steven Hellman's 1970 study in which the Party's feelings toward violence are analyzed (see Table III). This, of course, does not mean that 38% of the Party will use violence to take power, but as Hellman noted:

Several respondents took pains, in their openended answers, to stress that while the PCI foresaw a peaceful transition to socialism, a recourse to violence was not ipso facto excluded. All those who did make this point emphasized that a peaceful road was possible and desirable, but, should reactionary forces attempt to prevent the left from taking power forcibly, such a maneuver would be met in kind. This has always been the PCI's position, and, particularly given the experience of so many older functionaries in the Resistance, I included--more out of curiosity than anything else--an assertion in the written appendix (of the PCI statutes) which raises the question of severe and often cruel measures being necessary during revolutionary upheavals. The wording of the assertion is: "In order to realize great changes which benefit humanity, it is often necessary to act in a completely unbiased and even cruel way." 168

Within the context of all of these radical reforms, it is clear that a transformation of the political structure will have to take place, but the full impact of the transformation is left intentionally fuzzy. Since the PCI has decided to assume power only with a virtual electoral monopoly within the parliamentary constraints, it is safe to suppose that the

¹⁶⁸ Hellman, Organization and Ideology, p. 455.

TABLE I

Attitudes to the Existing Socioeconomic Order, 1968¹⁶⁹

	PCI	Non-Communist Left* (in percentages)	Center Right
1. Total rejection, destruction proposed	15	4	0
2. Rejected, but ameliorative reforms proposed	70	15	0
3. Accepted, but ameliorative reforms proposed	15	81	61
4. Accepted, no important reforms proposed	0	0	39
	<hr/> 100	<hr/> 100	<hr/> 100
	(N = 20)	(N = 27)	(N = 36)

* Non-Communist Left is composed of deputies from the PSI, the PSIUP, and the left-wing of the DC.

¹⁶⁹ Putnam, Robert. "The Italian Communist Politician," Communism in Italy and France. eds., Donald L.M. Blackmer and Sidney Tarrow (Princeton, 1975), p. 204.

TABLE II

Attitudes to the Existing Political Order, 1968¹⁷⁰

	PCI	Non-Communist Left*	Center Right
	(in percentages)		
1. Total rejections, destruction proposed	5	0	0
2. Rejected, but ameliorative reforms proposed	30	4	17
3. Accepted, but ameliorative reforms proposed	65	93	61
4. Accepted, no important reforms proposed	0	4	22
	<hr/> 100	<hr/> 100	<hr/> 100
	(N = 20)	(N = 27)	(N = 36)

* Non-Communist Left is composed of deputies from the PSI, the PSIUP, and the left-wing of the DC.

¹⁷⁰ Ibid, p. 184. For a more detailed look at Putnam's methodology and further aspects of his study, see "Studying Elite Political Culture: The Case of Ideology," American Political Science Review, LXV (1971), 651-681, and The Beliefs of Politicians: Ideology, Conflicts, and Democracy in Britain and Italy. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973.

TABLE III

Functionaries' Reaction to Assertion About Severity
and Cruelty as Often Necessary¹⁷¹

Response	Total	Red Areas	White Areas	Under 40	40 & Over
Agree	38%	36%	42%	47%	29%
Disagree	62	64	58	53	71
Totals	100	100	100	100	100
(N)	(34)	(22)	(12)	(17)	(17)

¹⁷¹ Hellman, Organization and Ideology, p. 455.

state itself will become the instrument of the monolithic party wherein the total use of power will bring about the restructuring of the society's social and economic system. Gramsci made this point in 1919 when he wrote that:

The socialist state already exists potentially in the institutions of the social life of the exploited working class. To tie these institutions together---to centralize them powerfully...means creating from then on a true and real workers democracy.¹⁷²

The PCI reemphasized Gramsci's thoughts in its 1976 Party platform when it spelled out the need to direct power from the central government and, "to enable Parliament to accomplish this function, we need a profound transformation in its form of existence and operation."¹⁷³ Most of the policy statements of the PCI have purposefully been left vague on the subject of transformation of the form of government to prevent the government from using such statements as a pretext to outlaw the Communists. It is clear from Gramsci's theories and the occasional statement that pops up that the Party will use the State in the "war of position" and modify it for the Party's purposes in the "war of movement."

More obvious statements of transformation have been made about the economic and social transformation of Italy. Perhaps this has been because the PCI finds more support for change in these areas. The central goal of the revolution is transformation of the economic structure. Gramsci originally wrote about the unique requirements for the transformation of

¹⁷² Tarrow, Peasant Communism, p. 103.

¹⁷³ FBIS, No. 105, Supp. 36 (28 May 1976), p. 47.

Italian economy. He explained that in highly developed and automated capitalist societies there was a capacity for retention of a neo-capitalistic system within the new socialist order.¹⁷⁴ This new-capitalist system would incorporate a new order of production and distribution.¹⁷⁵ The state would be the ultimate arbiter and controlling agency for the means of production. This would mean that the Italian economy would be run along the lines of "state capitalism," where the state uses central planning to control the economy and free markets to stimulate the economy. Some communist countries have recently introduced a measure of market socialism to increase efficiency, but for the Italian economy this would be a step backward rather than forward.¹⁷⁶

This state-directed economy is still what is being proposed by the present leadership, "for us, therefore, it is a question of public control, of utilization of the major means of production in the interests of the nation, of progressive worker participation in management, of the introduction of the elements of socialism."¹⁷⁷ Berlinguer emphasized the need for central planning in his 13 May 1976 speech to the PCI Central Committee:

¹⁷⁴ Greene, p. 5.

¹⁷⁵ Pozzolini, A. Antonio Gramsci: an Introduction to His Thought (London, 1968), p. 5.

¹⁷⁶ Johnson, Chalmers. Change in Communist Systems (Stanford, 1970), p. 3.

¹⁷⁷ Interview with PCI Secretariat member Piero Pieralli. FBIS, Annex 235 (5 December 1975), p. 1.

Democratically prepared and implemented (economic) planning will be the basic instrument for this policy: not in order mechanically and in an authoritarian fashion to put ourselves above the laws of the market, not to expand the public economic area which will instead be restored and reorganized, but in order to use the laws of the market in the correct fashion so as to bring about massive shifts of funds and political commitments toward agriculture and toward scientific research, to guide the necessary process of industrial conversion, to establish new priorities in investments and consumptions, to provide jobs for boys and girls, and to broaden the area of social consumption.¹⁷⁸

The PCI Central Committee refined Berlinguer's ideas and explained them in more detail in their policy statement for 1976:

All fundamental choices of our planning policy--including those pertaining to sector programs for industrial conversion--must be submitted to Parliament. On the whole, our proposals tend to establish a close relationship between Parliament and the government in the management of economic policy, giving Parliament greater policy making and supervisory powers and enabling it to exercise these powers efficiently. The regions will be given an essential role in the formation of planning policy directions to which they must be called upon to contribute both through direct participation in the various phases of drafting the programs and the directions on the national level.¹⁷⁹

These proposals seem to parallel the Soviet Gosplans which leave little freedom for the industries to choose the direction of the economy. Although the phrase "democratic planning" has been used frequently by the PCI, once the state commands that production will proceed in a certain manner, democracy will no longer be part of the system.

¹⁷⁸ FBIS, No. 105, Supp. 36 (28 May 1976), p. 46.

¹⁷⁹ Ibid, p. 46.

To introduce a state-commanded economy, it would be necessary to control the majority of industry, which could be easily accomplished since Italy already has a high degree of centralism, with close relationships between banks and industry. Great bank trusts virtually control large portions of Italian industry, which are in turn dependent on government orders to maintain their viability.¹⁸⁰ Togliatti had advocated the nationalizing of most of the major monopolies while allowing some industry to remain in private hands. Togliatti deduced that with the state directing the economic plan and controlling major industries there is no need for the state to own everything. Part of this realization was reinforced by the fact that Mussolini controlled the economy quite well without nationalizing everything.¹⁸¹ Furthermore, if the state controls production quotas, employment policies and investments, while still allowing private ownership, then the people who are the nominal owners of these private businesses feel they have a stake in their business. The PCI official platform of 13 May 1976 assured the private sector that it will be able to survive, but within the framework of high level controls.

¹⁸⁰ For a further analysis of this phenomenon, see Proccacci, Guiliano. History of the Italian People (New York, 1970).

¹⁸¹ Some good parallels between Mussolini and proposed PCI economics were drawn by Angelo Codevilla in an interview entitled Italy After the Elections on 8 June 1976 by Valerie Bloom, Senior Financial Analyst, Flow of Funds Management, Bank of America.

We communists hold the opinion, as we have said many times before, that we must not look to a further extension of the public sector of the economy but rather to a rearrangement and a renewed commitment of this sector --which today is big enough--toward the attainment of the main economic and social development objectives spelled out through democratic planning. We must at the same time seek to offer--through planning--a frame of reference for the choices of the private enterprises and we must point up their development along priority lines.¹⁸²

The agricultural sector will probably undergo the largest transformation of the economy. Presently, there are many large, inefficient estates in Italy which control the majority of the land but produce little. The PCI wants to replace large land holdings with non-paying tenancy or peasant ownership.¹⁸³ People would be offered inducements to return to the farms and start a new life. The same state direction will apply to the farms that applies to industry. The proposal is akin to that presently being used in Poland.¹⁸⁴

In summary, it can be said that the PCI desires a transformation of the economy into a state command economy which can operate in a free market. The state is to be the final planning and directing agency and the central point of investment so as to control its plans. This economy will not require nationalization of all industry. Berlinguer stated this policy plainly on 3 June 1976:

¹⁸² FBIS, No. 105, Supp. 36 (28 May 1976), p. 40.

¹⁸³ Jones, Mervyn. "Italy: Il Momento e Grave," New Statesman, (18 June 1976), p. 801.

¹⁸⁴ FBIS, No. 105, Supp. 36 (28 May 1976), p. 40.

We believe that private enterprises in all sectors (in industry, agriculture, trade, cottage industry and so forth) can operate usefully--together with a public sector of the economy--not only in the building of socialism but also in an advanced socialist society. The distinguishing point is that in a socialist economy the economy is programmed in a way which tries to direct the whole economy toward general interests and establishes reference points, advantages and certainties from which both public and private enterprises can draw inspiration.¹⁸⁵

Besides the goal of ultimately overthrowing the dominant ideology and economy interests, the Party also advocates the utopian goal of a classless world society. This classless society would mean a levelling of life for the Italians and not necessarily an increase in prosperity. The PCI spelled out its goal in its 1976 policy statement when it called for:

A situation of greater justice and prosperity for the entire population, understood here not just as the search for and the possibility of having everyone acquire superfluous goods, not understood here as the mechanical and dissipating expansion of individual consumption but rather as the satisfaction of essential needs (food, shelter, health, education) for all, as the free development of the individual personality and the life of the individual and as the promotion of higher-level needs tending toward the cultural and civil growth of the citizens and the nation....¹⁸⁶

The Italians need only look at the USSR to see how such a non-consumer oriented society would function.

Putting all of this information together, what emerges is a non-violent revolutionary party which is determined to change the basic structures of society and politics in Italy, although the actions of "war of position" are perhaps misleading

¹⁸⁵ FBIS, No. 108 (3 June 1976), p. L-1.

¹⁸⁶ FBIS, No. 105, Supp. 36 (28 May 1976), p. 58.

in that they tend to portray the Party as another social-democratic party. It can be assumed that only when the "war of movement" has begun will the radical transformations of society start to take place. Also, in achieving socialism in Italy the PCI will be following a more national road which was originally described by Gramsci and thereafter repeated by every leader of the PCI.¹⁸⁷ As Berlinguer recently put it in his policy statement for 1976:

"Our aim is essentially the following one: To affirm and to put into effect a new idea of socialism that would be different both from the experiments underway in Eastern Europe and the kind of social democracy being practiced in other areas of Europe.

"The socialist society we want to crease implies a transformation of the entire structure of society..."¹⁸⁸

The term "national road" is not necessarily synonymous with the Soviet definition of national communism since the "national road" still recognizes the need for international communist unity and common action. Perhaps the most difficult thing for many people inside and outside of the Party to accept is the fact that the PCI is determined to come to power peacefully. Many people say this denies the Party linkage with Marxist-Leninist doctrine, but, considering that armed struggle is impossible in Italy and that Marxist-Leninist theory never

¹⁸⁷ See Sergio Segre's quote in the Historical Context, also see Blackmer, Communism in Italy and France, p. 374; Hellman, Organization and Ideology, p. 306-308; and Sasson, Donald, "The Italian Communist Party's European Strategy," The Political Quarterly, XLVII, No. 3 (July-September 1976) p. 53-275.

¹⁸⁸ FBIS, Annex 95 (14 May 1976), p. 2.

obliged anyone to be stupid, the PCI's national strategy is essentially correct Marxism-Leninism because whenever possible the PCI has stimulated desired changes in the environment.

Due to its national orientation, the PCI has had a tendency to adopt flexible strategies to deal with the changing nature of national politics. These strategies are formulated within the context of Party goals and ideology but adapted to the peculiar requirements of Italian society. Sidney Tarrow's book, Peasant Communism in Southern Italy, deals in depth with this policy of flexibility.¹⁸⁹ Tarrow describes how the PCI has maintained a dual policy in Italy for dealing with problems of northern or southern Italy. Obviously, this type of flexibility allows for more penetration and success in a diverse society such as in Italy.¹⁹⁰

In the "war of position," while it is not yet in control of the country, the PCI has had to develop a policy which would allow it to gain power within the social, economic and political realities. This parliamentary acquisition of power has four basic dimensions: development and maintenance of the Party itself; the penetration of the social and economic base; pursuit of the political and social alliances to allow it to increase its electoral base; and maintenance of close links with the USSR and the international communist movement as a whole.

¹⁸⁹ Tarrow, Peasant Communism.

¹⁹⁰ For more discussion of flexibility and penetration, see Blackmer, Unity, p. 502, and also Triska, Communist Party-States, p. 36.

The parliamentary strategy first of all required that the Party develop and maintain a large cadre capable of being active in Italian life, mobilizing the people when required, disseminating information to party and non-party members and running the vast party organization. Furthermore, the experience with Fascism in Italy taught that a purely class party would be disastrous and therefore the PCI had to transcend class and regional differences to form a large, broad-based party. Gramsci formulated the idea of a mass party, combining all the exploited forces of Italy. This mass aspect was based on Lenin's teachings at the time of the formation of the PCI in which he stated that:

The law of military success which consists of having an overwhelming preponderance of forces at the decisive moment in the decisive place, is also the law of political success particularly in that fierce, intense war of classes which is called revolution.¹⁹¹

and also:

But in order to achieve victory you must have the sympathy of the masses. An absolute majority is not always essential, but in order to achieve victory, in order to retain power, it is not only necessary to have the majority of the working class--I use the term "working class" here in the West European sense, meaning the industrial proletariat--but also the majority of the exploited and the toiling rural population.¹⁹²

Gramsci was even willing to extend his mass party to the bourgeoisie.¹⁹³

¹⁹¹ Lenin, Vladimir I. Collected Works, Vol. 17 (London, 1938), p. 46.

¹⁹² Lenin, Vladimir I. Collected Works, Vol. 10 (London, 1938), p. 287=288.

¹⁹³ Boggs, p. 60.

When Togliatti landed in Italy in 1944 he followed Gramsci's plan for a mass party and further amplified the idea when he spoke of the "Party's task to gather round itself all the productive forces in the country" and defined the "nation" which the PCI must strive to represent as not only the working class per se, but "the peasantry, the masses of intellectuals, the masses of all those who work with their brain as well as those who work with their arms--professional men, technicians, clerks...."¹⁹⁴ Togliatti also wanted a large party to act as a buffer against right-wing reactionary forces. Berlinguer, like his predecessor, continued the strategy of a mass party. He emphasized the broad base of the Party while never forgetting the reasons for the Party's being. At a speech in Bologna in 1974 Berlinguer stated that the PCI was:

....A mass party which is at the same time vitally bound to the working class; a national and people's party which is at the same time loyal to its internationalist tradition; and a democratic and at the same time revolutionary party....¹⁹⁵

Clearly, such a large party would be difficult to control but Gramsci provided for that contingency also. He felt that historical continuity, a solid base, good organization and strong discipline would keep the Party together.¹⁹⁶ The organization and composition of the Party will be looked at in

¹⁹⁴ Ibid, p. 36-37. For further analysis of the mass party see also, Hellman, Organization and Ideology, p. 77, and Macciocchi, p. 131-132.

¹⁹⁵ FBIS, No. 129 (10 October 1974), p. M2-M5.

¹⁹⁶ Cammett, p. 195.

in a later chapter in the context of the present makeup, and the historical continuity has already been demonstrated in this and earlier chapters, but, the discipline which the PCI displays is a very interesting feature of the Party which needs closer analysis. It is the one facet of Party life that never changes, never slackens and separates the PCI from the loose groupings of political theories which make up the other Italian parties. With strong discipline the PCI is able to provide a united front to the electorate, thereby constantly improving their electoral basis, year after year. Giovanni Sartori writes in European Political Parties: The Case of Polarized Pluralism that the PCI is the only party in Italy "whose discipline and hierarchical structure overcome internal dissent."¹⁹⁷

The PCI has several problems besides just controlling a mass party when it comes to discipline. Because the PCI is a radical group which is ideologically oriented, it harbors many fringe elements which occasionally deviate in one direction or the other. To maintain the tight ideological unity of the Party, these groups are periodically purged. The recent Chilean problems with fringe groups further emphasized this problem for the PCI. Additionally, the practical problems of politics in a parliamentary setting make it imperative for the PCI to maintain strong discipline to keep their elected

¹⁹⁷ La Palombara, Joseph and Myron Weiner, eds. Political Parties and Political Development (Princeton, 1966), p. 151.

officials under control. And finally, once this mass party gains control of the government, strong discipline will be required to "lead" the country along the "Italian road to socialism."

It was Lenin who first brought up the need for strong discipline in a party. In 1920 he spoke of the need for "iron discipline" and although dissenting opinions would be allowed in the Party, no independent factions would be allowed to form.¹⁹⁸ Gramsci was even more concerned about discipline than Lenin. Gramsci's insistence on the necessity of discipline, especially in the course of political action, is one of the most effective things he wrote and is still preached constantly by the PCI cadres.¹⁹⁹ In his theoretical writings on discipline he explained that the Party was to be guided by the principles of democratic centralism and, therefore, "discipline in this sense does not annul individual personality..., but merely limits the will and irresponsible impulsiveness."²⁰⁰ By limiting the will, he meant that no factions would be allowed to organize.²⁰¹ According to Gramsci, discipline was in keeping with democracy because it maintained the over-all unity of the Party:

If the authority is a specialized technical function, and not an "arbitrary" force or an external imposition, discipline is a necessary element of democratic order and freedom.

¹⁹⁸ Lenin, Vladimir I. Selected Works, Vol. X (London, 1943), p. 204.

¹⁹⁹ McInnes, Western Marxists, p. 99.

²⁰⁰ Cammett, p. 194-195.

²⁰¹ McInnes, Western Marxists, p. 79.

A specialized technical function exists when the authority is exercised within one socially (or nationally) homogeneous group; when it is exercised by one group over another group, discipline will be autonomous and free for the first, but not for the second.²⁰²

In the Western meaning of the word, democracy was not being displayed in the principle of democratic centralism but for Gramsci and the PCI this fit their definition perfectly.

The limits placed on factions and dissention were a further limiting element in the portrayal of a "democratic" party.

When the PCI was formed in 1921 the theories of discipline were put into effect and have been strengthened throughout the Party history. The cornerstone of discipline, democratic centralism, has been written into the Party rules:

Once a decision is reached, all members of the party are bound to the line decided by the majority; decisions of higher levels of the party organization are obligatory for lower levels; activities leading to organized factions or oppositions within the party are prohibited.²⁰³

This, of course, did not deny the possibility of legal debate but there was definitely a limit as to the extent that debate would be allowed. Togliatti emphasized this point by stating that even though he was advocating a "new party" that the PCI would not become a debating club made up of opposing factions, "but a revolutionary party, created for action and combat," and governed by strict discipline.²⁰⁴

Even though the Party statutes declare that the Party maintain strict discipline, it is still another matter to

²⁰² Cammett, p. 195.

²⁰³ Hellman, Organization and Ideology, p. 86.

²⁰⁴ Ibid, p. 86.

carry them out. The PCI has done a noteworthy job of carrying out the statutes and has a lengthy record of purges and periodic shuffles to maintain discipline. Beyond the expulsions mentioned in the historical context, such as after the attempted assassination of Togliatti, Luca di Luca, Il Manifesto and others, there were other major purges such as from 1955 to 1960 when Togliatti's cleaning of the Party went all the way down to the lower levels of Party structure²⁰⁵ and when Antonio Graziadei, the economic theorist of the Party, was expelled when he attempted to prove the lack of foundation for the Marxist-Leninist theory of surplus value.²⁰⁶ Macciocchi saw the principle used quite often during her campaign in Naples.²⁰⁷ During an interview in 1975 Berlinguer summarized the PCI's feelings on extremist groups. In speaking about the Il Manifesto group he emphasized that the PCI takes a harsh attitude toward positions which it believes to be mistaken.

As long as the "manifesto" group remained within the sphere of the discussion of ideas, there were no measures, when it entered the sphere of an organized creation of splits, a conflict with the rules which govern the life of the party really began. There is absolute agreement on the part of the entire party on the principle of not allowing currents...²⁰⁸

A better understanding of how strong the theory of democratic centralism is in the PCI is reflected in Stephen Hellman's

²⁰⁵ Blackmer, Unity, p. 104.

²⁰⁶ Tarrow, Peasant Communism, p. 33.

²⁰⁷ She describes the use of democratic centralism virtually throughout her book.

²⁰⁸ FBIS, No. 41 (28 February 1975), p. M-2

study of this phenomenon in Party functionaries. The question asked was: Given the chance to hold referendums on major party policies, would you accept the idea or not? Table IV reflects the responses:²⁰⁹

TABLE IV

PCI Functionaries' Reaction to a "Referendum of the Base"

Reaction	Percentage of Respondents
1. Unqualified acceptance	19%
2. "O.K. in certain cases"	19
3. Very qualified acceptance, rejecting any "yes-no" formula	23
4. Rejected idea	39
TOTAL	100%

Even when offered the chance to participate in any type of referendum, 39% flatly refused, citing the fact that this was not in keeping with the Party's feelings on discipline. With respect to the rest of Italy, Longo's statements on democratic centralism explain the full range of application to be used externally as well as internally:

Democratic centralism is the main instrument for expressing the communists' desire to run events and not to be run by them. This also applies to the party's unitary actions and to the development of all its forces in order to achieve its chosen goals and to combat

²⁰⁹ Hellman, Organization and Ideology, p. 416.

manifestations of weakness expressed in the internal contradictions which are inherent in a system of currents and in factionalism.²¹⁰

By what Longo says, the system of democratic centralism is not to be excluded from external application in pursuit of party goals. This is an important principle to remember when forecasting future Party actions.

Democratic centralism and rigid discipline reinforce many aspects of PCI character. By sustaining a disciplined, centralized party, the PCI is able to maintain ideological unity, and effectiveness denied other parties because of allowing the communist to act in a monolithic way. In a recent interview Berlinguer explained it thusly, "...democratic centralism is the system which guarantees maximum efficiency and maximum democracy..."²¹¹

Since the PCI would be both revolutionary and "democratic" the second dimension of PCI strategy would take on aspects of Duverger's devotee party and Selznik's combat party.²¹² As Gramsci saw it, the Party was to have two basic emphases. The first would be the vanguard of the workers:

It is the cutting edge of the movement that seeks to look ahead of the proletariat's short term interests and concentrate on real interests. To do this it translates philosophy into action.²¹³

²¹⁰ FBIS, Vol. III (31 May 1976), p. E-13.

²¹¹ FBIS, No. 118 (17 June 1976), p. L-6.

²¹² For a more detailed analysis of this combination of theories, see: Tarrow, Sidney G. "Political Dualism and Italian Communism," The American Political Science Review, LXI, No. 1 (March 1967), p. 39-40.

²¹³ McInnes, Western Marxists, p. 100.

The second and major emphasis of the Party would be on the cultural and social penetration of the masses to increase the support of the Party in the masses.²¹⁴ The acquisition of leverage from this penetration would allow further penetration and so on until the PCI would be massive enough to acquire governmental power. This idea of "presence" is the linchpin of the PCI's strategy and was first acknowledged by Gramsci when he called for the PCI to establish itself in the "trenches and fortifications of bourgeois society."²¹⁵

The requirement for securing the allegiance of Italian society through other than political means results from the non-political nature of the Italians. Enzo Forcella, a nationally known reporter, once remarked about the political nature of Italy in an article on the reporting of politics that:

A political journalist in our country can count on about 1,500 readers: the ministers and the undersecretaries (all), the parliamentarians (part), the party leaders, trade-union leaders, high prelates, and a few industrialists who want to appear informed. The rest do not count, even if the paper sells 300,000 copies.²¹⁶

This is reflected in Table V which shows which methods of influencing government the Italians feel are most effective:

²¹⁴ Boggs, p. 169.

²¹⁵ Tarrow, Sidney G. "Adaption and Change," Communism in Italy and France. eds. Donald L.M. Blackmer and Sidney G. Tarrow (Princeton, 1975), p. 585.

²¹⁶ Kogan, Norman. The Politics of Italian Foreign Policy (New York, 1963), p. 18-19.

TABLE V

Preferred Methods of Influencing Government, by Region²¹⁷
(in Percentages)

<u>Methods of Influence</u>	<u>North</u>	<u>South</u>	<u>Italy</u>
Personal, family connections (<u>clientelismo</u>)	12	12	12
Writing to officials	13	15	14
Forming a group	15	9	13
Working in a party	12	25	16
Protest demonstration	7	5	6
None; don't know; other	41	34	39

Gramsci recognized that in order to gain control of the Italian state and create his socialist society that there was a need to exercise hegemony over all spheres of society:

Every revolution has been preceded by an intense labor of criticism, of cultural penetration, of permeation of ideas through groups of men initially refractory and engrossed with solving day by day, hour by hour, their own political and economic problem.²¹⁸

This situation would exist until the "war of position" had been won and the masses were ready to break down the last vestiges of resistance in the "war of movement."²¹⁹ In fact, Gramsci made it imperative that the Party "exercise leadership

²¹⁷ Tarrow, Peasant Communism, p. 80.

²¹⁸ McInnes, Western Marxists, p. 92.

²¹⁹ Boggs, p. 67.

(i.e., hegemonic) before winning governmental control."²²⁰ He recognized that it would take a long term effort to be able to build up the socio-political influence to convince all classes that the workers' struggle was their struggle too. To do this, the Party's presence would need to cut across class and geographic barriers. It would also require the formation of direct alliances with existing groups in order to be able to mobilize the population.

A closer look at this strategy in action reveals the depth to which it has been applied. The PCI has penetrated local and regional governments, trade unions, cooperatives, press, cultural institutions, schools, universities, cinema, television, sports and most all professional groups. The PCI is the largest political employer below the level of national government, controlling virtually all major cities and most municipalities. Because of its regional control, the PCI has constantly lobbied for more decentralization in Italian government and at the same time trained legions of Party members to be administrators.

One example of Party presence is the penetration of the largest labor union, CGIL, which was initially very large but as the presence spread to other organizations the actual number of Party members in the hierarchy decreased.

²²⁰ Hoare, Quinton and Geoffry Nowell Smith. Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci (London, 1971) p. 207. See also Pozzolini, p. 88.

(See Table VI.) The PCI's loss of position did not mean a loss of dominance because most CGIL activity still takes place along PCI lines.²²¹

TABLE VI

Party Affiliation of the CGIL Executive Committee²²²

	<u>1960</u>	<u>1965</u>	<u>1969</u>
	(%)	(%)	(%)
PCI	53	55	32
PSI	47	27	24
Other	--	4	32
PSIUP	--	14	12

One benefit from this is that by not being too closely identified with one group the PCI is able to extend its influence to a greater area of Italian society without alienating any one group.

The presence of the PCI is clearly spelled out for the lower echelons in the Party statutes which apply to section responsibilities:

The section should tend to have a permanent headquarters which should be the meeting and activity center for the Communists and a hub of political, cultural, educational, recreational, and assistential life for all the workers of the locality.

²²¹ Tarrow, "Adaption and Change," p. 542.

²²² Ibid, p. 555.

It should promote, direct, and coordinate the activity of the Communists in every aspect of mass political action in the centers of productive, cultural, and associative life which exists in the territory under its jurisdiction.²²³

This penetration on the lower levels has established the PCI in the majority of the common man's social and economic life. In order to increase Party flexibility, no directives have been issued as to specifics governing the course of lower level penetration because each area has its own problems. This tailoring to needs has allowed the Party to use existing structures to aid its penetration.

One unique system of handling problems, clientelismo, has grown up around the lack of ability of the Italian government to handle most problems and it has favored the growth of the Communists' presence.²²⁴ As discussed earlier in the historical context, this system grew up in the 19th century out of economic needs and has become a way of life in Italy. In a study done by Joseph La Palombara on voting behavior he found:

That the voters were motivated by strictly local and personal economic issues, that ideology and national issues played little part in determining voting behavior, and that many shifts were simply the result of clientelismo, voters following a personal leader from one party to another.²²⁵

²²³Lange, Peter. "The PCI at the Local Level: A Study of Strategic Performance," Communism in Italy and France. eds. Donald L.M. Blackmer and Sidney G. Tarrow (Princeton, 1975), p. 259. Tarrow's book, Peasant Communism, does a good job of analyzing the unique approaches used in different areas of Italy.

²²⁴Giacomo Sani does a good job of handling the Clientelismo problem in his article, "Political Traditions as Contextual Variables: Partisanship in Italy," American Journal of Political Science, XX, No. 3 (August 1976, p. 375-405.

²²⁵Tarrow, Peasant Communism, p. 77.

Since the PCI controls most of the local governments, it also controls all the local jobs such as town doctor, cemetery attendant, street cleaner and town guards and therefore is the largest user and beneficiary of the system of patronage.²²⁶

Additionally, because it controls the CGIL it can extend its economic patronage. Over-all, the PCI has made effective use of an economic peculiarity in Italy for political gains.

The PCI's presence in Italian society would still not be effective if the Party were unable to mobilize the populace it had penetrated. Fortunately for the Communists, the widespread patronage and broad social penetration has made it possible for the PCI to call into play a large portion of Italian society when required.²²⁷ In addition, the large, well disciplined cadre discussed earlier has allowed the PCI to apply this support in a coherent manner, not only politically but economically and professionally as well. Ascher and Tarrow in their study, "The Stability of Communist Electorates: Evidence from a Longitudinal Analysis of French and Italian Aggregate Data," confirmed that the PCI's capacity for mass mobilization does not fluctuate greatly and has increased steadily over the years.²²⁸

²²⁶Norman Kogan expands more on the municipal patronage in "The Impact of the New Italian Regional Governments on the Structure of power within Parties," Comparative Politics, VII, No. 3 (April 1975), p. 383-406.

²²⁷Blackmer, Donald L.M. "Italian Communism: Strategy for the 1970's," Problems of Communism, XXI, No. 3 (May-June 1972), p. 48.

²²⁸See the evidence presented by William Ascher and Sidney G. Tarrow in "The Stability of Communist Electorates: Evidence from a Longitudinal Analysis of French and Italian Aggregate Data," American Journal of Political Science, XIX (3 August 1975), p. 475-500.

The social dimension of PCI strategy has greatly facilitated the implementation of the political strategy. Since power acquisition is of primary strategic importance to the PCI, it is natural for their political strategy of parliamentary politics to be based on short term compromise and alliances, both of which are aided by the social strategy of presence. Coalition and alliance strategy does not mean ideological compromise, but rather a flexibility in attuning the Party to reality so as to capitalize on the PCI's "progressive aspects. Basically this has meant finding an issue on which collaboration was possible and then making the Party available for cooperation. By doing this, the PCI has not only advanced the cause of the Communists but also insulated the Party from counterrevolutionaries.

Lenin enunciated the need for compromise when dealing with the enemy:

A vanguard performs its task as vanguard only when it is able really to lead the whole mass forward. Without an alliance with non-communists in the most varied spheres of activity there can be no question of any successful communist constructive work.²²⁹

He also admonished his followers to take care to remain true to the ideology during the compromise:

The task of a truly revolutionary party is not to renounce compromises once and for all but to be able throughout all compromises, when they are unavoidable, to remain true to its principles, to its class, to its revolutionary purpose, to its task of preparing the way

²²⁹ Lenin, Vladimir I. Collected Works, Vol. II (London, 1939), p. 71.

for revolution and of educating the masses for victory in the revolution.²³⁰

Lenin felt that if the party could remain loyal to the ideology while making "all the necessary compromises" then the coming to power could actually be accelerated.²³¹

Gramsci added to Lenin's theory of compromise and alliance by extending it to all socialist forces:

There is no country where the proletariat is in a position to conquer power and retain it by itself: it must therefore always seek allies. It must look for a policy which will allow it to assume the leadership of those other classes which have anti-capitalist interests and guide them in the struggle for the overthrow of bourgeois society.²³²

Although he felt the need for alliances, at every chance he emphasized that the movement was still to be originated in the proletariat.

The theory of alliances with other classes has been stressed by each General Secretary of the PCI. The PCI has identified these alliances with as many legitimate movements and called them by as many names as necessary in order to convince the Italian people of the PCI's sincerity. Such names as "democratic and left wing," "all democratic and socialist" or "all democratic and anti-fascist" forces are but a few of the names used by the PCI to describe their proposed coalitions.

²³⁰ Lenin, Vladimir I. Selected Works, Vol. VI (London, 1943), p. 208.

²³¹ Ibid, Vol. X, p. 38.

²³² Fiori, Guiseppe. Antonio Gramsci: Life of a Revolutionary (New York, 1971), p. 203.

In addition to opening alliances to virtually all classes, the PCI also adopted the Leninist principle of "partial actions" whereby the Party could gain ground by bits and pieces even if it did not directly benefit the workers.²³³ Gramsci said that this was required because of the nature of Italian society:

Because of the unique problems in Italy, the PCI would have to assume power by stages. This period of transition would take the place of direct conquest of power and therefore the PCI should adopt the slogan of "constituent assembly" and use it as "the basis for an agreement with the anti-fascist" parties.²³⁴

The theory of "partial actions" has allowed the PCI a strategic and tactical flexibility which has been called everything from revisionist to opportunist but the fact is that the PCI has followed a preconceived strategy which specifically calls for compromise, alliance and strategy to achieve its goals. Two good examples of the PCI's attempt to form major alliances are the Party's attempt at coalition with the Catholic Church and the "historic compromise."

Gramsci was keenly aware of the fact that over 90% of the Italian population professed to follow the Catholic religion. He urged that the PCI never engage in a frontal confrontation with the Church but instead do everything possible to win over the Church's support.²³⁵ Clearly the communists' goals

²³³ Tarrow, Peasant Communism, p. 103.

²³⁴ Cammett, p. 184-185.

²³⁵ Tarrow, "Adaption and Change," p. 584. See also Hellman, Organization and Ideology, p. 108.

and methods conflicted with those of the Church and therefore the PCI would find it difficult to influence the Church. The only chance which the PCI had to offer the Church anything was when the Party helped include the Lateran Pacts in the Italian constitution. Even in this case the Party erred in that Togliatti underplayed his hand and his acceptance of the Lateran Pacts did not display a sincere desire at understanding the Church but rather an inclination to use the Church to the Communists' own ends. In Togliatti's speech he stated the reason for inclusion of the Lateran Pacts in the constitution was purely tactical:

Since the...Church will continue to be the very center of our country--and hence any conflict with it would disturb the consciences of many citizens--we (communists) must arrange carefully our relation with the Catholic Church.²³⁶

As this historical context shows, the Church was normally quite hostile to the Communists. In spite of periods of thaw, the Church would quickly revert back to an anti-communist stand when it looked as if the PCI might win too many votes at the polls (e.g., 1948 and 1976 elections). In the face of constant rejection the PCI still persists in trying to form links with the Catholics or at least breaking the strong attachment between the DC and the Church. To this date they have had limited success under the table but have failed to win any overt approval from the Church.

The most obvious attempt at coalition has been centered around the Communists' endeavors to form a political coalition

²³⁶ "Italy," Time, XLIX, No. 14 (7 April 1947), p. 32.

strong enough to gain power. The PCI's desire to gain a majority of votes involves perhaps the most complicated coalition or series of coalitions, and yet the Party has always tried to explain the over-all strategy in very simple terms. In the early days of the PCI's growth this strategy was based on Lenin's writings concerning the need for a majority of masses to achieve the revolution.²³⁷ The history of the Party is replete with attempts at Fronts, or coalitions of all "democratic" forces.

The most recent manifestation of political coalition strategy is Berlinguer's "historic compromise." This amplification of earlier attempts to form a coalition of all Catholic "democratic," socialist and anti-fascist forces came in response to the coup d' etat in Chile. What happened in Chile was that Allende's leftists took power with a very small base of popular support, and because the Chilean Communist Party lacked a strong party and a secret police force they were unable to maintain control of their own people and the rate of socialist transformation. Once Allende was in power, the workers in the Chilean Communist Party demanded and got the expropriation of thousands of farms and businesses, causing economic chaos. The economic collapse only spurred the activists to further expropriation. Allende finally had to instigate repressive measures against his opposition to prevent them from becoming too vocal. Unfortunately for

²³⁷ Lenin, Vladimir I. Collected Works, Vol. 10 (London, 1938), p. 286-287.

Allende, the opposition controlled the military and he was overthrown.²³⁸

Since the PCI had been advocating an advent to power similar to that which occurred in Chile, they were extremely shaken by the coup d'etat, but once again the unique flexibility of the Party strategy devised a new solution. Berlinguer in his articles in Rinascita on "Italy after the Chilean Events" laid out the "revised" future strategy of the PCI. He called for:

An historic compromise between the forces that rally and represent the great majority of the Italian people. (It would be completely illusory to think that, even if the parties...of the Left managed to gain 51 percent of the votes and of the parliamentary representation...this fact would guarantee the survival...of a government representing that 51 percent. This is why we speak not of a "leftist alternative," but rather of a "democratic alternative,"--that is, the political perspective of a collaboration and an understanding of the popular forces of a communist and socialist inspiration with the popular forces of a Catholic inspiration, and also with formations that would have some other democratic orientation.²³⁹

His plan of action outlined in the strategy was as follows:

1. A progressive transformation of the political, economic and social assets of Italy to lay down the conditions for a future "democratic way to socialism."
2. Socialism in Italy through constant government assistance to the masses.
3. Socialism achieved by injecting the working class into the mainstream of the decision-making process, without serious damage to the middle class.
4. Socialism through a coherent alliance with heterogeneous political forces whose common denominator is the perfection of the democratic state.

²³⁸ Codevilla, Angelo. "Italy after the Elections," p. 2.

²³⁹ Radio Free Europe Research Report No. 118, p. 7.

5. The "historic compromise" by a "democratic" transformation means the rejection of any collaboration with conservative, capitalist and neo-fascist elements at all levels of the political and government pyramid.²⁴⁰

The two most important points brought out in this program were the need for more than a simple majority and the requirement for a transformation of the non-communist forces prior to the "historic compromise" taking place.

Berlinguer was determined to work within the constraining conditions of the time and to use every tactic to avoid a vertical breakup of the Italian people into two hostile fronts. He emphasized the need for maintaining alliances between the workers and middle class by stating that, "even at times when the political battle becomes more inflamed and harsh, we must still pursue a policy of unity and one of seeking for the broadest convergences and alliances, never abandoning the struggle."²⁴¹ The last phrase indicates, as mentioned earlier, that even during a coalition the Party was not to lose sight of the ultimate goal.

Berlinguer's fears stemmed from the fact that he felt that he may not be able to control his own party once the PCI was in power because, "if the working class parties think they can go it alone, they would abandon acting positively to influence the other forces of democratic orientation."²⁴² This would

²⁴⁰ Nazzaro, Pellegrino. "Italy in Trouble," Current History, CVIII, No. 403 (March 1975), p. 103.

²⁴¹ FBIS, No. 184 (20 December 1974), p. M-2.

²⁴² FBIS, No. 62 (30 March 1976), p. L-1.

result in a second problem which is that of maintaining stability and solidarity of a left-wing government when, "as is right and proper to expect of a left-wing government--it actually embarked on profound reforms of the country's economic and social structures with the remaining 49 percent of the electorate and Parliament aligned in a hostile front against it."²⁴³ Berlinguer was not voicing unfounded fears because between 1970 and 1974 the centrist DC government thwarted at least three right-wing plans to overthrow the government.

The fear of driving the DC into opposition of a left-wing alternative caused the semantic abandonment of the "front" policy. The reason this is described as a semantic change in strategy is because the PCI is still not willing to deal with any hostile non-socialist forces in their present form. Referring back to Berlinguer's plan for the "historic compromise" it is clear that all of the other political forces will be transformed into acceptable partners of the PCI before a political coalition will take place. Once again, the PCI was using new names to breathe new life into old plans and policies. In particular, the PCI's attitude toward the DC was unchanged. The PCI was determined to retain its own ideological unity while denying the DC theirs. Togliatti had written in 1962 that, "a thorough going revision and transformation of the Christian Democratic leadership must be pursued and obtained, if we want to open the road to general political

²⁴³ FBIS, No. 34 (19 February 1975), p. M-3.

renewal," and in 1974 Berlinguer said, "this is still the essential point."²⁴⁴ In essence, the process was to be a slow transformation of the DC into what the PCI felt they could deal with, another socialist party.²⁴⁵

Two general problems were apparent in the "historic compromise." One problem, which will be discussed later, was the fact that once all parties become socialist there will no longer be any opposition party. The other problem was that the "historic compromise" seemingly locked the PCI into a long term gradual ascent to power and denied them the traditional tactical opportunity to seize the initiative, if required. This, however, was not the case because, with the Party's typical flexibility, they soon declared their intent to use temporary "tactics," if required.

A situation which provoked the "tactical" maneuvering was a poll in May of 1976 prior to the June elections which gave the PCI 55% of the vote.²⁴⁶ Sensing a victory for the left wing forces, Berlinguer declared that although his Party was not abandoning the strategy of the "historic compromise" that, "it was being set aside for the time being to respond to the

²⁴⁴ FBIS, No. 82, Supp. 6 (28 April 1975), p. 62. See also "Italy's Communist," Economist (28 February 1976), p. 53-60.

²⁴⁵ For statements by the PCI to this effect, see Amendola's speech, YICA 1975, p. 213 and also Berlinguer's speeches as reported in FBIS, No. 87, Supp. 6 (5 May 1976), p. 63; No. 87 (26 May 1976), p. M-1; and No. 118 (17 June 1976), p. L-2.

²⁴⁶ See Berlinguer's interview, FBIS, No. 118 (17 June 1976), p. L-1.

more immediate needs of the country."²⁴⁷ Apparently once the PCI became aware of the fact that it might be able to enter the government immediately, all fear of right-wing reactionaries faded. The PCI seemed convinced that it could do what Chile and Portugal had failed to do.

These two examples of PCI coalition strategy show the tenaciousness with which the PCI pursues its alliances (as in the case of the Catholic Church), the flexibility of its tactics (as in the "historic compromise"), and above all, the retention of the Party ideology while pursuing coalition for purely strategic and tactical reasons.

The Communists have made almost every conceivable type of alliance and coalition and they seem inclined to continue to do so until the coalitions no longer suit their purposes or, as Macciocchi said, until the "war of position" is over and the PCI is no longer threatened by reactionary forces.²⁴⁸

In spite of all the concern for internal growth and flexibility, the PCI has always maintained a close attachment to the international communist movement and the USSR.²⁴⁹ The PCI's adaption of a flexible domestic strategy has had an impact on its relations to the international movement.

²⁴⁷ FBIS, No. 96 (17 May 1976), p. L-1 - L-3; also see FBIS, No. 99 (20 May 1976), p. L-4.

²⁴⁸ Macciocchi, p. 135-137.

²⁴⁹ For an incisive review of PCI-USSR relations, see Blackmer, Donald L.M. and Annie Kriegel. The International Role of the Communist Parties of Italy and France (Cambridge, 1975). Also see Triska, Communist Party-States and Meyer, Alfred G. "The Comparative Study of Communist Political Systems, Slavic Review, XXVI, No. 1 (March 1967), p. 3-12.

The Italian Communists have had to adopt a seemingly more liberal attachment to the international cause in order to please its domestic audience but at the same time it has steadfastly proclaimed its unity with the international movement.

The main factors in the PCI's persistence in maintaining its international communist solidarity come from the desire to maintain the natal bond of ideological unity which gives the Party its unique character and the fact that the allegiance to communist ideology virtually forces the Italian Communists to deal with the international movement for financial and moral support. The communist parties naturally are closer to each other than any heterogeneous outsider because of similar desires to build socialism, aims, enemies (i.e., capitalism) and methods. As Sergio Segre, Directorate member, said in 1971:

We believe that the national character and internationalism of a revolutionary force are both essential and inseparable, and that only in this way can the working class acquire ever growing importances, become the predominant class in its own country, and thus make an effective contribution to the struggle of the International proletariat.²⁵⁰

Just as the Socialists, Christian Democrats and other parties in Europe work for common goals and ideals, so do the Communists, but the written ideology forms a more permanent bond between communists of different countries. This common bond alienates the communists from many of the other Western

²⁵⁰ YICA 1972, p. 197.



Berlinguer and Brezhnev
at a meeting in Moscow.

democratic parties. If the PCI were to break with the international movement it would find itself isolated from all sources of support except what it could muster internally. Therefore, polemics between the PCI and other "fraternal" parties should not be taken to mean that a rift has occurred. In spite of the recent U.S. press reports of a "break" between the PCI and international communism, the Italian Communists have displayed solidarity with the other communist parties in Vietnam, Greece, Chile, Portugal and Angola.²⁵¹

The historical analysis showed how the PCI's attitude toward the international movement seemed at times to alter and yet the adjustment reflected more continuity than change. As Togliatti said, he needed an international strategy to suit his internal purposes and that meant polemics with any "fraternal" parties whenever domestic situations required.²⁵² The outward manifestation of this policy was increased criticism of other communist parties and yet each disapproving comment ended with an assurance of solidarity with the international movement. Even declarations of autonomy were limited to domestic pursuits and not foreign associations:

A workers' and socialist party must always maintain its solidarity with these (socialist) regimes. If, for any reason whatsoever, a workers and socialist party breaks its solidarity with them, then it goes over to the other side, it forgets its own essential function, it forgets the objectives for which it is fighting.²⁵³

²⁵¹ FBIS, USSR, No. 44, Supp. 21 (4 March 1976), p. 19.

²⁵² See the chapter in the historical context on the 1956 Hungarian uprising.

²⁵³ Blackmer, International Role of PCI, p. 27.

The destalinization process which allowed the PCI to finally pursue its domestic strategy unhindered by Soviet restraints also caused internal discussion over international attachments and yet even at the height of the discussions in 1961 the PCI Central Committee declared:

Proletarian internationalism is and will remain one of the cardinal pillars of our policy, along with profound attachment and adjustment to the national situation and to search for new methods guided by the principles of Marxism-Leninism.²⁵⁴

At every Party Congress the PCI has echoed this same theme. Berlinguer's opening remarks to the 14th Congress contained the usual emphasis on solidarity:

The Italian worker movement and our party have healthy internationalist traditions to which we intent to remain faithful. Let no one think that there is any room among us for any insinuations or exhortations to the effect that we break with the principles and practices of proletarian internationalism, that we withdraw from that line of solidarity and common struggle with all of the worker, socialist, and revolutionary forces anywhere in the world, the line which we have chosen and which we intend to pursue through our free choice and amid the fullness of our autonomy.²⁵⁵

The closing document of the Congress also took pains to stress solidarity with the international communist movement.²⁵⁶

The PCI's relationship with the USSR provides a special case involving PCI ties with international communism since actions of the Soviets have greatly affected the Italian domestic scene. The PCI attitude toward the Soviets has

²⁵⁴ Dallin, p. 463.

²⁵⁵ FBIS, No. 82, Supp. 6 (28 April 1975), p. 15.

²⁵⁶ FBIS, No. 58 (25 March 1975), p. M-3.

paralleled the Italian Communists' stand on internationalism up until 1956 when it was able to extricate the Party from the tight control of the Soviets. The historical process showed that this had been a gradual process until Khrushchev abruptly "freed" the Italians at the XX CPSU Congress. The Italians still hold a strong ideological attachment to the Soviets and respect what the USSR has done, but do not wish to follow the Soviet model. The PCI has preferred instead to devote the majority of its attention to the "Italian road" (which at times involves polemics with the USSR). By comparison with other communist parties, the PCI may have seemed daring and outspoken in its relationship with the CPSU and yet by Italian standards it has been conservative. According to Blackmer's book, The International Role of the Communist Parties of Italy and France, there has been no depth to the Italian Communists' denunciations of the Soviets.²⁵⁷ Blackmer saw this as merely a requirement of domestic strategy. In a more recent interview with Angelo Codevilla, it was emphasized that the same situation which Blackmer described happened after Hungary, Czechoslovakia and that even today the PCI's polemics lack sincerity:

The PCI has declared its independence from Moscow in passages which are 1% declarations of independence, 49% declarations of fidelity to proletarian internationalism and praise of the Soviet Union, and a good 50% denunciation of the United States and of the West.²⁵⁸

²⁵⁷ Blackmer, International Role of the PCI, p. 26.

²⁵⁸ Codevilla, Angelo. "Italy after the Elections," p. 6.

Further proof of the PCI's continued attachment is displayed by the fact that the PCI sends an average of one delegation a week to Moscow and regular sessions of the Italian Party Secretariat frequently convene in Moscow with CPSU leaders.²⁵⁹ The economic ties with the USSR are a further block to any disassociation from the CPSU (this will be discussed in a later chapter).

Soviet attitudes toward the PCI have also been cautious. They have been concerned about any ideological complications the Italians' position posed but they also realized the benefits to be derived from having a communist country in NATO and Western Europe. Much has been made recently over how the USSR would not like to have the PCI assume power because of the ideological costs to the Soviets. This may cause some problems but the interviews with Italian Communists shows that the PCI has not seen this as a factor. In June 1976, Berlinguer commented that, "there has been no explicit, direct CPSU position against our line,"²⁶⁰ and in September 1976, Napolitano reemphasized the same idea by pointing out that:

The PCI has never been defined as revisionist by the CPSU. One must not confuse articles containing generalized polemics on Eurocommunism with a definition which has never been made by the CPSU with regard to our party.²⁶¹

²⁵⁹ Ibid, p. 6.

²⁶⁰ FBIS, No. 13 (10 June 1976), p. L-5.

²⁶¹ FBIS, No. 185 (11 September 1976), p. L-3.

Earlier in the spring of 1976, when the CPSU held its XXV Congress, Berlinguer met with Brezhnev and issued a cordial communique which was said to be particularly pleasing to the Italians.²⁶² Obviously, there were no serious problems in their joint relations as reported by many Western sources. Even in the context of polemics over some item of difference between the two parties the PCI would never resort to such vituperative statements as it recently used to describe the U.S. State Department officials and Kissinger:

We are not replying to the stupid slaves of the foreigner who are always ready to follow the instructions given by the U.S. Embassy's hall porter.²⁶³

The Soviets' attitude is best characterized in terms of a cost-benefit analysis, weighing the cost of ideological problems against the gains to be made politically, economically and militarily by backing the PCI. It seems clear that the Soviets feel that supporting the Italian Communists is optimal.

For the Italians, the situation is reduced to determining priorities. Although the PCI has decided to give priority to domestic strategy it has still maintained close relations with the USSR.²⁶⁴ The question then becomes, what does the domestic situation require and how far to push the criticism of the CPSU without isolating itself from the world communist movement?

²⁶² FBIS, No. 42 (2 March 1976), p. L-1.

²⁶³ FBIS, No. 130 (7 July 1975), p. L-1.

²⁶⁴ Radio Free Europe Research Report #142, p. 2.



Berlinguer and Kirilenko hold discussions
through an interpreter.

The PCI has found a balance between domestic and international needs which complement each other. Pajetta described it as, "a 'national road,' a tactic, a strategy which derives from individual experience and from autonomous decisions (which) does not, however, oppose an effective and--we believe-- necessary internationalism."²⁶⁵

After closely examining the PCI's actions within the international communist movement it seems likely that the PCI will continue to expound those "advanced" communist positions which correspond to its domestic needs. At the same time the Party will continue to insist on its basic solidarity with international communism and the USSR, adhering to the latter's main foreign policy lines, while using what influence it possesses to move other parties in its direction.

After examining the four dimensions of the PCI's strategy it becomes clear that the Italian Communists have adopted policies and plans which are uniquely suited to the Italian situation. At times certain aspects of their strategy have failed to achieve the desired results, but mainly because of a lack of politicization of the Italians and poor communications. Two recent studies described in Blackmer's book, Communism in Italy and France, reveal that the PCI has, in fact, been very successful. In Peter Lange's study, "The PCI at the Local Level: A Study of Strategic Performance," he showed that all lower echelons of the Party were doing an

²⁶⁵ FBIS, No. 230 (28 November 1975), p. L-1.

effective job of performing strategic tasks.²⁶⁶ In the second study by Giacomo Sani, entitled "Mass-Level Response to Party Strategy: The Italian Electorate and the Communist Party," the conclusion is that the strategy has been favorably received by the populace.²⁶⁷ The electoral growth of the PCI is the final proof of the success of PCI strategy, a fact which Gramsci emphasized when stating the idea of:

Number...the supreme law, (observing that through it) you measure precisely the effectiveness and capacity for expansion and persuasion of the opinions of a few, of the active minorities, of the elites, of the vanguards and so...that is, their rationality of historical authenticity or specific functionality.²⁶⁸

One final element which has been a major factor in the Party's success has been its continuity. This consistency in Party goals has been of prime importance in maintaining internal unity. Despite the continual adaption to the realities of the Italian political situation there is no evidence that the PCI has been altered or absorbed by Italian politics.²⁶⁹ On the contrary, as Berlinguer reported to the PCI Plenum in October of 1975, this unique Italian heritage has strengthened

²⁶⁶Lange, p. 259-304.

²⁶⁷

Sani, Giacomo. "Mass-Level Response to Party Strategy: The Italian Electorate and the Communist Party," Communism in Italy and France. ed. Donald L.M. Blackmer and Sidney G. Tarrow (Princeton, 1975), p. 456-503.

²⁶⁸FBIS, No. 64 (1 April 1976), p. L-5.

²⁶⁹For further discussion of this idea, see Blackmer, Communism in Italy and France, p. 21, and Blackmer, "Strategy for the 70's," p. 42.

the Party.²⁷⁰ The consistency in Party ideology has been proclaimed at every opportunity by the PCI as well as a need to safeguard always that continuity. At the PCI's 14th Congress, Berlinguer stated that:

We have always tried to hold firm, even at moments of extreme political tension, that is to say, we tried to hold firm to the general objectives of our action; we tried to maintain the link between immediate objectives and historical goals, our very own goals, that is, the emancipation of the world of labor, the democratic and socialist revolution.²⁷¹

While emphasizing the need for flexibility and change, he noted that:

...there is one thing that must never change, he said: the dedication, the selfless devotion to our cause, the revolutionary dash with which we must accomplish all of our tasks, even the most humble and modest ones, along with our own selflessness. The communists certainly are also human beings and therefore have their shortcomings, they have their ambitions, but these must never overrule the general interests of the party and of the Italian worker movement. The entire party must therefore be attentive and alert so that these virtues, which are alive, will never fade away, in any of our organizations, in any of our comrades, regardless of the level and the field of their responsibilities.²⁷²

The effort to define the "Italian road" and the origins of present strategy can be traced back to Gramsci and Togliatti. The PCI has made tactical and strategic shifts when required by the realities of the Italian political situation but in spite of attempts to characterize them as

²⁷⁰ FBIS, No. 215 (6 November 1975), p. L-5. For a concise review of this aspect of the PCI, see Greene, "The Communist Parties of Italy and France."

²⁷¹ FBIS, No. 82, Supp. 6 (28 April 1976), p. 42.

²⁷² FBIS, No. 87, Supp. 8 (5 May 1975), p. 63.

non-revolutionary and revisionist they have proven that they remain true to Party goals and ideals and the revolutionary spirit.

In summarizing the goals and strategy of the PCI one must remember two words, continuity and flexibility, in strategy and tactics. The Party has always been dedicated to total non-violent transformation of Italian society by penetration of the socioeconomic and political structure. In transforming society, any alliance or coalition is authorized as long as it furthers the aims of the Party. In short, the PCI is a communist party dedicated to the socialist revolution in Italy.

XII. PARTY ORGANIZATION AND COMPOSITION


In the struggle for power in Italy there has been a tendency to focus on the emotional and ideological conflict and to forget that the actual battle is mostly an organizational one. Lenin noted that, "in the struggle for power the proletariat has no other weapon but organization...",²⁷³ and went on to conquer Russia by using such an organization. Since it has been established that the PCI seeks to transform the system in which it exists, it can be assumed that the political organization is being used as a weapon such as described by Lenin. In his book, The Organizational Weapon: A Study of Bolshevik Strategy and Tactics, Selznik explains that this type organization is run like a machine and, like a machine, much of the Party's essence is hidden from view.²⁷⁴ Some of these shadowy tasks, such as penetration, mobilization, indoctrination and manipulation, have already been addressed but the over-all organization, composition and electoral base are to be examined in this chapter.

Gramsci wrote in 1919 that he felt that, "the Communist revolution is essentially a problem of organization and discipline."²⁷⁵ He felt that a strong organization was required

²⁷³ Lenin, Vladimir I. Collected Works, Vol. II (London, 1936), p. 466.

²⁷⁴ Selznik, Phillip. The Organizational Weapon (New York, 1952).

²⁷⁵ Tarrow, Peasant Communism, p. 119.



Leaders of the Communist Party of Italy (PCI) celebrate their June 1976 election gains from the balcony of party headquarters in Rome. In the center (in the dark suit) is PCI Secretary-General Enrico Berlinguer. To his right are Giorgio Amendola and PCI President Luigi Longo; to his left, Luigi Lama, Secretary-General of the Italian General Confederation of Labor (CGIL).

to enable the Party to come to power and that it should have three levels of organization, which basically correspond to: the masses, "whose participation depends upon discipline and faith, not organizational and creative spirit"; the intellectual leadership, "the principal cohesive factor"; and the cadres, "that articulate the first element with the second."²⁷⁶

One of the crucial defining characteristics of the Party was to be its organizational coherence; in other words, unified, self-contained, trained and disciplined. Clearly the PCI has proven by history to fit all of the categories well. Many of these items have for the most part been covered in previous chapters but the organization needs to be examined further to determine its real cohesiveness.


The Party statutes establish the basic structure of the Party (see Figure 1 for general outline). The Party is a large organization, but the strong hierarchy controls the organization well. This is evidenced by the fact that resolutions at all Congresses and Plenums are effected unanimously, and by the strong inter-party discipline discussed previously.

Only a short explanation will be given for each of the major elements of organization since they correspond to the Soviet model. The Central Committee is supposedly the supreme organ of the Party but it functions, like the Soviet model, as a rubber stamp. After modest beginnings in the post-war period it has grown considerably since 1956. It is divided into five


²⁷⁶ Ibid, p. 120.

Organizational Chart of the Italian Communist Party²⁷⁷

NATIONAL LEADERSHIP



REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS (20)



PROVINCIAL FEDERATIONS (93)



AREA COMMITTEES

64 City Committees and 750 Communal or Zonal Committees

SECTIONS (11,000)

CELLS (30,000)

MEMBERS (1,702,565)

Explanatory Note: The figures for the National Leadership are as of the changes of November 1976. All other figures are for 1975.

²⁷⁷ Macciocchi, inside of cover leaf.

permanent commissions which meet while the Central Committee is not in session. In addition to the permanent commissions, there are also smaller sections which are headed by members of the Directorate. It is in these smaller sections that the most of the policy is elaborated and communicated to lower units.²⁷⁸ (See Appendix G for names of members).

The Central Control Commission is the next element in the hierarchy. The Central Control Commission is allowed a total membership equal to one-third that of the Central Committee. It is populated by senior PCI officials who have been phased out of active Party participation and hence is a very prestigious post. Its main role is that of judge, arbitrator and policeman, but in addition it has a very important educational function. In concert with the Central Committee, the Central Control Commission establishes curricula for all Party schools and courses, and it also oversees the general education of PCI cadres.²⁷⁹

The Directorate is perhaps the most powerful part of the hierarchy other than the General Secretary. This group runs the organization. It controls the agenda of the Central Committee, makes many policy decisions and is the point of departure for any discussion in the Party. Comparable to the CPSU Politburo, this organization also is the starting point for the principle of democratic centralism.

²⁷⁸ Hellman, Organization and Ideology, p. 127-132.

²⁷⁹ Ibid, p. 127-130

Within the Directorate there are also 15 departments which correspond to those in the Italian government and are like the British shadow government. They function daily to put forth policy statements and await the PCI's "eventual" accession to power to assume their full potential. The Secretariat performs the same general role as the Soviet counterpart, with perhaps more authority. The General Secretary is the real leader of the Party. The personality behind this post will be discussed later.

The Regional Organizations correspond to the political regions of Italy and are the direct link to the central party headquarters. They act as one more controlling device in order to maintain closer control over the decentralization of the PCI. The Provincial Federation actually performs a more active role in organizing and grass roots manipulation. It is set up like the Party headquarters and performs much of the daily distribution of orders to lower echelons (see Figure 2 for chart of organization). To increase control over the lower echelons, there is much duplicity between Regional and Provincial organizations. Additionally, many of the PCI's powerful and important functionaries are located at the Provincial Federation level.

The real secret of the mass party is the ability of local organizations to activate a large number of sympathizers on almost a regular basis. In the late 1960's the PCI moved away from cell life and the over-all number fell, but mainly


due to the abandonment of the territorial cell.²⁸⁰ Factory and work-place cells are still an active part of the Communist life but the main emphasis has shifted to Sections. This larger organization is almost akin to a typical Italian political club and, as such, allows for greater socialization and penetration. It is at this level that much of the presence of the PCI originates. Here is where the "colonization" of trade unions, cooperatives and all other labor organizations begins. For example, the PCI controls the 3,827,000-man CGIL, the 2,412,000-man National League of Cooperatives, the Italian Youth Federation, Association of Democratic Lawyers and Association of Democratic Journalists. There are also many peripheral organizations which it controls or directly influences such as: cultural (Italian-American Clubs); sports, recreation and travel (Intersport); anti-fascist (National Association of Italian Partisans); university, labor, and professional groups which provide a catch-all for any overlooked groups.

This massive and cohesive organization can best be compared to the Catholic Church in Italy. Whereas the Catholic Church reaches 99% of the people in Italy with 26,000 parishes, the Communist Party has 11,000 sections and 20,000 cells. The extensiveness of the PCI organization has enabled it to transform a diffuse population into a source of political power.

²⁸⁰ Lange, "The PCI at the Local Level," p. 260.

FIGURE 2

Organization of a Provincial Federation 281



Note: Sections are territorial units and are therefore included in both the Communal or Zonal Committees and the Federal Committee. Their primary link is to the Federal Committee except where decentralized committees are highly developed

281 Hellman, Organization and Ideology, p. 141-A

In order to run such a vast organization it takes money, and the Communists are no exception. Fortunately, the PCI is very well off financially and growing rapidly. Sales from the Party newspaper L' Unita alone topped 5,128,000,000 lire in 1975 and are expected to go over 10 billion lire in 1979.²⁸² Although the PCI lists the normal range of political income sources, there are hidden contributors which are not reflected in the official statistics (see Table VII for 1974-1975 official balance sheet). Informed sources indicate the PCI budget is closer to 1,200 billion lire a year.²⁸³ To make up the difference, there are four sources not listed in the official financial report. They are: the salaries of Party members holding official positions, kickbacks for Labor and Industry, brokerage commissions from trade, and direct payments from the CPSU.

The reason that salaries of Party members holding office are considered income is because these people are required to turn their check over to the PCI which in turn reimburses them at a constant rate.²⁸⁴ This not only increases the amount in the Party coffers but also increases PCI control over subordinates. Additionally, it shows that the Party is of primary interest to PCI members, and the State second.

²⁸² Unita (18 January 1976), p. 22. (667 lire = \$1)

²⁸³ Ibid, p. 22.

²⁸⁴ Ledeen, Michael and Claire Sterling. "Italy's Russian Sugar Daddies," The New Republic, CLXXIV, No. 14 (3 April 1976), p. 18

TABLE VII

PCI FINANCIAL STATEMENT²⁸⁵

Income (in Lire)	1974	%	1975	%
Membership dues	6,494,987,220	27.27	7,848,224,470	29.28
States contribution	10,671,655,077	44.82	10,847,664,396	40.48
Sundry revenue	569,165,117	2.39	1,041,767,263	3.89
Sundry income	6,060,000,000	25.45	7,053,527,614	26.32
Donations	17,108,000	.07	9,100,000	.03
Total	23,812,915,414		26,800,283,743	
Expenses (in Lire)	1974	%	1975	%
Staff	1,246,126,735	5.23	1,229,262,691	4.55
General expenditure	3,470,458,080	14.57	3,005,677,276	11.11
Contribution to peripheral offices & organization	13,450,030,118	56.49	17,121,412,950	65.33
Publishing & propaganda	4,081,995,893	17.14	4,660,138,101	17.24
Election campaigns	1,564,304,588	6.57	1,020,654,518	3.77
Total	23,812,915,414		27,037,145,536	

²⁸⁵ Codevilla, *YICA*, 1976, p. 178.

The budget also fails to mention contributions from labor unions and businesses. Since this source is denied to the public access, it is clear that either the PCI is extracting a large amount from these sources or, for purposes of legitimacy, wishes to deny any contact with these sources.

In April of 1976 an article was published by Michael Ledeen and Claire Sterling entitled "Italy's Russian Sugar Daddies" which exposed the rest of the PCI's clandestine financing.²⁸⁶ It indicated that one continuing major source of income is derived from commissions and brokerage fees from setting up transactions between Italian companies and the governments of Eastern Europe. Since virtually all negotiations must take place through the PCI, the communists collect very large fees from Italy's 2,000 billion Lire (\$3 billion) a year trade with Eastern Europe.²⁸⁷

In addition to the brokerage fees and commissions, Ledeen and Sterling report that direct payments made from the USSR amount to between 30% and 35% of the total PCI budget. The bulk of these payments are still handled through diplomatic pouches and therefore very difficult to detect.²⁸⁸ One example of cash contributions was the 18 billion Lire (\$27 million) the USSR contributed to the PCI for the 1972 elections.²⁸⁹

²⁸⁶ See Ledeen and Sterling, p. 16-21.

²⁸⁷ Atlantic, Vol. 235, No. 5 (May 1975), p. 13.

²⁸⁸ Ledeen and Sterling, p. 18.

²⁸⁹ Atlantic, Vol. 235, No. 5 (May 1975), p. 13.

In response to the Ledeen-Sterling article, the PCI denied direct Soviet financing but the brokerage role of the Party was admitted by Secretariat member Gianni:

...We have encouraged, occasionally even in the role of promoters, the establishment of companies among comrades over the past decades, mainly on a small scale and with the aim of facilitating economic exchanges between Italy and socialist countries.²⁹⁰

After analyzing some of the PCI's strategy, it comes as no surprise that they would prefer to keep some activities from the public eye as well as disassociating themselves from the Soviet Union. Nonetheless, several points about PCI financing stand out: it uses more money than any other Italian party; most of the income and expenses of the PCI are kept secret; and the Party is economically still dependent on the Soviets.²⁹¹

The composition of the 1.7 million member PCI is as diverse as one might expect considering the PCI's strategy of presence; however, the Party does exercise selectivity in recruiting and education, with special emphasis being placed on the intellectual leadership. The importance of certain types within the hierarchy reflects the character and development of the present PCI. However, the total social makeup was envisioned by Gramsci to encompass all classes in Italy with the primary emphasis being placed on the workers.

²⁹⁰ FBIS, No. 74 (11 April 1976), p. L-1.

²⁹¹ See Ledeen and Sterling for a more detailed description of PCI finances. Also see Ledeen, Michael. "The Soviet Connection," Commentary, LXII, No. 5 (November 1976), p. 51-54.

The PCI membership meets the guidelines set up for the over-all strategy very well. According to the Ascher and Tarrow study, the Party's strategy of presence is working well and the PCI has solid class support for mobilization.²⁹² One drawback in the over-all program is the fact that all Party members are not full time activists so that some effectiveness is lost. This lack of activism is being corrected by cultural and ideological education of the members, a Party imperative expressed by Gramsci in the 1920's.²⁹³ The education tends to stress closer orientation to Party ideals, thereby reinforcing the communist "id" and internalizing values. To do this job the Party has stepped up propaganda in cells, increased attendance at section and federation schools, as well as extended offerings at the three national schools in Bologna, Milan and Rome to more of the leadership by offering courses of three to six months' duration.²⁹⁴ In 1975, 150,000 PCI members attended Party schools. This education opportunity has also given the Italian Communists a chance to recruit from a more diverse social strata for Party membership.

With respect to over-all composition of the PCI, Table VIII VIII shows the social composition of the Party.~ One obvious point that stands out is the preponderance of the proletariat,

²⁹² Ascher, William and Sidney Tarrow. "The Stability of Communist Electorate: Evidence from a Longitudinal Analysis of French and Italian Aggregate Data," American Journal of Political Science, XIX (3 August 1975), p. 494.

²⁹³ Pozzolini, p. 107-116.

²⁹⁴ McInnes, The Communist Parties of Western Europe, p. 175.

TABLE VIII

Social Composition of PCI Membership²⁹⁵

<u>Social Category</u>	<u>Membership (%) by Year</u>				
	<u>1948</u>	<u>1952</u>	<u>1956</u>	<u>1962</u>	<u>1971</u>
Urban workers	45	42	39.8	39.5	39.5
Agricultural workers	17	18	17.1	12.7	8
Peasants	12	11.8	11.9	10.7	9.69
Artisans	5.6	4.3	5.0	5.2	4.63
Shopkeepers, Small businessmen	4.0	3.5	4.7	5.6	3.02
White collar workers	3.3	2.5	2.1	2.2	3.35
Professionals	.8	.6	.5	.6	.96
Students	.7	.5	.3	.3	1.15
Housewives	9.5	11.4	14	12.4	12.6
Retirees	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Others	2.1	5.4	4.2	9.8	2.18

²⁹⁵ 1948-1962 period from Tarrow, Peasant Communism, p. 140. (One would suspect the "other" figure of Tarrow's includes "retirees"). 1971 Figures from Lange, "The PCI at the Local Level," p. 284.

TABLE IX

Comparison of Social Composition of PCI and DC²⁹⁶

<u>Social Category</u>	<u>% of Members</u>	
	<u>PCI</u>	<u>DC</u>
Urban workers	39.5	16.6
Agricultural workers	17.6	15.2
Middle class	13.1	32.2
Retired	14.9	7
Housewife	11.6	25

²⁹⁶ McInnes, The Communist Parties of Western Europe, p. 61.

exactly as earlier planned by Gramsci. However, a comparison with the DC in 1973 (Table IX) shows the lack of penetration into the middle class. It is also interesting to note that the PCI has not absorbed as much of the female vote as many people believe. This is just another indication of some of the problems of "presence."

This mass Party with a relatively diverse social strata requires a strong, cohesive leadership to guide the membership. Additionally, the emphasis on hierarchy and ideology in a Communist system, and in particular the discipline-minded PCI, almost dictates that those people occupying leading organizational and external administrative positions are likely to be quite similar in background, outlook and political style. The importance of Party education reinforces this unity in values even more. The result is an exceptionally compact, homogeneous, like-thinking, professional leadership which perpetuates itself and imposes itself at will. History has shown the continuity of the Party hierarchy up to the present day but a more detailed analysis of the elite structure should provide insight into another key element of PCI character.

In Gramsci's early writings he was as concerned with the leaders of the Party as he was with forming a broad-based mass party:

We speak of captains without an army, but in reality it is easier to form an army than to find captains. It is surely true that an already existing army will be destroyed if it lacks captains; whereas a group of captains, cooperative and in agreement on common ends,

will not be slow in forming an army, even where none exists. ²⁹⁷

Much of his writings on the leadership of the Party was affected by the disruption of the post-World War I era. In this period it became obvious that a leadership was needed which could unify the moral-cultural force that Gramsci had envisioned would arise from the Party's presence. At the helm of the Party would be the intellectuals, but not in the narrow sense of the meaning of the word. He defined the intellectual as a man who, apart from his chosen profession, "exhibits some intellectual activity,...shares a world view, has a conscious line of moral conduct, and therefore contributes to sustaining or modifying a conception of the world."²⁹⁸ These intellectuals had a functional role of exercising direction over society (e.g., managers, administrators, etc.) as well as being the organizers and educators of society (scholars, teachers, artists, etc.).²⁹⁹ Thus, Gramsci makes a vertical separation of the visionaries who direct, at the highest level and specialists in organizing certain aspects of society at lower levels.

Gramsci also makes a horizontal distinction between "traditional" and "organic" intellectuals. The "traditional" intellectuals are the philosophical, educated class which historically had dominated the important social activities. The "organic" intellectual is what could be considered a product of the environment. He is the industrial manager,

²⁹⁷ Cammett, p. 196.

²⁹⁸ Ibid, p. 201.

²⁹⁹ Ibid, p. 201

the rising artist or the local administrative expert. Gramsci does not rigidly separate the two individuals but his theory shows that the "traditional" intellectual will aid and educate the "organic" intellectuals in their progressive advance to their rightful place in society.³⁰⁰

Gramsci makes a further classification of intellectuals by class and origin wherein he states a very obvious point that an urban intellectual will be the industrial manager wherein the rural intellectual will run the agricultural cooperatives.³⁰¹

The conclusion to be drawn from Gramsci's discourse on intellectuals is that the hierarchy will be more educated than the masses and that the Party apparatchiks should have some concrete technical skill to support their position.³⁰²

In analyzing the PCI elite it is best to divide the investigation into two parts: the national leadership; and the lower level functionaries. This will allow a closer scrutiny of the distinctive features of both and guard against sweeping generalizations about hard core national leadership which may or may not apply to the local politicians.

Nationally, the PCI is led by an intelligentsia elite, which is firmly organized, well disciplined and adequately financed. These leaders have become so entrenched in the higher society of Italy that they have been referred to as

³⁰⁰ Ibid, p. 203.

³⁰¹ Ibid, p. 203.

³⁰² Pozzolini, p. 80.


"the Communists in the double-breasted suits," a term usually reserved for bankers and industrialists.³⁰³

Some of the key figures in the PCI hierarchy at this time are: Luigi Longo, President; Enrico Berlinguer, General Secretary; Giorgio Amendola, Directorate member and head of the PCI Center for Economic Policy Studies; Paolo Bufalini, Directorate member and Secretariat member; Armando Cossutta, Directorate member and head of the PCI's commission on regional and local government; Pietro Ingrao, Directorate member and head of the PCI's Center for State Reform Studies; Giorgio Napolitano, Directorate member, Secretariat member and head of the PCI's commission on Labor; Gian Carlo Pajetta, Directorate member, Secretariat member and head of the International Policy Commission; Sergio Segre, Directorate member and head of the PCI's Foreign Affairs Commission. Other key Party members are listed in Appendix G.

In characterizing the present Party hierarchy it is useful to begin with the earlier elites and then compare them with the present leadership. The intellectual standard-bearer of the Party was Antonio Gramsci.³⁰⁴ He was born in 1891, in Sardinia, to a modest clerk. He proved to be a good student and despite his financially thin upbringing he was awarded a scholarship to the University of Turin in 1911. He distinguished himself while at the University but he soon became preoccupied with the Socialist Party. The rest of his life

³⁰³ Taggiasco, Ronald. "Letter from Rome," Business Week (25 May 1976), p. 12.

³⁰⁴ For a more extensive biography, see Cammett & McInnes, The Western Marxists.




Giorgio Amendola



Paolo Bufalino




Armando Cossutta




Carlo Galluzzi




Pietro Ingrao




Giorgio Napolitano



Gian Carlo Pajetta



Sergio Segre



Umberto Terracini

has been adequately documented in the earlier chapters dealing with historical analysis, but two important facts should be noted. Gramsci was the philosophical fountainhead of the Party ideology, and, in spite of upbringing by poor parents, he was a well educated member of the intelligensia.

Gramsci's cohort and successor, Palmiro Togliatti, was also born in Sardinia (Genoa), but two years later than Gramsci. He was the son of a bookkeeper of peasant origin.³⁰⁵ Like Gramsci, Togliatti worked hard in school and won a scholarship to Turin in 1911. Togliatti graduated second in his class, to Gramsci's seventh place. After receiving his law degree, he was drafted in the army but discharged after a year because of lung trouble. He returned to school to study philosophy where he soon teamed up with Gramsci to form Ordine Nuovo. The rest of his political life has been described in the historical analysis. Togliatti and Gramsci were very similar in origin and political outlook. Perhaps the reason why Gramsci became the theoretician and Togliatti became the tactician was Gramsci's incarceration.

Longo followed the mold of Gramsci and Togliatti.³⁰⁶ He was born in 1900 to a family of peasants. He was able to break out of the peasant life by becoming a Lieutenant in World War I. After the war he joined the PCI at the split at Livorno. In 1922 he was the PCI's youth representative at the Fourth

³⁰⁵ For more detail, see Wohl, p. 19-31.

³⁰⁶ See Caldwell, p. 503-525, for a concise biography.

Comintern Congress. Because of his anti-fascist activities he was forced to leave Italy in 1924. Until his return to Italy in 1943 he was active in the exiled PCI hierarchy and Comintern. He was one of the senior members of the Partisan leadership in Italy after 1943 and was awarded the Bronze Star by the U.S. for his efforts in the resistance. In 1945 he became Deputy General Secretary to Togliatti and because of his close adherence to Togliatti's policies he was a logical successor to the General Secretary's post after Togliatti's death in 1964. He remained as General Secretary until 1972 when another of Togliatti's proteges, Enrico Berlinguer, replaced him.

The ease of Berlinguer's succession to Longo's position surprised no one because Berlinguer had been a close associate of both Togliatti and Longo since 1944.³⁰⁷ Born in 1922 on the island of Sardinia to a middle class lawyer, Berlinguer's upbringing was more pleasant than his earlier predecessors'. He studied law for three years but then dropped out and joined the Communist youth movement in 1943. He was quickly promoted by Togliatti to the leadership of the youth movement and later became the President of the World Federation of Democratic Youth. In 1955 he became a member of the PCI's Directorate and swiftly moved up the ladder, joining the Secretariat in 1962 and the Politburo in 1966. Berlinguer has proven to be an able tactician for the Party, dealing and maneuvering the

³⁰⁷ New York Times Magazine of 9 May 1976, p. 51, gives a good account of Berlinguer's life.

PCI into the government for the first time since 1947. He is a centrist in the Party and more concerned with the "Italian road" than anything else. He is pro-international communism but definitely wants an autonomous PCI.

A brief look at other major PCI members should help to clarify the character of the hierarchy.³⁰⁸ Giorgio Amendola is perhaps the most controversial of all PCI leaders but his mastery of the Party organization and flexibility have kept him out of trouble. At 69 years old, he is one of the older members of the Party and yet maintains a vigorous schedule. Although a protege of Longo, he is more outspoken concerning autonomy from the USSR. In spite of his position on autonomy, he supports the Soviet line in the same manner as Berlinguer.

Paolo Bufalini is the perfect "organization man." He has enthusiastically supported the Party line in all of his speeches. He is for a more independent PCI but is content not to force his position in PCI meetings.

Armando Cossuta is the most pro-Soviet member of the PCI hierarchy and because of this position he travels often to the USSR and Eastern Europe. Speculation has it that he has recently fallen out of favor with Berlinguer, however Est et Ouest says that part of the reason is because he is the head of a new front organization for the PCI.³⁰⁹ He has firmly

³⁰⁸ Much of the information on the PCI personalities is taken from bits and pieces of articles, speeches by the individuals and interviews with Dr. Angelo Codevilla of the Hoover Institution on War and Peace.

³⁰⁹ Codevilla, YICA, 1976, p. 180, and Est et Ouest, No. 552 (May 1975).

supported the domestic policies of the PCI without discussion so the Est et Ouest article may have the best analysis of his present status. At 60 years of age, he is one year younger than Bufalini.

Pietro Ingrao is one of the theoretical leaders of the Party but is most well known for his borderline left-wing stance on PCI affairs. As a borderliner he has opposed the slow adaptation of the PCI to Italian politics for fear of disrupting ideological unity; however, he too supports the "historic compromise." He has been a constant critic of the USSR since the PCI Central Committee discussions on destalinization in 1961.³¹⁰ Ingrao is 61.

One of the younger leaders in the Party is Giorgio Napolitano. At 51 years of age, he has risen to the highest levels of Party leadership. He is a protege of Luigi Longo and has been a centrist in his policies. He reflects the current thinking of General Secretary Berlinguer in his writings on the PCI's relationship with the USSR and domestic policy.

Gian Carlo Pajetta is one of the older members of the Party. Born in 1911, he was able to join the PCI at an early age and served on national and international communist organs. Like most older members, he became a leader of the resistance and hence is a respected member of society. He is a firm believer in current PCI strategies and in particular the idea of "presence" to gain power.

³¹⁰ His earlier comments of 1961 are listed in Dallin's book on pages 446-447.

Sergio Segre is the Foreign Affairs specialist with the PCI. He helps formulate and carry out much of the foreign policy of the Party. Although only 50, he commands great respect in the Party. His policies toward the Soviets and the USA reflect the Party's over-all political strategy (which most often leads him to polemicize with the USSR).

In summary, the PCI hierarchy can be described as: part of the intelligensia; with an average of around 55, relatively young; holding a firm conviction for the "Italian road"; and, except for Cossuta, they consider the relations with the USSR as secondary to domestic priorities.

This character sketch clearly fits the ideological context of the Party, and, the youth of the hierarchy leads to the conclusion that present policies will continue for the next several decades. The only problem in that continuity could arise at the lower echelons. It is therefore appropriate to analyze the lower echelon functionaries in addition to the central elite to see if continuity is reflected at all levels of the PCI.

With a total of 12,000 salaried Party functionaries at work, down to even the level of the smallest federation, the PCI displays a very imposing apparatus.³¹¹ Unfortunately, there are too few good people to fill all of the posts the PCI wishes to control, so most Party functionaries also hold public office.³¹² This dual positioning divides the work of

³¹¹ Hellman, "Generational Differences," p. 82

³¹² Taggiasco, p. 12.

many officials and sometimes results in too much time being spent at the non-Party business. Fortunately there are benefits from holding down two jobs. As Sani has shown, the presence of PCI functionaries in so many aspects of PCI life cannot help but affect the perceptions of the mass of Italian people favorably.³¹³

To fulfill all of the requirements of the PCI, it would be expected that the Party would draw from a varied background for its functionaries while still maintaining Gramsci's directives of working class organic intellectuals. Table X shows the recruitment of PCI functionaries by class. Even with the change in distribution from lower to middle class in the younger age group there is still a marked continuity in recruitment from the lower class.³¹⁴

³¹³ See the following articles by Sani: "Determinants of Party Preference in Italy: Toward Integration of Complementary Models," American Journal of Political Science, XVIII, No. 2 (May 1974), p. 315-331; "Mass Constraints on Political Realignments: Perceptions of Anti-System Parties in Italy," British Journal of Political Science, VI (January 1976), p. 1-32; "Political Traditions as Contextual Variables: Partisanship in Italy," American Journal of Political Science, XX, No. 3 (August 1976), p. 375-405; and The Italian Election of 1976: Continuity and Change. Paper delivered at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, 2-5 September 1976.

³¹⁴ See Tarrow, Peasant Communism, p. 226-246 for a comparison with 1948-1963 figures.

TABLE X

Class Origins of PCI Functionaries, by Age Group³¹⁵

<u>Class</u>	<u>Totals</u>	<u>Under 40</u>	<u>40 and Older</u>
Middle	14%	31%	0%
Lower-Middle	23	13	32
Lower	63	56	68
Totals	100%	100%	100%

This change to other than lower class groups is more dramatic in the list of party candidates for office, since technical and managerial skills are required to effectively carry out the duties of elected positions. For example, in the local elections in Milan in 1975 workers held positions 5, 10, 14, 15 and 17 on the list of candidates and the top seven in the Marche were as follows:³¹⁶

1. Economist
2. PCI National Treasurer
3. Professor of History
4. Female Teacher
5. Actress
6. Chairman of the Peasants Alliance
7. Shipyard Worker

In order to effectively utilize the elected positions of its functionaries, the PCI has required a much higher educational level than seen in the populace as a whole. Table XI shows the educational makeup of Party functionaries. Note the increasing educational level of the younger functionaries.

³¹⁵ Hellman, *Organization and Ideology*, p. 362.

³¹⁶ Jones, p. 808.

TABLE XI

Educational Level of PCI Functionaries, by Generation³¹⁷

Level	Totals	Under 40	40 and Older
University ^a	18%	24%	12%
High School ^b	21	24	18
Junior High ^c	32	24	41
Elementary	29	29	29
Totals	100	101	100

^aIncludes those with at least two years' attendance

^bCompletion of scuola media superiore, technical, or professional institute.

^cCompletion or near-completion of scuola media inferiore.

Hellman's conclusion in his recent article, "Generational Differences in the Bureaucratic Elite of Communist Party Provincial Federations," is that the newer PCI functionaries are much better educated and prepared to assume the roles required by the PCI's strategy of presence.³¹⁸

³¹⁷ Hellman, Organization and Ideology, p. 365.

³¹⁸ Hellman's article on "Generational Differences in the Bureaucratic Elite of the Italian Communist Party Provincial Federations" does an excellent job of point out the fact that the new generations of PCI elite are more prepared for power.

Another way to analyze the PCI elite is to evaluate the reasons why they joined the Party in the first place. Table XII shows these reasons by regions (i.e., red = strongly communist, white = DC-controlled areas).

TABLE XII

Functionaries' Reasons for Joining PCI, by Region³¹⁹

Motivation	Total	Red Areas	White Areas
1. Idealistic or intellectual	14%	4% (1)	31%
2. PCI in resistance	16	17	15
3. Other specific occasion pushing person to PCI	16	12	23
4. Personal example or persuasion by PCI friends	14	17	8
5. Area, environment, family, etc.	41	50	23
	55%	67%	31%
Total (N)	101 (37)	100 (24)	100 (13)

Clearly the biggest reason is traditional ties and associations with Communists. This demonstrates that while ideology is a factor, the PCI's strategy of presence is of considerably more importance. In fact, the partisanship in the PCI tends

³¹⁹ Hellman, Organization and Ideology, p. 375.

to continually reinforce itself, much more so than the other Italian parties (see Table XIII).³²⁰

This partisanship leads to an ideological encapsulization despite daily interaction with non-communist politicians. The PCI functionaries have a greater commitment to political values than other Italian politicians, and, because of this and Party strategy, they are more deeply involved at the local level in Italian society. A survey of PCI mayors showed that 62% felt that they were successful in contributing to the growth of the country.³²¹

TABLE XIII

Interview of Communist Mayors Showing Partisan Involvement³²²

Mayors	Percentage of Total*		
	PCI	Left	Right
Who have held two or more Party jobs	69	32	34
Who hold PCI jobs at provincial or national level	31	9	3
Whose group memberships are all Party dominated	86	43	48

*non-communist Left

³²⁰ Tarrow, Sidney, "Party Activists in Public Office: Comparisons at the Local Level in Italy and France," Communism in Italy and France. eds. Donald L.M. Blackmer and Sidney Tarrow (Princeton, 1975), p. 147.

³²¹ Ibid, p. 149 and 154.

³²² Ibid, p. 147.

Naturally, an ideological movement would be self-perpetuating and therefore each generation of PCI elites would look for certain qualities which would fulfill the tasks and requirements of the current leadership. Table XIV reveals the qualities desired by the present elite. Note the close correlation between domestic strategy mentioned earlier and the first three qualities. Comparing this table and a study done by Hellman on the most important factor in over-all Party life, it is clear that most Party functionaries believe in the same ideals as the national leadership.³²³

Once again, the age factor demonstrates that the youth of the PCI will be closely following the present strategy when they take over. In Hellman's study, the elements which youth of the Party stressed even more than some older elites were Party discipline, democratic centralism and the need for aggressive reform.

³²³ See Hellman, "Generational Differences" for a more detailed analysis of generational beliefs.

TABLE XIV

Qualities Mentioned Most Frequently as
Required of a Good Communist Leader³²⁴

Quality	% of Respondents Mentioning Quality		
	Total	Red Areas	White Areas
1. Practical abilities	57%	70%	38%
2. Ideological, cultural training	53	52	54
3. Openness, tact, flexibility	41	54	15 (2)
3a. Ability to lead creating consensus	11	4	23
4. Closeness to masses and movement	16	30	8 (1)
5. Sense of self	11	9 (2)	15 (2)
6. Self-sacrifice	11	9	15
(Respondents)	(36)	(23)	(13)

Final confirmation of the PCI elite's adherence to the over-all Party's aims was demonstrated by Tarrow's survey of Italian mayors and Putnam's analysis of PCI politicians. Putnam and Tarrow found that PCI mayors were more active in Italian political life and found that accomplishing the goals of the Party was the most satisfying experience.³²⁵

³²⁴ Hellman, Organization and Ideology, p. 399.

³²⁵ Tarrow, "Party Activists," p. 143-172.

In spite of being overworked, the mayors displayed a high productivity, a firm commitment to transforming Italian society and a deep involvement in Italian political and social life.

In summarizing the characteristics of the Italian politicians at all levels, several important attributes stand out.³²⁶ Putnam's studies show that the PCI politicians are 85% above average in ideological commitment and 90% above average in partisan involvement compared with their opponents.³²⁷ They are more committed to political life and activity and derive the most satisfaction from achieving Party goals.³²⁸ Since they are more ideological and politically oriented, they tended to approach most problems in ideological terms. This leads to programmatic rather than technical solutions to problems.³²⁹ Putnam stresses the point that the PCI politicians are not merely "social democrats, content to tinker with the surface manifestations of what they see as fundamental social injustice," but rather, radical Marxists committed to the total transformation of society.³³⁰

To complete the analysis of the PCI organization, it is necessary to examine the sources of support for the Party

³²⁶ Putnam gives the best analysis of beliefs of the Italian politicians in The Beliefs of Politicians, and "The Italian Communist Politician."

³²⁷ Putnam, "The Italian Communist Politician," p. 179.

³²⁸ Ibid, p. 177.

³²⁹ Ibid, p. 180-182.

³³⁰ Ibid, p. 209-217.

within the populace. Several factors affect the participation of the people in Italian politics: national integration of the country as a whole; the lack of understanding of politics by most of the populace; and the general dissatisfaction with the government. In short, the voting base contains most of the country's most salient political and cultural features.

Italy's national integration was a problem as far back as Mazzini and has still not been fully completed. As a result, there is a tendency to focus on local problems and for a large segment of the population there is no psychological involvement in public policy making.³³¹ Instead, the majority of the populace is more concerned with the parochial centers of life, e.g., neighborhood, social groups, etc.³³² This makes them easy targets of the PCI's strategy of presence.

The frustrations generated by not being part of the national policy-making group tends to radicalize people and force them to seek alternatives in protest. The PCI has made a science of mobilizing this popular dissent into electoral support. Because it is an anti-system party, it provides a legitimate alternative to the government as well as being a vehicle of protest. The Party organization is able to crystallize the alienation and disaffection into a force which

³³¹ See La Polombara, Joseph and Myron Weiner, eds. Political Parties and Political Development (Princeton, 1966).

³³² Tarrow, Peasant Communism, p. 54.

transcends the traditional class role granted to a Marxist party.³³³

The lack of involvement in national politics and general dissatisfaction with the national government has led to an over-all political apathy in the populace. Tables XV and XVI graphically illustrate the voter apathy.

TABLE XV

Understanding of Local Issues by Region³³⁴

<u>Understand Issues</u>	(in percent)		
	<u>North</u>	<u>South</u>	<u>Italy</u>
Very well	11	23	15
Moderately	21	27	23
Not so well	21	16	19
Not at all	30	20	27
Depends; no answer	17	14	16

³³³ The Ascher-Tarrow study shows that this protest vote has become institutionalized. For further confirmation, see Tarrow, "Party Activists"; and New York Times Magazine (9 May 1976), p. 13.

³³⁴ Tarrow, "Peasant Communism," p. 76.

TABLE XVI

Attention to Electoral Campaign, by Region³³⁵

<u>Amount of Attention</u>	<u>North</u>	<u>South</u>	<u>Italy</u>
Much attention	13	24	17
Little attention	26	22	25
No attention	57	50	54
Other; don't know	4	3	4

Macciocchi ran into the same problem in her campaign in Naples. Most people were not concerned with major issues or ideology but rather where the next Lire was coming from and how to improve their plight. Macciocchi found that the electoral tactics of the PCI, such as using catchy phrases and calling for contemporary solutions, were successful in capturing the masses.³³⁶ Since the PCI had a strong presence in much of Naples' social and economic life, it was able to mobilize the people around purely personal issues.

Since voting patterns in Italy have nothing to do with ideology or national issues, the PCI's strategy of presence is the most effective way of gaining new electoral support. Because the Party makes use of local and personal economic issues to mobilize the population, it has been very successful.

³³⁵ Ibid, p. 78.

³³⁶ Macciocchi, p. 34.

One unfortunate element of this system for the Italian populace is that they do not realize the full impact of communism. There is a feeling that detente has disintegrated any differences in East and West and that all that matters is to get the best deal possible.

One final important element needs to be described before moving on to an analysis of the strength at the polls, and that is the age factor. Just as age is decreasing the Party, so is it decreasing in the over-all electoral support. Fully fifty percent of 18-20-year-olds vote for the PCI.³³⁷ This signifies future increased strength for the Communists as well as approval of the ways and means of the over-all strategy.

Over 30 years the PCI has gained steadily in national and local elections (see Appendix F). The Provincial results of 1976 are compared to the most recent other non-national elections in Table XVII. These figures are somewhat misleading in that the raw data shows a steady increase in the PCI's strength and yet the percentage of votes won by the left has remained virtually unchanged. Giacomo Sani's recent paper, "The Italian Election of 1976: Continuity and Change," delivered to the American Political Science Association, brings to light some interesting statistics concerning this problem. In 1946 the Communists and Socialists polled 39.6%

³³⁷ Sani, Giacomo. "Political Traditions as Contextual Variables: Partisanship in Italy," American Journal of Political Science, XX, No. 2 (August 1976), p. 390.

TABLE XVII

Provincial Balloting Results Compared to the Results of the
Last Provincial Elections in 1971 and Regional Elections in 1975³³⁸

Party	Votes	Perc. 76	Seats	Perc. 71	Perc. 75
DC	758,414	31.7	15	27.2	28.8
PCI	897,322	37.5	17	27.1	35.
PSI Socialists	184,556	7.7	3	8.4	9.6
MSI-Neo Fascists	254,231	10.6	5	7.	12.
PSDI-Soc. Dems.	83,893	3.5	1	5.	6.
PLI Liberals	33,544	1.6	1	1.	3.
PRI Repubs.	91,544	3.8	2	2.	3.9
PSIUP Leftists	--	--	--	--	--
DP-Dem. Prol.	35,194	1.5	--	--	--
Radicals	47,102	2.0	1	--	--
N.P.P.	1,443	0.1	--	--	--

³³⁸ FBIS, No. 123 (24 June 1976), p. L-4.

of the vote, whereas the PSI, PCI and other leftist parties polled a combined total of 40% in 1972 and 44% in 1976. Figures 3 and 4 and Table XVIII graphically depict where the changes have taken place. To summarize the Figures and Table, it can be seen that significant changes occurred in the composition of the electorate, i.e., the parties of the center and right lost more cohorts to death, the left attracted more young voters and very few defections took place.³³⁹ In effect, the voting percentages remained relatively stable between the left, center and right, with most flow taking place within major groups.

Even after finding out from close analysis that the polarization of the Italian electorate was not a result of mass defections to the left, the fact remains that from whatever source the PCI has made gains in its electoral base every year. It has clearly done a good job of analyzing voter preferences and capitalized on these preferences.³⁴⁰ Although the growth at the polls has been slow, the PCI strategy has been specifically designed to increase the electorate at whatever rate is acceptable to the populace while at the same time increasing the Party's presence.³⁴¹ A comparison of provincial and national results proves this point.


³³⁹ Sani, The Italian Elections of 1976, p. 14-15.

³⁴⁰ See description of the methods of PCI in utilizing votes in Sani, "Mass Constraints."

³⁴¹ For a fuller discussion of this premise, see the Ascher and Tarrow study.

FIGURE 3

Electoral Change: 1972-1976³⁴²



³⁴² Sani, The Italian Elections of 1976, p. 3A.

FIGURE 4

Estimates of Changes in the Composition of the Italian Electorate³⁴³

(in millions of voters)

1946 Electorate: 28.0		
Electors deceased between 1946 and 1976		Voters added to the electoral registry from 1946 to 1976
(47.4%)	(52.5%)	
13.3	14.7	25.7
	(36.4%)	(63.6%)
1976 Electorate: 40.4		

³⁴³ Ibid, p. 3B.

TABLE XVIII

Alternative Estimates of Votes Lost and
Gained by the Parties Due to Turnover³⁴⁴
(thousands of votes)

	Left (PCI, PSI, Others)	Center-right (PSDI, PRI, DC, PLI, MSI)	Total
Losses of votes due to cancellations of electors from the registry:			
a. Based on 1974 study	607 (32%)	1,291 (68%)	1,898
b. Based on 1975 study	740 (39%)	1,158 (61%)	1,898
c. Intermediate estimate	683 (36%)	1,215 (64%)	1,898
Votes gained due to new electors:			
a. Based on 1974 study	2,856 (56%)	2,244 (44%)	5,100
b. Based on 1975 study	3,264 (64%)	1,836 (36%)	5,100
c. Intermediate estimate	3,060 (60%)	2,040 (40%)	5,100
Difference between gains and losses:			
a. Based on 1974 study	2,245	953	
b. Based on 1975 study	2,524	678	
c. Intermediate estimate	2,377	825	
Gains-Losses Ratio:			
a. Based on 1974 study	4.87	1.74	
b. Based on 1975 study	4.41	1.59	
c. Intermediate estimate	4.48	1.68	

³⁴⁴ Ibid, p. 5A.

Summarizing the organization and composition of the PCI is not difficult because the Party adheres to the theoretical construction laid out by Gramsci. It is an ideologically motivated, disciplined, hierarchical organization. The Party elite has displayed definite continuity in composition and goal orientation and the youthful look in the PCI portends no changes for the future. The PCI possesses the organizational weapon and the personnel to make its strategy work and accomplish its goals. As for the electorate, all that need be said is that the Party's presence is working.

XIII. CONCLUSION

Before summarizing the unique characteristics of the Italian Communists, it is instructive to examine two further questions about the PCI which have not been discussed previously. The questions are those of the PCI's adherence to the principles of: (1) democracy and, (2) pluralism. These precepts are central to Western political systems and are the basis for reluctance on the part of many Italians and Westerners to trust the PCI.

The main point of conflict centers around the fear of many Italians that, once in power, the PCI will attempt to set up a dictatorship of the proletariat. The problem of the PCI's adherence to the principles of democratic politics is complicated, as described previously, by the Communists' perversion of the political vocabulary. The PCI has denied that the dictatorship of the proletariat is its intent because, for the Italian Communist Party, the process of guidance, in the event of their rise to power, will be called the "hegemony of the working class." The question now arises as to what hegemony means. Once again the Party turns to Gramsci's theoretical writings for the basis of this policy. According to Gramsci, hegemony is an equilibrium between civil society and political society; more specifically an equilibrium between leadership (or direction) based on consent

and domination based on coercion in the broadest sense.³⁴⁵
A historical bloc is formed once there is equilibrium, e.g.,
when a class "succeeds in maintaining hegemony over society
through both direction and domination, persuasion and force."³⁴⁶
The last part of the definition is important in that Gramsci
insisted that the hegemony was to be both a leadership and
a domination role.³⁴⁷ This whole process of hegemony ties
in with the strategy of presence because Gramsci said that
hegemony over society would take place in the cultural, social
and economic areas before as well as after the assumption of
power.³⁴⁸ Theoretically then, the hegemony of the working
class seems to be identical to a dictatorship of the prole-
tariat, except the people are to be "led" by the Party before
as well as after the takeover of power. In addition, this
hegemony would allow for the formation of a historical bloc
of forces which would be the new majority in society (a
notion expressed by Berlinguer in the "historic compromise").

The current leadership in the PCI describes hegemony as
a wide alliance of all forces seen "in the sense of capacity
for direction, conquest of consent, and construction of alli-
ances."³⁴⁹ This hegemony will then provide "the real guarantee

³⁴⁵ Pozzolini, p. 73. See also Gramsci, Antonio, Letters from Prison, p. 42.

³⁴⁶ Gramsci, p. 42.

³⁴⁷ Pozzolini, p. 73.

³⁴⁸ Cametti, p. 206.

³⁴⁹ Codevilla, YICA, 1976, p. 191.

that socialism can develop protected from reactionary counter-attacks..."³⁵⁰ The PCI does not deny the similarity between "hegemony of the working class" and dictatorship of the proletariat but prefers to associate hegemony with democracy:

If we do not use the term "dictatorship of the proletariat" to indicate the historical function of the working class and the objectives facing it, it is because we want to stress the new way in which, precisely in the present situation, the working class and the parties representing it are considering outside any possible terminological misunderstanding of the problem of alliances, of the full realization of the democratic method, and of the full development of man's and citizens' freedom in a society without exclusive rights, monolithisms, privileges.³⁵¹

It is easy to see how the Italian Communists can make such a comparison when one understands that they feel that Lenin's rule was democratic:

When Marx and Lenin talk of the "dictatorship of the proletariat" it must be borne in mind that the term which accompanies and is opposed to the "dictatorship of the bourgeoisie" has the significance of a guide and a determining political influence exercised by a class which assumes a leading function through a profound social upheaval. The term "dictatorship" in either case is not to be confused with the adoption of terrorist or even merely authoritarian and administrative measures in the administration of power.³⁵²

Since the "hegemony of the working class" is to be utilized over the minority, it is democratic and not an authoritarian dictatorship.³⁵³ To further cloud the issue of the use of

³⁵⁰ Ibid, p. 191.

³⁵¹ FBIS, No. 239 (11 December 1975), p. L-2.

³⁵² Ibid, p. L-2

³⁵³ See Radio Free Europe Background Report No. 35 (9 February 1976) for a more extensive explanation of this idea.

force in achieving this hegemony, the Party emphasizes that force will be used only against the enemies of the state and for the good of the "people":

Coercion certainly does not disappear, since one cannot develop democracy and bring it on to socialism without a rigorous and coherent action, within the framework of state legality, against the reactionary and subversive forces of big capital. The coercion, however, is exercised in this case by the power bloc which must steer the transformation of society and the state in a socialist direction....Within the power bloc itself, to build it and maintain it, the ruling function of the working class must be exercised.³⁵⁴

In spite of the PCI's semantic maneuverings and protests, the "hegemony of the working class" emerges transparently as dictatorship using coercion if necessary. Clearly this dictatorship would be opposed to the principle of free will as exercised in a democracy. It would mean that the workers and their associated organizations, as guided by the PCI, would direct the government, industry, education and all social affairs.

Freedom is the other important aspect of democracy which would take on a new meaning under the PCI. Gramsci's idea was that freedom and democracy were to be controlled by the "majority" of the workers to speed the rapid development of the socialist struggle.³⁵⁵ He distinguished between bourgeoisie democracy and freedom, and the new state in which discipline would become a "democratic necessity" to protect

³⁵⁴ Ibid, p. 2

³⁵⁵ Pozzolini, p. 63-69.

the majority from attacks by minority factions.³⁵⁶ This discipline was fully consistent with Gramsci's idea of democracy:

Discipline therefore does not negate personality and freedom; the question of "personality and freedom" stems not from the fact of discipline itself, but from the origin of the power that lays down the discipline. If this origin is "democratic," if that is, the authority is a specialized technical function and not "arbitrariness" or an outside and external imposition, discipline is a necessary element of democratic order, of freedom.³⁵⁷

One example of this application of "freedom" is the utilization of the principle of democratic centralism by the Italian Communists. Perhaps an even more telling example of the PCI's idea of freedom is the opinion often stated by the Italian Communists that the USSR is a free country and perhaps even more so than Western countries. Napolitano expressed this sentiment in February of 1976 when he answered an interviewer's questions about freedom and equality in the USSR by saying, "You will acknowledge that there is more equality there (in the USSR) than in countries like our own."³⁵⁸ It is clear that the Western idea of democracy and the PCI's idea of democracy are not one and the same. Whereas in the West free speech and almost unlimited personal freedom are the norm, the PCI uses the standard dialectical rationalizations when it discusses suppressing those political parties which are counter-revolutionary, the strikers who aim to sabotage

³⁵⁶ Ibid, p. 63.

³⁵⁷ Ibid, p. 65.

³⁵⁸ FBIS, No. 39 (26 February 1976), p. L-3.

the people's mines and factories, the spies and fascists who are abusing free speech or any other of the offenses directed against the state.

Another important element of democracy is pluralism, or the alternation of political parties. Since historical experience has shown that one of the basic aspects of communism after it achieves victory is to eliminate both allies and real elections, many Italians are skeptical about the PCI's profession of complete adherence to the democratic principle of pluralism. In a poll in April of 1976, Italians were asked whether the PCI, once it was in the government, would accept a return to the opposition if it lost at the polls: 30.4% said yes, while 45.8% thought the PCI would not leave.³⁵⁹ The PCI is quick to protest, saying that it is not like other communist parties. Of course the Italian Communists have little choice but to protest, since they are intent on following the parliamentary road and can scarcely tell their fellow travellers that they will be liquidated in the future. In response to remonstrances by the PCI as to its firm support of democracy, the Italian news service has noted that the Italian Communists' protests almost always appear on the back page of the Communist Party newspaper and that replies to Pravda or Izvestia on pluralism are often invisible.³⁶⁰

³⁵⁹ FBIS, No. 65 (2 April 1976), L-1.

³⁶⁰ The PCI's did not deny that this statement was true but instead protested again that they firmly believed in these principles. See FBIS, No. 118 (17 June 1976), p. L-3.

When the PCI speaks about pluralism, its basic emphasis is on the fact that the multi-party system will remain and that alternation of leadership of the country may occur.³⁶¹ The catch in the system stems from the fact that alternation of parties has no meaning for a PCI-run government since the PCI's plan for coming into power at the vanguard of a vast majority coalition precludes any effective opposition. Longo alluded to this in his speech to the 14th PCI Congress when he said that:

Whereas hitherto the conservative and retrograde forces have been at the country's helm, with the inception of the so-called "compromise" it will be the progressive Communist, Socialist and Catholic forces which will govern and for once, the retrograde and conservative forces of the old and obsolete which will form the opposition.³⁶²

Berlinguer further defined this new opposition as, "the extreme right wing, the conservative forces, and the other forces which do not share either the general outlines or specific programs of the unity government."³⁶³ Essentially, this brings us back to the same point that the opposition would be so small or kept so ineffective by the "hegemony of the working class," as in Poland or Hungary, that it would cease to be an opposition in the democratic sense, i.e., an alternative force.

For his part, Berlinguer may sincerely believe in a type of democracy, but he talks about it in terms of the future,

³⁶¹ FBIS, No. 120 (21 June 1976), p. L-1.

³⁶² FBIS, No. 82, Supp. 6 (28 April 1975), p. 57.

³⁶³ FBIS, No. 105, Supp. 36 (28 May 1976), p. 24.

after the socialist ideal has been achieved, and in terms of a non-Western type of democracy. The point must be emphasized that the PCI does not talk of democracy in a Western sense.

In his survey of Italian politicians, Putnam concluded that:

Italian Communists employ almost exclusively classical and socioeconomic conceptions of democracy. Only rarely do they stress elements of liberal or polyarchal democracy-free speech, the rule of law, limited government, political competition, and so on. Not Locke and Schumpeter but Marx and Rousseau are their intellectual forbears.³⁶⁴

The democracy, freedom and pluralism acknowledged by Western statesmen is inconsistent with the principles of Marx or Gramsci. The radical transformations would prove unpalatable to all but the dedicated communists, which in turn would surely lead to conflict and invocation of communist principles of equality.³⁶⁵ The myth of "democratic communism" is perhaps the most erroneous characterization of the PCI. With this last characterization in mind, it is appropriate to summarize the distinctive features of the PCI.

The character of the PCI is a product of national ideas, particular conditions of history, and the men who participated in the organization of the party. Although there has often seemed to be a split between theory and practice, this has been a result of the flexible strategy adopted by the Party to meet the realities of the time. Even at times of conflict there has remained a basic interaction between ideology,

³⁶⁴ Putnam, "The Italian Communist Politician," p. 194.

³⁶⁵ See The Communist Parties of Western Europe, by Neil McInnes, p. 176-177, for further discussion of this idea.

goals, strategy and organization. Throughout its history, the basic philosophic and programmatic content of the "Italian road" has been preserved intact: from Gramsci to Berlinguer, the movement has always remained constant in its goals.

The first point to note about the character of the PCI is that it represents a national form of communist ideology. In other words, the character of the party was not shaped by the occupation of the country by Stalin's army. It was born in the national movement of the 19th century and raised to consciousness by its own original theoretician, Antonio Gramsci. The basic theory is Marxist-Leninist but Gramsci altered it to fit the Italian situation. This Gramscian ideology has been the basis for all policy formulation and strategy since about the 1930's. The continuity of application of his theories has remained unbroken to the present. The rest of the world may have Marx and Lenin but Italy looks decisively to Gramsci for guidance. Sergio Segre summed up the Party's feelings on the PCI by saying that:

It did not just base itself on translations of Marxist-Lenist texts. It had its own seminal thinkers in the figure of Gramsci and others. Italian communism is not an import. It had developed in the tradition of the previous Italian culture.³⁶⁶

An important element of this Italian ideology is that Gramsci taught that his theories should not be dogmatically applied, therefore flexibility became the key to party life.

³⁶⁶ Yergin, Daniel, "A Letter from Rome," The New Republic, LCXXII, No. 18 (1 November 1975), p. 12.

In strategy, tactics and organization, nothing was too firm to be altered to suit the ultimate utopian goal. Thus we have an ideology which has both unique national continuity and flexibility.

The goal of the PCI is the political, social and economic transformation of Italian society. In his speech to the PCI Central Committee on 13 May 1976, Berlinguer stated the goal quite clearly, "The socialist society we want to build involves a transformation of the entire structure of society ..."³⁶⁷ Its revolutionary goals, although perhaps in theory non-violent, preclude any identification with a social-democratic movement. It is dedicated to the ruthless pursuit of a communist state and one in which the Western ideas of society, including democracy and freedom, do not exist. In attaining the communist state, the Party has opted to achieve power by parliamentary means. This has been misunderstood by many to mean that the PCI has adapted to the democratic system, while to the contrary such an opting means only that the Party realizes it must use the system if it is to gain power. Once in power, as it has often stated, the PCI would use the "hegemony of the working class" to oversee the transformation of society.

The PCI has forged a four-pronged strategy to achieve its goals. It aims to continue to develop and maintain a mass party capable of achieving and holding onto power.

³⁶⁷ FBIS, No. 105, Supp. 36 (28 May 1976), p. 20.

Secondly, it wants to create a "presence" in Italy by the penetration of the social and economic foundations of the country. Thirdly, it means to pursue coalitions and alliances anywhere and everywhere to allow it to increase its electoral base. Finally, it is determined to maintain fraternal links with the USSR and the international communist movement with which it feels such close ties. These strategies are all linked by Gramscian theory but at the same time the flexibility of his theory allows partial or conflicting strategies to be used if the need arises. One important aspect of these strategies which must be repeated is the continuity with which they have all been pursued.

If continuity is the watchword of ideology and strategy, pragmatism best describes the tactical applications used daily. Party life is marked by political actions which are flexibly geared to the realities of the moment. The PCI uses cajolery most often but also uses coercion if the need arises. In the over-all scheme of Party actions there may be partial actions and tactical compromise which seemingly conflict with the improvement of the plight of the workers, but, in reality these both fit into the "war of position." Only after the "war of movement" is entered into will the tactics no longer be compromising or partial. Berlinguer described the Party's actions by saying that it had always "tried to maintain the link between immediate objectives and historical goals..."³⁶⁸

³⁶⁸ FBIS, No. 82, Supp. 6 (28 April 1975), p. 42.

To carry out the goals of the PCI, it was necessary to build a mass party with a cohesive organization. This organization is well disciplined and uses the principle of democratic centralism to prevent any undue dissention or factionalism. The PCI politician is ideologically dedicated to the destruction of Italian capitalism. They have maintained a consistent belief in the PCI's goals since the time of party formation. To sustain this consistency, the PCI carries on a selective recruiting program, a rigorous education program and performs periodic purges to cleanse the Party. On the other hand, the vast majority of the people who vote communist have no awareness of what the Party stands for or what it means to them. They vote communist out of protest, because they have received favors from the communists or because their friends vote communist. The vote-getting capability of the PCI reflects the effectiveness of the organization in mobilizing the populace when required. If there are two words which could easily sum up the organization, they would be discipline and success. Putnam stresses the fact that the PCI politicians "are no mere social democrats, content to tinker with the surface manifestations of what they see as fundamental social injustices," and that the people in Italy are responding.³⁶⁹

It seems clear from the summary of the main elements of the PCI character that the PCI is a revolutionary communist party with strong links to the international communist movement.

³⁶⁹ Blackmer, Communism in Italy and France, p. 182.

In short, the PCI is the sort of a threat which should give the U.S. State Department serious cause for alarm. It is the kind of party which could, if voted into power in Italy, cause serious problems for Italy and the Western allies. Perhaps a brief look at some of the possible ramifications of a communist-led Italy will clarify the problem.

There are several points which seem to be the motivating factors behind the U.S. Government's negative response to the PCI. The most important are suggested by the following questions: What will happen in Italy when and if the PCI comes to power? Will the U.S. or USSR benefit? What will a communist Italy mean for NATO? And, what will such an Italy mean for the Mediterranean in general?

First of all, it seems fairly obvious that Berlinguer is dedicated to achieving power by peaceful means. He may even believe the whole idea of an independent, national and democratic road to a communist transformation of society. Although it is not a foregone conclusion that the PCI will achieve the goal of government participation, if it does, the participation will most likely be peaceful initially.³⁷⁰ This point has been demonstrated often by the Communists' penchant for moving slowly and cautiously along the "Italian road," always aware that they are on trial with the Italians and the world as

³⁷⁰ See the Conference Report entitled, "The Political Stability of Italy" at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Georgetown University, 2 April 1976. The topics discussed at the Conference ranged from domestic politics to foreign policy of the PCI.

a whole. The need for alliances and coalitions would undoubtedly constrain the Party until it assumed power, but the real dilemma would arise after power was attained. Once the Italian Communists were in control of the government, they would be faced with fulfilling the promises made to the people who put them in power.³⁷¹ Many of these people, who in the past have proven to be difficult to control, are now going to demand quick solutions to problems. If the PCI continues to move slowly, these people will probably carry out unofficial economic expropriation in Italy as in the recent case of Chile. To prevent this rapid loss of power, the PCI is going to have to consolidate power and control quickly and probably reduce some freedom. Even if the people do not demand that the PCI carry out its promises, at some point the Communists would find themselves confronted with the problems of the transition to socialism. After analyzing the PCI's organization and internal discipline, one can assume that the PCI would not be reluctant to resort to the extreme measures of control employed by so many other communist regimes. Whereby the Italian "democratic road" would have the appearance of any other authoritarian regime. Djilas describes this resort to coercion in action in his book, The New Class. One further bit of proof of the PCI's ability to avail itself of radical procedures lies in the continuity of Party discipline and organization. If the PCI did not foresee a future need

³⁷¹ Ibid, p. 8.

to impose a coercive and repressive form of government, then there would be less of a requirement to perpetuate the organization, internal discipline and strategy that characterize the Party.

It has been postulated that even if the PCI were to achieve power in Italy that the USSR would suffer a greater loss than the West because of the ideological disruption posed by the Italian brand of communism.³⁷² This hypothesis is hyperbolically optimistic. The PCI is not only emotionally and ideologically attached to the USSR, but in part financially dependent on them as well. Perhaps on a spectrum of strict conformity to the Soviet line the Italian Communists would be to the left of Rumania but hardly as far afield as Yugoslavia or China. It is also highly probable that the USSR would suffer some discomfiture by having a liberal communist party in Europe. It may even cause some dissention in Eastern Europe, but the current Soviet statements about the PCI do not portray a fear of, or violent dissatisfaction with, the Italian Communists. The fact remains that the USSR would find an ally, which has historically declared its solidarity with the Soviets, in the midst of the Medeterranean and outflanking the forces of NATO (the position of NATO in Italy will be discussed next). The USSR would clearly benefit proportionately more than the West and the gains to the Soviets would outweigh the ideological loss.

³⁷² Ibid, p. 10-11.

The matter of NATO is a sensitive problem for the PCI since it only recently (1974), and largely out of pragmatic necessity, decided to remain in the alliance. Even this "acceptance" of NATO is conditional:

Communists consider Italy's presence in the Atlantic Alliance and in NATO a negative fact which is a danger to peace and national security. But they are not raising Italy's withdrawal from this system of alliances as a point of order, because their aim is the obsolescence of the military and political blocs within a perspective of peace and gradual, controlled and balanced disarmament. Communists oppose the acceptance of new military and financial commitments and any attempt to overburden the contents of agreements which were explicitly declared to be defensive and geographically limited.³⁷³

Perhaps even more enlightening is Berlinguer's statement regarding the reasons why the PCI changed its mind on NATO, "We believe any other solution would be damaging and sterile, both because any unilateral exit from the two (power) blocs would disturb the move towards detente, and because it would create a break between Italy's democratic parties."³⁷⁴ The last reason was enlarged upon by Berlinguer when he declared that any pullout from NATO would reopen "a furrow on the domestic level between our country's democratic and popular forces."³⁷⁵ Coming after the coup in Chile, these statements seem to be geared more to the Party's coalition strategy than to sincere acceptance of the spirit of NATO. Other statements on the military such as the proposed reforms of the PCI which would make the Italian army defensive in nature and pull back

³⁷³ FBIS, No. 130 (7 July 1975), p. L-1.

³⁷⁴ FBIS, Annex 95 (14 May 1976), p. 2.

³⁷⁵ FBIS, No. 54 (11 March 1975), p. L-1.

the forward NATO forces, cast even more suspicion on the Western character of the PCI's new policy.³⁷⁶ These points raise serious doubts about the PCI's willingness to participate effectively in NATO, to protect NATO classified data, and most of all, to be a reliable Western ally in time of crisis. If one can take the PCI's stand on SALT, the Panama Canal, the Mideast, Angola and Portugal as examples of the PCI's feelings in time of crisis, there is no question that the PCI would not be a reliable ally for the West.

Another point which needs to be emphasized in conjunction with the PCI and NATO is Italy's importance to the Mediterranean. Any analysis of the Mediterranean will show that Italy divides the two basins of the Mediterranean Sea and could possibly control access to either basin in time of crisis.³⁷⁷ Given the recent attitude expressed by the Italian Communists on NATO and the Mediterranean, the PCI could be expected to pursue a position of neutrality or even hostility toward the West in time of a conflict in the Mediterranean (especially in the Mideast).³⁷⁸ One recent manifestation of this attitude has been the attempts of the PCI to persuade the

³⁷⁶ Codevilla, YICA, 1976, p. 189. See also FBIS, No. 36 (21 February 1976), p. M-2.

³⁷⁷ For a more detailed analysis of the situation of Italy in the Mediterranean see: Allsopp, George A. Soviet Naval Challenge in the Mediterranean: Who Rules the Mediterranean. Carlisle Barracks: Army War College, 1972; Campbell, John C. "The Mediterranean Crisis," Foreign Affairs, LIII, No. 4 (July 1975), 605-624; and Lewis, Jesse W.J. The Strategic Balance in the Mediterranean. Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1976.

³⁷⁸ See Lange, Peter. "What is to be done about Italian Communism," Foreign Policy, No. 21 (Winter 1975-1976), p. 224-240.

Italian government to regain control of all U.S. bases in Italy. In this same vein, during a recent interview of Berlinguer, a journalist asked what would be the response of the Communist ministers in the Italian government if a conflict were to break out in the Mediterranean area and the forces of the Warsaw Pact or NATO requested limited and temporary use of Italian territory as a support and supply base for naval and air units? Berlinguer replied:

I am often asked the following question: How would you behave in the event of a conflict involving forces both of the Atlantic Pact and of the Warsaw Pact? And I must say once again quite simply that this eventuality would signify the outbreak of a nuclear war, and so I do not see what the problems would be.³⁷⁹

Berlinguer's ambiguous answer leads to the conclusion that he either cannot decide on one side or the other, or he wishes to remain neutral. In either case, the answer for Western forces is clearly a problem, and little or no effective support from Italy can be counted on once the PCI attains power.

Scenarios could continue to be built using the characterization of the PCI which have been constructed in this paper but the main point is the following: the inclusion of the PCI in the Italian government will prove to be detrimental to Italy and to the West. Further, having the PCI in power will benefit the Soviets while being detrimental to NATO and the strategic balance in the Mediterranean.

In the final analysis, what is at stake is the ideological control of men's lives and minds through the absolute use of

³⁷⁹ FBIS, No. 108 (3 June 1976), p. L-1.

state power. The "accommodation of mutual interests" envisioned by Western leaders can never come about because the goals of the Communists do not include a Western democratic society. Conversely, no society where the rights of man are respected would tolerate the transition to communism. The radical transformations required for communism would prove unpalatable for Italian society. Berlinguer may try to stick to a democratic road to communism, but as Djilas found in Yugoslavia, no matter what circumstantial adaption and modifications the communists make, the party will remain Marxist-Leninist and eventually the democratic road will become more undemocratic as communism progresses.³⁸⁰ For a telling forecast of the future of democratic communism as characterized by the PCI, one may turn to three quotes by recent "democratic" leaders:

The Communist Party should take into account that in the present phase we are following the line of a national and democratic revolution.

Klement Gottwald, 1945
Czech Communist Party Secretary

Popular democracy in Poland is not the dictatorship of the proletariat. Our democracy is not the same as Soviet democracy.

Wlodyslaw Gomulka, 1946
Polish Communist Party Secretary

In the past 25 years, the world's communist parties have learnt that there are different ways to socialism, and so we cannot construct socialism if we do not build our own way, taking account of the particular conditions

³⁸⁰ For more on this comparison see Radio Free Europe Research Report #35 (9 February 1976); also McInnes, The Communist Parties of Western Europe, p. 176-177.

prevailing in the country. We have learnt our lesson, and if we are reinforcing Hungarian democracy, we are not doing so for tactical reasons, or in pursuit of some secret objective, but in accordance with our deep communist faith.

Madyas Rakosi, 1946
Hungarian Communist Party Secretary³⁸¹

Although these statements were made twenty years ago, they reflect the attitude of the present PCI and bear ample warning to the West.

The PCI has obscured its goals in a mass of ideological rationalizations and rhetoric but the revolutionary goals and radical views are as plain as those of Adolf Hitler in Mein Kampf. The Party does not deny that it will radically change the pattern of life in Italy nor does it disguise its dislike of Western democracy. The Italian Communist elite do not refuse the fact that they rigorously pursue communist goals, nor do they hide their close association with the international communist movement and the USSR in particular. In short, they are a revolutionary communist party, flexible and yet held together by an unchanging ideological continuity, dedicated to the overthrow of Capitalism. The PCI made these feelings clear at the 14th PCI Congress:

Italians ought not to delude themselves; the disintegration they see around themselves cannot be healed by Western means. Only the advent of socialism will bring moral health.³⁸²

³⁸¹ The Economist (28 February 1976), p. 54.

³⁸² Codevilla, YICA, 1976, p. 183.

This new Italy was described clearly by Berlinguer: "The socialist society which we want to build involves a transformation of the entire structure of society."³⁸³

The alternatives for the United States are few. The U.S. Government must resist any impulse to portray the PCI as anything but dedicated communists. Western leaders need to recognize that the PCI will never become another social democratic party. The only course of action, therefore, must be to dissuade the Italian people from allowing the communists to participate in the government. And finally, the Western governments must aid the democratic parties in Italy in their efforts to resist communist gains which are based on the subtle tactics of pragmatically working within the existing system. Without this vigilance and active resistance to Italian "democratic communism" the struggle between Western civilization and the "mediation of earthly paradise" of Marxism will be over and the PCI's new revolutionaries will have won.

³⁸³ FBIS, No. 105, Supp. 36 (28 May 1976), p. 20.

APPENDIX A

GENERAL RULES OF THE INTERNATIONAL WORKING MEN'S ASSOCIATION³⁸⁴

That the emancipation of the working classes must be conquered by the working classes themselves; that the struggle for class privileges and monopolies, but for equal rights and duties, and the abolition of all class rule;

That the economical subjection of the man of labor to the monopolizer of the means of labor, that is, the sources of life, lies at the bottom of servitude in all its forms, of all social misery, mental degradation, and political dependence;

That the economical emancipation of the working classes is therefore the great end to which every political movement ought to be subordinate as a means;

That all efforts aiming at that great end have hitherto failed from the want of solidarity between the manifold divisions of labor in each country, and from the absence of a fraternal bond of union between the working classes of different countries;

That the emancipation of labor is neither a local nor a national, but a social problem, embracing all countries in which modern society exists, and depending for its solution

³⁸⁴ Günther Nollau, International Communism and World Revolution (New York, 1961), p. 328-331.

on the concurrence, practical and theoretical, of the most advanced countries;

That the present revival of the working classes in the most industrious countries of Europe, while it raises a new hope, gives solemn warning against a relapse into the old errors, and calls for the immediate combination of the still disconnected movements;

For These Reasons--

The International Working Men's Association has been founded.

It declares:

That all societies and individuals adhering to it will acknowledge truth, justice, and morality, as the basis of their conduct towards each other and towards all men, without regard to color, creed, or nationality;

That it acknowledges no rights without duties, no duties without rights; and in this spirit the following rules have been drawn up.

1. This Association is established to afford a central medium of communication and cooperation between Working Men's Societies existing in different countries and aiming at the same end, viz., the protection, advancement, and complete emancipation of the working classes.

2. The name of the Society shall be "The International Working Men's Association."

3. There shall annually meet a General Working Men's Congress, consisting of delegates of the branches of

the Association. The Congress will have to proclaim the common aspirations of the working class, take the measures required for the successful working of the International Association, and appoint the General Council of the Society.

4. Each Congress appoints the time and place of meeting for the next Congress. The delegates assemble at the appointed time and place without any special invitation. The General Council may, in case of need, change the place, but has no power to postpone the time of meeting. The Congress appoints the seat and elects the members of the General Council annually. The General Council thus elected shall have the power to add to the number of its members.

On its annual meetings, the General Congress shall receive a public account of the annual transactions of the General Council. The latter may, in cases of emergency, convoke the General Congress before the regular yearly term.

5. The General Council shall consist of working men from different countries represented in the International Association. It shall from its own members elect the officers necessary for the transaction of business, such as a treasurer, a general secretary, corresponding secretaries for the different countries, etc.

6. The General Council shall form an international agency between the different national and local groups of the Association, so that the working men in one country be constantly informed of the movements of their class in every other country; that an inquiry into the social state of the different

countries of Europe be made simultaneously, and under a common direction; that the questions of general interest mooted in one society be ventilated by all; and that when immediate practical steps should be needed--as, for instance, in case of international quarrels--the action of the associated societies be simultaneous and uniform. Whenever it seems opportune, the General Council shall take the initiative of proposals to be laid before the different national or local societies. To facilitate the communications, the General Council shall publish periodical reports.

7. Since the success of the working men's movement in each country cannot be secured but by the power of union and combination, while, on the other hand, the usefulness of the International General Council must greatly depend on the circumstance whether it has to deal with a few national centres of working men's associations, or with a great number of small and disconnected local societies; the members of the International Association shall use their utmost efforts to combine the disconnected working men's societies in their respective countries into national bodies, represented by central national organs. It is self-understood, however, that the appliance of this rule will depend upon the peculiar laws of each country, and that, apart from legal obstacles, no independent local society shall be precluded from directly corresponding with the General Council.

7a. In its struggle against the collective power of the possessing classes, the proletariat can act as a class only

by constituting itself a distinct political party, opposed to all the old parties formed by the possessing classes.

The coalition of the forces of the working class, already achieved by the economic struggle, must also serve, in the hands of this class, as a lever in its struggle against the political power of its exploiters.

As the lords of the land and of capital always make use of their political privileges to defend and perpetuate their economic monopolies and to enslave labor, the conquest of political power becomes the great duty of the proletariat.

8. Every section has the right to appoint its own secretary corresponding with the General Council.

9. Everybody who acknowledges and defends the principles of the International Working Men's Association is eligible to become a member. Every branch is responsible for the integrity of the members it admits.

10. Each member of the International Association, on removing his domicile from one country to another, will receive the fraternal support of the Associated Working Men.

11. While united in a perpetual bond of fraternal cooperation, the working men's societies joining the International Association will preserve their existent organizations intact.

12. The present rules may be revised by each Congress, provided that two-thirds of the delegates present are in favor of such revision.

13. Everything not provided for in the present rules will be supplied by special regulations, subject to the revision of every Congress.

APPENDIX B
THE 21 CONDITIONS³⁸⁵

The Second Congress of the Communist International puts forward the following conditions of adherence to the Communist International:

1. All propaganda and agitation must be a genuinely Communist character and in conformity with the program and decisions of the Communist International. The entire Party press must be run by reliable Communists who have proved their devotion to the cause of the proletariat. The dictatorship of the proletariat is to be treated not simply as a current formula learnt by rote; it must be advocated in a way which makes its necessity comprehensible to every ordinary working man and woman, every soldier and peasant, from the facts of their daily life, which must be systematically noted in our press and made use of every day.

The periodical press and other publications, and all Party publishing houses, must be completely subordinated to the Party Presidium, regardless of whether the Party as a whole is at the given moment legal or illegal. Publishing houses must not be allowed to abuse their independence and pursue a policy which is not wholly in accordance with the policy of the Party.

³⁸⁵ Günther Nollau, International Communism and World Revolution (New York, 1961), p. 337-344.

In the columns of the press, at popular meetings, in the trade unions and cooperatives, wherever the adherents of the Communist International have an entry, it is necessary to denounce systematically and unrelentingly, not only the bourgeoisie, but also their assistants, the reformists of all shades.

2. Every organization which wishes to join the Communist International must, in an orderly and planned fashion, remove reformists and centrists from all responsible positions in the workers' movement (party organizations, editorial boards, trade unions, parliamentary factions, cooperatives, local government bodies) and replace them by tried Communists, even if, particularly at the beginning, "experienced" opportunists have to be replaced by ordinary rank-and-file workers.

3. In practically every country of Europe and America the class struggle is entering the phase of civil war. In these circumstances Communists can have no confidence in bourgeois legality. They are obliged everywhere to create a parallel illegal organization which at the decisive moment will help the Party to do its duty to the revolution. In all those countries where, because of a state of siege or of emergency laws, Communists are unable to do all their work legally, it is absolutely essential to combine legal and illegal work.

4. The obligation to spread Communist ideas includes the special obligation to carry on systematic and energetic propaganda in the Army. Where such agitation is prevented

by emergency laws, it must be carried on illegally. Refusal to undertake such work would be tantamount to a dereliction of revolutionary duty and is incompatible with membership of the Communist International.

5. Systematic and well-planned agitation must be carried on in the countryside. The working class cannot consolidate its victory if it has not by its policy assured itself of the support of at least part of the rural proletariat and the poorest peasants, and of the neutrality of part of the rest of the rural population. At the present time Communist work in rural areas is acquiring first-rate importance. It should be conducted primarily with the help of revolutionary Communist urban and rural workers who have close connections with the countryside. To neglect this work, or to leave it in unreliable semi-reformist hands, is tantamount to renouncing the proletarian revolution.

6. Every party which wishes to join the Communist International is obliged to expose not only avowed social-patriotism, but also the insincerity and hypocrisy of social-pacifism; to bring home to the workers systematically that without the revolutionary overthrow of capitalism no international court of arbitration, no agreement to limit armaments, no "democratic" reorganization of the League of Nations, will be able to prevent new imperialist wars.

7. Parties which wish to join the Communist International are obliged to recognize the necessity for a complete and absolute break with reformism and with the policy of the

"Centre," and to advocate this break as widely as possible among their members. Without that, no consistent Communist policy is possible.

The Communist International demands unconditionally and categorically that this break be effected as quickly as possible. The Communist International is unable to agree that notorious opportunists, such as Turati Modigliani, Kautsky, Hilferding, Hilquit, Longguet, MacDonald, etc., shall have the right to appear as members of the Communist International. That could only lead to the Communist International becoming in many respects similar to the Second International, which has gone to pieces.

8. A particularly explicit and clear attitude on the question of the colonies and the oppressed peoples is necessary for the parties in those countries where the bourgeoisie possess colonies and oppress other nations. Every party which wishes to join the Communist International is obliged to expose the tricks and dodges of "its" imperialists in the colonies, to support every colonial liberation movement not merely in words but in deeds, to demand the expulsion of their own imperialists from these colonies, to inculcate among the workers of their country a genuinely fraternal attitude to the working people of the colonies and the oppressed nations, and to carry on systematic agitation among the troops of their country against any oppression of the colonial peoples.

9. Every party which wishes to join the Communist International must carry on systematic and persistent Communist

activity inside the trade unions, the workers' councils and factory committees, the cooperatives, and other mass workers' organizations. Within these organizations Communist cells must be organized which shall by persistent and unflagging work win the trade unions, etc., for the Communist cause. In their daily work the cells must everywhere expose the treachery of the social-patriots and the instability of the "centre." The Communist cells must be completely subordinate to the Party as a whole.

10. Every party belonging to the Communist International is obliged to wage an unyielding struggle against the Amsterdam "International" of the yellow trade unions. It must conduct the most vigorous propaganda among trade unionists for the necessity of a break with the yellow Amsterdam International. It must do all it can to support the international association of red trade unions, adhering to the Communist International, which is being formed.

11. Parties which wish to join the Communist International are obliged to review the personnel of their parliamentary factions not only verbally but in fact subordinate to the Party Presidium, requiring of each individual Communist member of parliament that he subordinate his entire activity to the interests of genuinely revolutionary propaganda and agitation.

12. Parties belonging to the Communist International must be based on the principle of democratic centralism. In the present epoch of acute civil war the Communist Party will be able to fulfill its duty only if its organization is as

centralized as possible, if iron discipline prevails, and if the Party center, upheld by the confidence of the Party membership, has strength and authority and is equipped with the most comprehensive powers.

13. Communist parties in those countries where Communists carry on their work legally must from time to time undertake cleansing (re-registration) of the membership of the Party in order to get rid of any petty bourgeois elements which have crept in.

14. Every party which wishes to join the Communist International is obliged to give unconditional support to any Soviet republic in its struggle against counter-revolutionary forces. Communist parties must carry on unambiguous propaganda to prevent the dispatch of munitions transports to the enemies of the Soviet republics; they must also carry on propaganda by every means, legal or illegal, among the troops sent to strangle workers' republics.

15. Parties which still retain their old social-democratic programs are obliged to revise them as quickly as possible, and to draw up, in accordance with the special conditions of their country, a new Communist program in conformity with the decisions of the Communist International. As a rule, the program of every party belonging to the Communist International must be ratified by the regular Congress of the Communist International or by the Executive Committee. Should the program of a party not be ratified by the ECCI, the party concerned has the right to appeal to the Congress of the Communist International.

16. All the decisions of the Congresses of the Communist International, as well as the decisions of its Executive Committee, are binding on all parties belonging to the Communist International. The Communist International, working in conditions of acute civil war, must be far more centralized in its structure than was the Second International. Consideration must of course be given by the Communist International and its Executive Committee in all their activities to the varying conditions in which the individual parties have to fight and work, and they must take decisions of general validity only when such decisions are possible.

17. In this connection, all parties which wish to join the Communist International must change their names. Every party which wishes to join the Communist International must be called: Communist party of such and such a country (section of the Communist International). This question of name is not merely a formal matter, but essentially a political question of great importance. The Communist International has declared war on the entire bourgeois world and on all yellow social-democratic parties. The difference between the Communist parties and the old official "social-democratic" or "socialist" parties, which have betrayed the banner of the working class, must be brought home to every ordinary worker.

18. All leading Party press organs in all countries are obliged to publish all important official documents of the Executive Committee of the Communist International.

19. All parties belonging to the Communist International, and those which have applied for admission, are obliged to convene an extraordinary Congress as soon as possible, and in any case not later than four months after the 2nd Congress of the Communist International, to examine all these conditions of admission. In this connection, all party centers must see that the decisions of the 2nd Congress of the Communist International are made known to all local organizations.

20. Those parties which now wish to join the Communist International, but which have not radically changed their former tactics, must see to it that, before entering the Communist International not less than two-thirds of the members of their central committee and of all their leading central bodies consist of comrades who publicly and unambiguously advocated the entry of their party into the Communist International before its 2nd Congress. Exceptions can be made with the consent of the Executive Committee of the Communist International. The ECCI also has the right to make exceptions in the case of representatives of the center mentioned in paragraph 7.

21. Those members of the party who reject in principle the conditions and these put forward by the Communist International are to be expelled from the Party.

The same applies in particular to delegates to the extraordinary Congresses.

APPENDIX C

PCI PARTICIPATION IN THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT

<u>Premier</u>	<u>Period</u>
Parri	June 1945 - December 1945
De Gaspari	December 1945 - July 1946
De Gaspari	July 1946 - January 1947
De Gaspari	February 1947 - May 1947

APPENDIX D

CONGRESSES OF THE ITALIAN COMMUNIST PARTY

<u>Congress</u>	<u>Date</u>	<u>Place</u>
First	January 1921	Livorno
Second	March 1922	Rome
Third	January 1926	Lyon
Fourth	March-April 1931	Cologne-Dusseldorf
Fifth	December 1945 - January 1946	Rome
Sixth	January 1948	Milan
Seventh	April 1951	Rome
Eighth	December 1946	Rome
Ninth	January-February 1960	Rome
Tenth	December 1962	Rome
Eleventh	January 1966	Rome
Twelfth	February 1969	Rome
Thirteenth	March 1972	Milan
Fourteenth	March 1975	Rome

APPENDIX E
POST-WAR PARTY MEMBERSHIP

<u>Year</u>	<u>Membership</u>
1945	1,770,896
1947	2,252,000
1948	2,115,231
1949	2,242,719
1950	2,352,625
1951	2,112,000
1952	2,059,000
1955	2,145,317
1956	2,035,353
1957	1,818,156
1959	1,787,338
1960	1,792,974
1961	1,728,620
1962	1,630,550
1963	1,675,112
1965	1,615,296
1966	1,575,972
1967	1,534,000
1968	1,531,000
1969	1,503,181
1970	1,507,047
1971	1,520,974
1972	1,584,659
1973	1,613,525
1974	1,657,815
1975	1,702,565

Note: Statistics compiled from numerous sources which often-times were conflicting. Statistics should be viewed as being approximate.

APPENDIX F
PCI ELECTION RESULTS³⁸⁶

<u>Year</u>	<u>Number of Votes</u>	<u>Percent</u>	<u>Seats</u>	<u>Percent</u>
1921	304,719	4.6	35	6.5
1946	4,358,243	18.9	104	18.7
1948	5,000,000	19.0	131	22.8
(w/PSI) 1948	8,173,305	31.0	183	31.9
1953	6,121,922	22.6	143	24.2
1958	6,704,454	22.7	140	23.5
1963	7,768,228	25.3	166	26.3
1968	8,557,404	26.9	170	28.1
1972	9,085,927	27.2	179	28.4
1976	N/A	34.4	228	36.2

³⁸⁶ Mackie, Thomas T. and Richard Rose. The International Almanac of Electoral History. New York: The Free Press, 1974. Also references checked with FIBS.

APPENDIX G

PCI LEADERSHIP*

On 11 April 1975 the CC (Central Committee) and the CCC (Central Control Commission) of the PCI (Italian Communist Party) unanimously approved the following key positions for the party working sections, publications and commissions; organization (Gianni Cervetti); administration (Guido Cappelloni); party training (Gastone Gensini); labor (Giorgio Napolitano); programs and reforms (Luciano Barca); agriculture (Emanuele Macaluso); middle classes and economic association (Rodolfo Mechini); southern Italy (Pio La Torre); emigration (Guiliano Pajetta); press and propaganda (Paolo Bufalini); RAI-TV (Carlo Galluzzi); culture (Aldo Tortorella); schools advisory board (Guiseppe Chiarante); mass cultural activities (Dario Valori); regional and local government (Armando Cosutta); women's affairs (Adriana Seroni); foreign affairs (Sergio Segre); L'UNITA [central organ of the PCI] chief editor, Luca Pavolini; co-editor, responsible for Milan edition, Claudio Petruccioli; RINASCITA [theoretical weekly] chief editor, Aldredo Reichlin; co-editor, Romano Ledda; CRITICA MARXISTA [bi-monthly journal] chief editor, Emilio Sereni.

In addition, the CC and the CCC made the following presidential assignments: Center for Economic Policy Studies

* FBIS, No. 87, Supp. 8 (5 May 1975), p. 3-5, and FBIS, No. 208 (27 October 1976), p. L-11.

(Giorgio Amendola); Center for State Reform Studies (Pietro Ingrao); International Policy Commission (Gian Carlo Pajetta).

Paolo Bufalini, Gerardo Chiaromonte and Giovanni Cervetti, have not been assigned any section responsibilities, but are engaged in general functions of the Secretariat. Responsibility for the coordination of the party's work in economic and social affairs was assigned to Giorgio Napolitano.

The following presidents of the five commissions of the CC were also nominated:

Commission I--foreign policy; relations with communist labor parties, and with liberation movements; emigration; Tullio Vecchiatti;

Commission II--democratic institutions and Parliament; Umberto Terracini;

Commission III--economic and social affairs: Vincenzo Galetti;

Commission IV--press and propaganda, ideological and cultural activities: Renato Zangheri;

Commission V--organization and party life: Alessio Pasquini.

Central Committee

Longo, Luigi	Fanti, Guido	Pecchioli, Ugo
Berlinguer, Enrico	Fanto, Vincenzo	Peggio, Eugenio
Aito, Vincenzo	Ferrara, Maurizio	Perna, Edoardo
Alinovi, Abdon	Ferri, Franco	Petroselli, Luigi
Ambrogio, Franco	Fibbi, Guilietta	Petrucchioli, Claudio
Amendola, Giorgio	Fieschi, Umberto	Pieralli, Piero
Andriani, Silvano	Gabbuggiani, Elio	Pierino, Guiseppe

Angelin, Gastone	Galetti, Vincenzo	Poli, Giangaetano
Ariemma, Iginio	Galli, Gino	Pollidoro, Carlo
Badaloni, Nicola	Galluzzi, Carlo	Prisco, Franca
Barbieri, Alfredo	Geremicca, Andrea	Quercini, Guilio
Barca, Luciano	Giacche, Aldo	Quercioli, Elio
Bassolino, Antonio	Giadresco, Gianni	Raggio, Andrea
Bastianelli, Renato	Gouthier, Anselmo	Ragionieri, Ernesto
Battistello, Liliana	Gravano, Domencio	Raparelli, Franco
Belardi, Erias	Gruppi, Luciano	Reccia, Antonio
Bernardi, Antonio	Guasso, Athos	Reichlin, Alfredo
Berlinguer, Giovanni	Guerzoni, Luciano	Rinaldi, Alfonsina
Bertani, Eletta	Guttuso, Renato	Roasio, Antonio
Biasutti, Umberto	Ingrao, Pietro	Rodano Cinciari, Marisa
Birardi, Mario	Imbeni, Renzo	Romeo, Antonio
Boldrini, Arrigo	Jotti, Leonide	Rondine, Carlo
Bonistalli, Alvaro	Latanza, Cosimo	Rotella, Nestore
Borghini, Gianfranco	La Torre, Pio	Rubbi, Antonio
Bufalini, Paolo	Ledda, Romano	Russo, Michelangelo
Bussotti, Luciano	Libertini, Lucio	Sabadini Edi, Dante
Cannata, Guiseppe	Li Causi, Girolamo	Salvietti, Gabriella
Cappelloni, Guido	Li Vigni, Mario	Sandirocco, Luigi
Cardia, Umberto	Lombardo Radice, Lucio	Sanna, Anna
Carmeno, Pietro	Luporini, Cesare	Schettini, Giacomo
Carnieri, Claudio	Macaluso, Emanuele	Segre, Sergio
Carossino, Angelo	Mafai, Simona	Sereni, Emilio
Castagna, Augusto	Manfredini, Willer	Seroni, Andriana
Cavina, Sergio	Marazzi, Francesca	Serri, Rino

Cecchi, Alberto	Margheri, Andrea	Sicolo, Tommaso
Ceravolo, Domenico	Mari, Alga	Sintini, Lorenzo
Ceredi, Giorgio	Marzoli, Miliana	Spagnoli, Ugo
Cerroni, Umberto	Massolo, Oreste	Spriano, Paolo
Cervetti, Giovanni	Mazzarello, Graziano	Stefanini, Marcello
Chiarante, Guiseppe	Mechini, Rodolfo	Tato, Antonio
Chiaromonte, Gerardo	Miana, Silvio	Tedesco, Giglia
Ciofi, Paolo	Micaelli, Emilio	Terracini, Umberto
Colajanni, Napoleone	Milani, Armelino	Terzi, Riccardo
Conti, Pietro	Minucci, Adalberto	Torchio, Mirella
Corallo, Salvatore	Montessoro, Antonio	Torri, Gino
Cosenza, Saul	Napolitano, Giorgio	Tortorella, Aldo
Cossutta, Armando	Natta, Alessandro	Trebbi, Ivonne
Cuffaro, Antonio	Nono, Luigi	Trivelli, Renzo
D'Alema, Giuseppe	Occhetto, Achille	Trupia, Lalla
DaPonte, Rosa	Oliva, Angelo	Vacca, Giuseppe
DeFelice, Giuseppe	Olivi, Mauro	Valenza, Pietro
Degli Abbati A., Maria	Pajetta, Gian Carlo	Valori, Dario
DePasquale, Pancrazio	Pajetta, Giuliano	Varnier, Giuliano
DiGiovanni, Arnaldo	Parisi, Giovanni	Vecchietti, Tullio
DiGiulio, Fernando	Pascolat, Renzo	Verdini, Claudio
DiPaco, Nella	Pasquali, Anita	Vianello, Elio
Dosio, Andrea	Pasquini, Alessia	Vidali, Vittorio
Elmi, Marino	Passigli, Marisa	Vizzini, Gioacchino
Esposito, Attilio	Pavolini, Luca	Zangheri, Renato

Central Control Commission

Colombi, Arturo	Grassucci, Lelio	Scardaoni, Umberto
Antelli, Franco	Janni, Guido	Terenzi, Amerigo
Atzeni, Licio	Landini, Goffredo	Tognoni, Mauro
Bardelli, Mario	Mannino, Antonio	Treccani, Ernesto
Bertini, Bruno	Marangoni, Spartaco	Valente, Giuliana
Bollini, Rodolfo	Massola, Umberto	Valenzi, Maurizio
Cacciapuoti, Salvatore	Milani, Giorgio	Sclavo, Bruno
Cecati, Vittorio	Modica, Enzo	Sanlorenzo, Dina
Ceravolo, Sergio	Mola, Antonio	Sanna, Carlo
Ciofi, Luigi	Mombello, Giacomo	Rossi, Tommaso
Colajanni, Pompeo	Morandi, Arrigo	Rossi, Raffaele
Conte, Luigi	Novelli, Diego	Rossetti, Giorgio
Cremascoli, Guido	Ognibene, Renato	Ravera, Camilla
Damico, Vito	Papalia, Antonio	Gensini, Gastone
D'Attorre, Piero	Papapietro, Giovanni	Fredduzzi, Cesare
DiMarino, Gaetano	Pellegrini, Giacomo	Franco, Pasquale
Diotallelevi, Dino	Peruzzi, Silvano	Farneti, Ariella
Donini, Ambrogio		Facchini, Adolfo

Central Auditing Committee

Barontini, Anelito	Bramhilla, Giovanni	Passoni, Luigi
Bosi, Ilio	Casalino, Giorgio	Schiapparelli, Stefano

Directorate

Longo, Luigi	DiGiulio, Fernando	Pecchioli, Ugo
Berlinguer, Enrico	Fanti, Guido	Perna, Edoardo
Alinovi, Abdon	Galluzzi, Carlo	Petroselli, Luigi

Amendola, Giorgio	Ingrao, Pietro	Quercioli, Elio
Barca, Luciano	Jotti, Leonilde	Reichlin, Alfredo
Bufalini, Paolo	Macaluso, Emanuele	Seroni, Adriana
Carossino, Angelo	Minucci, Adalberto	Serri, Rino
Chiaromonte, Gerardo	Napolitano, Giorgio	Terracini, Umberto
Colombi, Arturo	Natta, Alessandro	Tortorella, Aldo
Conti, Pietro	Occhetto, Achille	Valori, Dario
Cossutta, Armando	Pajetta, Gian Carlo	Vecchiatti, Tullio
Cervetti, Gianni	Borghini, Gian Franco	Trivelli, Renzo

Secretariat

Berlinguer, Enrico	Chiaromonte, Gerardo	Birardi, Mario
Bufalini, Paolo	Napolitano, Giorgio	Gouthier, Anselmo
Cervetti, Giovanni	Pajetta, Gian Carlo	

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